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This thesis explores the dependency between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
government funding in the form of grants. It utilizes a case study approach and an interpretive 
analysis of NGO operations based on a theoretical framework that operates at the intersection of 
three literature domains: systems theory, community sector, and public administration. Because 
of the gaps in our theoretical understanding of NGO operations, a parsimonious scaffolding built 
by system dynamics will help illustrate the multiple frames which the stakeholders perceive they 
operate under, the patterned behaviour inherent in the grants system, and the complexity issues 
involved in such a system. 
In the past three decades, the number ofNGOs has increased dramatically. Internationally 
operating NGOs now number about 40,000 (Leverty, 2014: para. 5). As of 2009, Australia had 
approximately 700,000 NGOs; in 2006/7, Australia's top 41,000 nonprofits employed 890,000 
people or 8.6% of employed Australians according to Lyons (2009: 1-2). As of 2008, Russia had 
about 277,000 ( although this figure is a decrease from a high of 650,000 in the early years of 
President Putin's first term) according to Rodriguez (2008: para. 5). As of 2012, the United 
States has an estimated 1.5 million NGOs operating in that country (U.S. Department of State 
Fact Sheet, 2012: 2). As of2009 (the last year NGOs were accounted for there), India had 
around 3.3 million, which is "one NGO for less than 400 Indians" according to Shukla (2010: 
para. 1). Although NGOs have a variety of fundraising sources (e.g., canvassing/face-to-face 
solicitation, media advertisement, mail-outs, membership, merchandise sales, online donations, 
special events, private funding through investments and corporate grants, grants from trusts and 
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foundations, etc.), it is government funding through grants that in general is their major source of 
considerable funds. 
Prior research into NGOs has been rather limited and has generally focused on their legal status, 
societal role, and funding sources, and to a lesser extent on the applicability of some 
organisational theories in a nonprofit environment. However, it is the contention of this research 
effort that these organizations and the systems they are imbedded in have evolved into such 
complex entities that existing theoretical models which tend to view these entities under a single 
paradigmatic lens are no longer sufficient. These models lack explanatory power in their ability 
to explain not only the workings of the entities but also the unintended consequences of their 
operations. 
This study attempts to investigate these unintended consequences brought about by complexity 
and to highlight them through a systems theory framework as a result of exploratory case study 
research. This investigation is framed by the following overarching research question: 
Research Topic: How do government grant recipients in Tasmania 
manage the complexity of the public sector grants system? 
and the following specific research questions: 
Research Question One: Are there any system archetypes noticeable in 
the public sector grants system? 
Research Question Two: Is the complexity of the public sector grants 
s_vstem increasing, and if so, why? 
This study was primarily informed by systems theory and utilized various theories surrounding 
the issue of complexity to illustrate key issues and themes. NVivo, a qualitative data analysis 
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software program, was used to undertake an analysis of interviews with key NGO personnel 
regarding their perspectives on funding and operations. This study identifies several "systems 
archetypes" of unintended consequences in the Tasmanian public sector grants system due to the 
zero-sum nature of government grants funding and attempts to display them in a systems model. 
This study's findings call for a synthesis of the existing literature and the use of a multiple 
theoretical lens to cast further light into the complex problem of public policy allocations and the 
wider issue of social well-being. It also points out adjunct areas ripe for future research which 
include: resource allocation under scarce conditions, complex problems and multi-optimal 
decision making, interactional complexity and system "fragility," funding management in 
relation to organisational complexity, the social management of public attention in regard to 
complex problems, and social well-being. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS* 
Balancing Process 
Combined with reinforcing loops, balancing processes form the building blocks of 
dynamic systems. Balancing processes seek equilibrium: They try to bring things to a 
desired state and keep them there. They also limit and constrain change generated by 
reinforcing processes. A balancing loop in a causal loop diagram depicts a balancing 
process (page 127). 
Causal Loop Diagram 
A causal loop diagram (CLD) is one of the tools of systems thinking. Causal loop 
diagrams capture how variables in a system are interrelated. A CLD take the form of a 
closed loop that depicts cause-and-effect linkages (127). 
Feedback 
The return of information about the status of a process. Example: annual performance 
reviews return information to an employee about the quality of his or her work (127). 
Reinforcing Process 
System 
Along with balancing loops, reinforcing loops form the building blocks of dynamic 
systems. Reinforcing processes compound change in one direction with even more 
change in that same direction. As such, they generate both growth and collapse. A 
reinforcing loop in a causal loop diagram depicts a reinforcing process. Also known 
as vicious cycles or virtuous cycles (129). 
A group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex 
whole. Almost always defined with respect to a specific purpose within a larger 
system. Example: An R&D department is a system that has a purpose in the context 
of the larger organization ( 130). 
Systems Archetypes 
One of the tools of systems thinking. Systems archetypes are the "classic stories" in 
systems thinking-common patterns and structures that occur repeatedly in different 
settings (130). 
* All terms taken verbatim from: Anderson, V. and Johnson, L. 1997. Systems thinking basics: From 





This thesis was started contemporarily with the opening of the first-ever Collective 
Impact conference in Sydney, Australia in February 2014. Hosted by The Centre for Social 
Impact, Social Leadership Australia, and StartSomeGood, the conference gathered a "range 
of players from across the government, not-for-profit, philanthropy and business sectors to 
develop the skills they need to collaborate effectively" (Centre for Social Impact, 2014b: 
para. 1 ). The conference focused on large-scale social change by encouraging participants to 
move away from their highly "siloed" sectors where other organisations are seen as 
competitors, decisions are made based on the anecdotal success of small-sample programs, 
and their sectors Jack common metrics (Mitchell, 2014). 
The Collective Impact collaborative network approach grew out of research into the 
welfare system in the United States v.rhere clients often have multiple problems that require 
"the synchronous provision of a range of complementary services" (Centre for Social Impact, 
2014a: para. 4). Any social problems that are multifaceted are the target of this approach as 
in the example of the juvenile justice system in the U.S. where multiple client issues have to 
be tackled (e.g., education, poor housing, mental health, employment, etc.) for young people 
starting to encounter that system (Mitchell, 2014). However, the issues involved in the 
conference could apply to any sector where multiple organisations are trying to secure 
funding for inventing or implementing independent solutions to complex social problems. 
The Collective Impact approach is referenced in this research because it deliberately 
highlights a key component of the government grants system that will be explored herein. It 
holds that: 
The social sector is filled with examples of partnerships, networks, and 
other types of joint efforts ... but few were successful enough to effect 
complex solutions and sustainable change (Gibbs, 2014: 1). 
Complexity abounds throughout government grants systems. Government funding to 
a large extent seems to dictate the population of the social sector but also its organisational 
forms, operations, and networks of cooperation and competition. As there is no universally 
accepted way to study complexity, the researcher has selected systems theory as the means 
to come to grips with it and will use this approach in a metatheoretical way to describe 
various complexity issues using the relationship between Tasmanian1 NGOs and 
Government in the context of grant funding as a specific instance of a much larger research 
agenda. 
This chapter therefore highlights the three basic concepts that frame this research 
effort, namely: 
l _ Complexity (What is its nature and ramifications for organisations?) 
2. System Theory (How can we describe the structure of complexity?) 
3. Government Grants System (A particular case of a multitude of 
elements all affected by complexity at many levels.) 
This chapter will provide additional rationale for the research into the government grants 
system specifically, to present the research questions that framed the study and the empirical 
focus of the investigation, and to outline the structure of the thesis. 
1 Note: Tasmania is a state within the Federal system of Australia. 
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1.1 Rationale for the thesis 
In the context of public policy instruments, government grants2 (hereafter referred to 
as public sector grants) stand alone as an allocation category. Much more ad hoc and less 
structured than other instruments of government such as budgets and programs, grants are 
also distinctive in their ubiquity on a global basis and resource allocation levels. According 
to Dr. Andrew Young, of the approximately $250 billion budgeted yearly for social purposes 
in Australia, $30 billion is dispersed to nonprofit organisations via grants (Young, 2013 ). Of 
the $90 billion or so in annual income for nonprofits, approximately $45 billion comes from 
fees for services, $30 billion from government grants, $15 billion from fundraising, and $1.5 
billion from foundations and high net-worth individuals (Young, 2013). There are over 
60,000 charities and nonprofits registered in Australia by the Australian Charities and Not-
for-profits Commission (ACNC)-a $55 billion sector (Dingle, 2014). In Tasmania, about 
20% of its budget-$540 million per annum-is disbursed through grants. As of this writing, 
there are 500 Tasmanian charities and nonprofits registered in the ACNC public registry (see 
the following website: http://wv.rw.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/FindCharity). However, there is a 
dearth of academic literature regarding almost all features of their funding, including the 
allocational efficiency and effectiveness of grants in terms of the programs they ultimately 
fund. Indeed, Wilsker (2011) in her thesis on grant funding could point to only a single 
study of the "detenninants of government funding at the organizational level" (13). While 
there are extensive subsections of literature covering broader government/NGO relations 
2 Note: The Commonwealth of Australia is a federal constitutional monarchy under a parliamentary democracy 
with three levels of government--Federal, State, and Local (Council). Various agencies compete for grants from 
each level of government in order to provide social, economic and environmental support and services. This 
thesis is primarily concerned with the grants system at the State level. 
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(frequently highlighted in publications such as Productivity Commission rcports--see for 
example "Charitable organisations in Australia" ( 1995), "Contribution of the Not for Profit 
Sector" (2010), and the "Improving the evidence base for the 'not-for-profit sector"' material 
in Chapter 1 of its Annual Report 2009-10 (20 I 0)) and much written about topics of mutual 
concern such as community engagement, accountability, and issue-based topics such aged 
care or home-based care (see for example the Department of Premier and 
Cabinet/Community Development Division's Consultation Paper, A Tasmanian Government 
Framework for Community Engagement (2013), the Tasmanian Council of Social Service's 
Interim Report "Making a difference-Towards an outcomes, performance and accountability 
framework/or Tasmanian community services" (2010), and the Productivity Commission's 
Inquiry Report, "Caring/or Older Australians" (2011)), this literature is not at an 
organizational level. 
Why then, in an era of evidence-based reasoning across multiple disciplines, is such 
an instrument still a favourite of governments worldwide for funding non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs)? Professor David Adams (2010, pers. comm., 6 May) postulates the 
following reasons for their continued use: 
• The scale of the social problem does not justify a government 
program. 
• Government cannot or does not want to address the social problem 
by other means at a certain point in time. 
• Their transaction costs are lower than that of government programs. 
• They are useful for pilot or incubation work. 
• They encourage creativity outside of fixed programs. 
• They are a safety valve to deal with social pressure points. 
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• They are "speedy". 
• They are usually short-term and one-off versus a recurrent 
commitment. 
• They enable political decisions outside of normal channels. 
• They can be used as a political "award" mechanism. 
As an entry point into the subject, Professor Adams first suggested investigation of 
the Tasmanian Community Grants Program which at that time was being reviewed by the 
state government for a possible merger between its two funds-the Community Support 
Levy and the Tasmanian Community Fund-under an independent body. It was through this 
research that the sometimes paradoxical nature of government grants was encountered as one 
part of this Grants Program was used by the Tasmanian government in part to offset 
concerns about community gambling (gaming operators within a Tasmanian hotel or club 
must pay 4% of gross profits from gaming machines to the Community Support Levy-50% 
of the Levy's distribution involves issues of problem gambling). [Note: The Board of the 
Tasmanian Community Fund (used to provide grants to nonprofits) was recently scrapped by 
the new state government (Smith, 2014: para. 9).] The research effort quickly broadened out 
to encompass the entire local grants system and the stakeholder perceptions of it. 
Understanding the public sector grants "system" ( or set of interrelated parts-see Glossary 
of Terms) ultimately required an investigation into the perceived complexity of the system 
by its key stakeholders. 
Because of the deficiencies in past research efforts in dealing with how the 
stakeholders of such a highly contested system respond to one another and adapt to changes 
in the system, it is hoped that this work can help explicate and model some of the key public 
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sector grants system elements. Also, it is assumed that work in this area will help to 
eventually provide a foundation case for the development of some new measure of "well-
being" from a multidimensional perspective, possibly utilizing multiple criteria decision 
making that deals with resource allocation under scarcity and using concepts at the 
intersection of multi-objective optimization, welfare economics, social justice, and social 
inclusion. This in tum would contribute both to public management and public policy 
research efforts in each of these areas. 
Three major factors help explain the need for such a study at this time. First is the 
Australian Commission of Audit's very recent suggestion that "significant changes are 
needed to the implementation of some 500 government grants" according to a recent radio 
broadcast (Aly and Huntley, 2014) which featured the former Secretary of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Terry Moran. During this broadcast, Mr. Moran addressed this 
point in relation to the inevitability of cuts to public service jobs: 
So I think those things can be done without cutting programs, but there 
are these hundreds of discretionary grants programs that sprinkle 
programmatic confetti all over the country and account for thousands of 
people in Canberra and are hugely expensive to administer, and as the 
Commission rightly says that they should be rationalized-that too 
would mean that public service jobs over time would be reduced (Aly 
and Huntley, 2014 ). 
Second is a movement sweeping multiple countries that has governments downsizing 
their direct efforts in public sector social welfare programs in favour of transferring these 
responsibilities to NGOs. Since government/NGO relationships are ubiquitous across the 
public sector grants systems of multiple countries, these relationships are set to be one of the 
prime areas of research in the near future into the ongoing phenomenon of public policy 
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implementation by nonprofits. Thus, this interface is the starting point for the current 
research. 
Third is the perspective from within the community sector that grants play such an 
important role in almost every aspect of their operation. The interplay between key areas of 
concern within an NGO ( e.g., client selection, mission, organisational reputation, retention, 
morale, service quality, etc.) all seem to point back to funding as a major factor that appears 
intimately tied in with the concept of organisational complexity. Thus, it is the matter of 
complexity and funding dynamics that the community sector needs to address in order to 
better understand complexity's effects on all of its other aforementioned concerns. 
1.2 Research opportunity and research questions 
The Tasmanian government grants system is the research focus of this thesis. 
Systems theory informed by issues concerned with the concept of complexity is the vehicle 
which led the researcher to a research topic which is presented here in the form of an 
overarching research question: 
Research Topic: How do government grant recipients in Tasmania 
manage the complexity of the public sector grants system? 
This topic was then further refined into two specific research questions: 
Research Question One: Are there any system archetypes noticeable in 
the public sector grants system? 
Research Question Two: Is the complexity of the public sector grants 
system increasing, and ifso, v,;hy? 
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In order to answer Research Question One from an operational perspective, the study 
will seek out any systems archetypes (i.e., patterned behaviour-see Glossary of Terms) 
which present themselves in the case analysis and try to highlight any unintended 
consequences or "push back" exhibited by stakeholders. It will also try to discover if the 
perceptions of stakeholders have changed over time. To answer Research Question Two, the 
study seeks to delve into aspects of transactional cost issues for both the government and 
NGOs. A qualitative approach to these research questions is taken because the research 
design met the guidelines of that approach as outlined by Creswell (2007) with its goal being 
a "holistic" sketch of the "larger picture that emerges" of the issue under study (Creswell, 
2007: 39). A case study methodology was selected to address these research questions for 
two reasons: 1) case studies are selective and focus on" ... one or two issues that are 
fundamental to understanding the system being examined" (Tellis, 1997: 2), and 2) case 
studies are analyses built on multiple perspectives which is quite relevant on a research stage 
so populated by a variety of independent actors: 
This means that the research considers not just the voice and perspec-
tive of the actors, but also of the relevant group of actors and the 
interaction between them. This one aspect is a salient point in the 
characteristic that case studies possess (Tellis, 1997: 2). 
1.3 Research focus of the thesis 
In order to understand the data and to place it within a theoretical framework that 
could be approached from a multitude of perspectives, systems theory with a particular focus 
on the issue of complexity was applied in this thesis. The data for this thesis was mainly 
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derived from interviews of high (CEO) and grant officer level executives of Tasmanian 
NGOs which are members of the Tasmanian Council of Social Service (TasCOSS)-the peak 
body for the community services sector in Tasmania. It was determined that officers at these 
two levels were best able from the NGO point-of-view to give a systems-wide perspective of 
their interactions with other stakeholders in the public grants sector. Since there is little 
available literature on public sector grants systems in general and their stakeholder 
perceptions of the complexity of such systems specifically, this thesis could be regarded as a 
ground level contribution to the understanding of such complex systems. 
It is intended that by starting the process of formulating a systems theory-oriented 
view of the public sector grants system from the perceptions of major stakeholders in the 
local arena, a more generalizable framework can be derived and research propositions for 
follow-up investigations can be generated from this framework. However, due to the nature 
of case study research, the question remains open as to whether: 1) all other Tasmanian 
NGOs regardless of classification and scale of operations interact with this particular grants 
system in the same way as those described herein, and 2) whether all public sector grants 
systems in other domains share enough of the features of the local system such that the 
suggested framework would be immediately familiar to them. Furthermore, an extension of 
the framework into any domain that has government funding and stakeholders playing a zero-
sum game of funding is also problematic but is it anticipated that the exploratory research 
insights herein can help form the basis for such future public policy research efforts. 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Six chapters provide the details of this study and its findings. Chapter One has 
explained the rationale for the study in its observation of the under-researched nature of this 
important government instrument in relation to its stakeholders, the recent interest in new 
paradigms of government/NGO collaboration, and desire to understand the complexity issues 
that surround this topic. Chapter Two will establish the theoretical context of the study by 
examining and utilizing the literature from multiple disciplines. 
Chapter Three will detail the research design and methodology of this thesis. It 
includes the rationale for utilizing a qualitative approach and the analysis of the data gathered 
using qualitative analysis software. 
Chapter Four will outline the multi-pass coding approach undertook with the 
qualitative analysis software which resulted in a new conceptual systems model of the data. 
This chapter also includes selected interview text which will illustrate a number of findings 
about the local public sector grants systems model. 
Chapter Five will discuss the research findings and their implications for theory 
development and will also widen the discussion by exploring an extension of the research 
into other areas in an attempt to address the concept of social "well-being" from a 
multidimensional perspective. Chapter Six will highlight some of the study limitations and 
offer suggestions for further research. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has conveyed the rationale for exploring the public sector grants system 
of Tasmania. It has briefly described its empirical focus on its sample ofNGOs, and it 
explains the structure of the remaining sections of the thesis and how the findings will be 
presented. Chapter Two will primarily present the background literature on the three 
concepts that frame this study-complexity, systems theory, and (agents within) government 
grants systems-in order to lay the groundwork for the development of a theoretical 





There are a number of relevant bodies of literature which highlight theories on 
nonprofit organisations and their relation to public policy of which grants are a subset. 
However, as the researcher points out throughout this chapter, there is no consensus on which 
theories (if any) have universal applicability. To avoid slanting the study toward a particular 
theoretical orientation which has no research precedent for the Tasmanian grants system, a 
broad descriptive overview of the interactions between this local grants system (its supporting 
processes and personnel) and local nonprofits was called for in the initial identification of a 
culturally relevant theoretical framework. Systems theory was chosen to present those 
interactions in a theory-neutral manner and complexity theory allowed the researcher to 
highlight the intricacy of those interactions. Utilizing the perceptions of the study 
participants of the basic operating principles of the local grants system, the researcher in this 
way hopes to glean what theories might eventually be germane to this local grants system and 
whether these theories might be pertinent to more disparate grants systems found elsewhere. 
The precedent for the selection of systems theory as an overarching framework was found in 
many works across social science research, most notably that of Gabriele (2014) which also 
used this framework to explore organisational complexity issues, Leong and Leach (2008) 
which used systems theory to help understand which study factors were universal versus 
which were contextual, and Mayrhofer (2004) which describes "the openness for additional 
theories" which systems theory allows for when used as an overall framework (178). 
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This chapter uses five subsections to explicate the actors and issues involved in this 
research. Section 2.1 provides the rationale for viewing NGOs and Government as part of 
broader sector-based categories. Section 2.2 explores some interlinked issues regarding 
public policy, public administration and organisational theory. Section 2.3 looks at 
Government and its public policy role. Section 2.4 examines the choice of systems theory in 
greater depth, while Section 2.5 explains the differences between complex problems and 
other forms of complexity. An additional subsection, Section 2.6, briefly highlights the key 
sources used in this literature review and may serve as a guide to future researchers. 
2.1 Organisations by sector 
This study's principle agents are Tasmanian NGOs and its Government. These 
entities should be placed in some kind of conceptual taxonomy. One way to conceptualize 
the various actors in this study is to employ an adaptation of Keynes' widely-used three 
sector model which holds that from a macroeconomic perspective, each economy is 
dominated by a household sector, a business sector, and a government sector with the 
interplay of spending, investment, and monetary and fiscal policies which emanate from their 
respective sectors leading to aggregate joint effects (Keynes, 2009). Although there are some 
differences in the way governments differentiate membership in each sector, this formulation 
of economic agents into sectors remains a popular way to differentiate an economic system's 
stakeholders. Although households (families) are usually not referred to as a "numbered" 
sector in various economic models ( due to its composition of individuals rather than 
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organisations), the private sector (business) has generally become kno¥1n as the First Sector 
and the public sector (government) is usually designated as the Second Sector. More recently, 
two additional sectors-a social sector consisting of nonprofits ( also known as the Third 
Sector), and a social enterprise sector consisting of a collection of "hybrid" (Feiss, 2009: para. 
3) for-profit and nonprofit organisations (aka the Fourth Sector) are being added into this 
sector-based taxonomy. It is interesting to note that "the concept of nonprofit organizations 
as a unified and coherent sector dates back only to the 1970s" (Block, 2004, cited in Horton, 
2013) in part because traditional economic theories ignored nonprofits-taking the position 
that nonprofits were "outside" of rational economic approaches (Horton, 2013: 3). Also of 
note, some view the last sector category, the social enterprise sector, as still immature but a 
"radical innovation" (Dart, 2004: 411) that simply suffers from a current lack of widespread 
government recognition and support. Others (Evers, 1995 & Tvedt, 1998, both cited in Lewis, 
2007: 70; Dees and Anderson, 2003) view the entire sector-based approach as limited due to 
boundary issues between sectors. 
As this research is primarily focused on Australian organisations, the researcher notes 
that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) formally defines only the following sector 
groupings in its Glossary of Standard Economic Sector Classifications. These verbatim 
definitions from the ABS Glossary (2008) are as follows: 
1. Household: A group of persons who share the same living 
accommodation, who pool some, or all, of their income and wealth 
and who consume certain types of goods and services collectively, 
mainly housing and food (1 ). 
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2. Non-profit institution: A legal entity which: (1) is created for the 
purpose of producing goods and services, and; (2) whose articles of 
association prohibit it from being a source of income, profit or other 
financial gain to the units that establish, control or finance the legal 
entity (1 ). 
3. Private sector: The combination of the household sector, the NPISH 
[ non-profit institutions serving households] sector and all resident 
corporations and quasi-corporations not controlled by the general 
government sector (1 ). 
4. Public sector: The combination of the general government sector, 
and all resident corporations and quasi-corporations controlled by 
the general government sector ( 1 ). 
Operationally, there are differences between countries in how nonprofits come into 
being ( e.g., as incorporated or unincorporated organisations, as trusts, or as associations), in 
their operating domain ( e.g., federal or state incorporation) which affects their fundraising, 
and in their tax status. In Australia, there are four choices when founding a nonprofit-
becoming a "co-operative society, a company limited by guarantee, an incorporated 
association or society under the Associations Incorporation Act 1985, or an incorporated 
associated or council under the Commonwealth Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 
1976" (Our Community Matters, 2014: para. 3). A nonprofit in Australia that wishes to 
register as a charity must do so through the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission (ACNC), and those organisations that seek tax exemptions must go through the 
Australian Tax Office (ATO). 
Because they have been established with different purposes ( e.g., some focus on 
economic, environmental, political or social issues at local, national, or international levels) 
under different government systems across many cultures over several centuries, nonprofit 
organisations are known by different names throughout the world. Common nonprofit 
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terms include-association, charity, civil or Big Society organisations, cooperative, INGOs 
(international NGOs), intermediary, NFP (not-for-profit), NGO (non-governmental 
organisation), voluntary organisation, etc.-and often these terms overlap (Lewis, 2010: 
1056). Indeed, researchers in this area are often "beset by a bewildering set of tenns and 
acronyms" (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 7). 
Given the research focus on Australian NGOs, the literature review in this area 
concentrated mostly on the definition of an NGO, NGO history, and their place in the research 
literature of organisations. As to the first issue, there is no one definition of an NGO since 
delineating their boundaries has proved quite elusive (Grant, 2012; Minow, 2002). Lewis 
(2010) states the case this way: 
'NGO' as an analytical category remains complex and unclear. For 
example, despite the fact that NGOs are neither run by government, 
nor driven by the profit motive, there are nevertheless some NGOs 
that receive high levels of government funding, and others that seek 
to generate profits to plough back into their work. Boundaries are 
unclear, and as one might expect from a classification that 
emphasizes what they are not rather than what they are, NGOs 
therefore turn out to be quite difficult to pin down analytically. This 
has generated complex debates about what is and what is not an 
NGO, and about the most suitable approaches for analyzing their 
roles (1057). 
While certain dimensions ( e.g., legal, economic, or functional) have helped past researchers 
define NGOs, others (e.g., Salamon and Anheier, 1992, cited in Lewis, 2010: 1058) seek 
broader operational definitions based on more "holistic" organisational characteristics. As a 
point of self-orientation, the researcher primarily relied on the following definition by the 
United Nations as he found it to be one of the most comprehensive: 
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A non-governmental organization (NGO, also often referred to as 
'civil society organization' or CSO) is a not-for-profit group, 
principally independent from government, which is organized on a 
local, national or international level to address issues in support of 
the public good. Task-oriented and made up of people with a 
common interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and 
humanitarian functions, bring public concerns to governments, 
monitor policy and programme implementation, and encourage 
participation of civil society stakeholders at the community level. 
Some are organized around specific issues, such as human rights 
(United Nations, n.d.: para. 1). 
Although NGOs have "existed in some form or another as far back as 25,000 years 
ago" (NGO Handbook, 2008: para. 2), Levitt (2012) begins the more modem historical trace 
of NGOs through their early beginnings as voluntary associations in Britain "a thousand years 
ago" and through the charitable trusts established there in the sixteenth century (27). Also of 
note, humanitarian associations in China of the 13th century, in Amsterdam of the 18th century, 
and smallpox eradication-oriented "humane societies" in various countries of the early 19th 
century are also recognizable forbearers (Davies, 2013: para. 4). Some see NGO precursors 
rising "out of social movements"-from European immigrants in the United States banding 
together to form associations (New World Encyclopedia, n.d.: para. l 0) to Atlantic world anti-
slavery groups of the late 18th and early 191h centuries (Davies, 2013: para. 5) to anti-
establishment organisations in Italy and Sweden a century ago (New World Encyclopedia, 
n.d.: para. 10). In more modern times, NGOs were awarded consultative status with the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1947 "in accordance with Article 71 of the 
UN Charter" (United Nations, n.d.: para. 2). 
From that point, the reputation of NG Os moved from "relative obscurity during the 
1960s and 1970s to sudden prominence in the l 980s"-by the early 1990s, NGOs had "a 
central position in development policy and practice" (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 204). By the 
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1990s, the "dominant view ofNGOs was essentially one of heroic organizations seeking to 
'do good' in difficult circumstances" (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 19). However, according to 
Lewis and Kanji (2009), criticism ofNGOs has increased from agents across the political 
spectrum since then partly because their "novelty value" has worn off ( 19) and partly because 
"there are surprisingly few data available relating to the performance and effectiveness of 
NGOs in either development or emergency work" (20). 
The field of "nonprofit studies" really only began in earnest in the 1990s with two 
major research topic streams-those focusing on "the range of organizations which exist, 
their relationships to policy, and the organizational challenges they face," and those studying 
the differences in such organisations in developed versus developing countries (Lewis, 1999: 
7 4 ). However, the entire body of nonprofit literature suffers from some important limitations. 
Some of the most notable deficiencies are summarized below: 
1. There is a research bias toward the study of larger nonprofits: 
"Much of the third-sector research literature has so far focused on 
larger, bureaucratic forms of organization, such as international 
NGOs like Oxfam or Save the Children Fund, or welfare service 
agencies such as the YMCA. There has been much less emphasis on 
small-scale, local, or 'associational' forms of activity, particularly 
those concerned with 'self-help' and mutual support in membership 
organizations" (Lewis, 1999: 75). 
2. The field is dominated by Western models of organisation, culture, 
and associations: "The study of Western third-sector organizations, 
whether U.S. nonprofit organizations, U.K. voluntary agencies, or 
international development NGOs, brings with it a set of assumptions 
and biases rooted in the history, values, and cultures of the West" 
(Lewis, 1999: 75). 
3. Key research issues such as bureaucracy, development, and policy 
have been studied in siloed disciplines and only recently have 
interdisciplinary approaches by "economists, sociologists, political 
scientists, and anthropologists" for example been attempted (Lewis, 
2009: 3). 
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4. There are separate bodies of literature: For example, the literature 
on nonprofits and the literature on NGOs are "largely separate and 
relatively little referencing has taken place between them" (Lewis, 
2008: 4). In addition, there are "two 'parallel universes' of academic 
literature" on third sector organizations in developed countries and 
those in developing countries (Lewis, 2008: 10). 
5. Case studies on NGOs were "often undertaken by researchers 
working in 'consultancy' mode on behalf ofNGOs themselves or 
their donors and so sometimes [are] lacking in objectivity" (Lewis, 
2009: 3). 
6. NGOs still remain difficult to research: " ... many prefer to prioritize 
their day-to-day work rather than grant access to researchers" 
(Lewis, 2009, 3). Consequently, there is "little work which 
examines what actually goes on inside these organizations" (Lewis, 
2007: 198). 
To this list, the researcher would also add that there simply does not exist a consensus in the 
field as to the applicability of any particular organisational theory to nonprofit organisations. 
To that point, Lewis (2007) is quite explicit: " ... there is very little effort made to link the 
concerns of the third sector literature and the NGO literature around organization and 
management issues" (202). Lewis (2007) also pointed out that at that point in time one could 
utilize with confidence only some limited foundational work by some key researchers such as 
the sociologist Amitai Etzioni who explored "why people become involved in organisations, 
and the different kinds of power relationships which determine organisational forms" ( 67), 
and the work of marketing management researcher Theodore Levitt who helped lay the 
groundwork for understanding organisational differences and how those differences affect 
public policy (67). As third sector research widened from its early base of public 
administration researchers in the 1970s to management researchers in the 1990s and beyond, 
perhaps the only consensus that has been reached is that "third sector organizations differ 
from organizations in the public and private sectors because there is no clear link between the 
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providers of funds and the users of the services" (Lewis, 2007: 193). There have also been 
some good surveys, model-building, and research work done in the nonprofit field (mostly in 
the areas ofleadership, organisational change, and capacity building), but all in all, one can 
easily come away from a review of the field with the firm belief that we are still very much at 
the level of metaphor and the development of conceptual frameworks (Lewis, 2007). In part, 
this is due to the very nature of nonprofits which can be very difficult to pin down: 
For example, for radicals who seek to explore alternative visions of 
development and change, NGOs may be seen as progressive vehicles 
for change. For conservative thinkers seeking private alternatives to the 
state, NGOs may be regarded as part of market-based solutions to 
policy problems (Lewis, 2010: 1057). 
Perhaps this is why Lewis (2010) goes so far as to view NGOs as a sort of "tabula rasa, onto 
which a range of current ideas, expectations, and anxieties about social transformation are 
projected" ( 1057). 
Perhaps most disturbing in the context of this research is the general lack of research 
in the wider third sector literature on the efficacy and efficiency of nonprofits, which is 
surprising due to the heavy reliance on NFPs as "deliverers of government funded services" 
according to a 20 IO Productivity Commission report. Nonprofits account for about 50% of 
social services in the United States (Salamon, 1990, cited in Payne, 1998); in Australia, the 
nonprofit sector "employs more than one million Australians-eight per cent of the 
workforce-and has an aimual turnover of around $100 billion" (Stewart, 2014: 39). In the 
Productivity Commission's report on the NFP sector (2010), a good example of government 
dependency on the sector comes from Tasmania via its Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) which established the Office for the Community Sector "reflecting the 
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significant investment that the Department has within the Tasmanian community sector" 
(301 ): 
In total, this investment is approximately $170 million to 240 organi-
sations contained within 400 service agreements and providing for 114 
different service types. This equates to approximately 10 per cent of the 
total departmental budget. .. (301). 
Although a Productivity Commission's report (2010) calls for flexibility in contracting, 
streamlining of tendering, and the use of new models to tackle "intractable" problems" (see 
section 2.5), one is still left with the impression that the field is dominated by bureaucratic 
complexities such as " ... the short-term nature of government service agreements and 
contracts; poor risk management; heavy handed contractual and reporting requirements; and 
the degree to which contracts are being used to 'micro manage' providers" (297), the extent 
and implications of which have not yet been a major research focus. 
In summary, even though the NGO domain has a broad literature pool to draw from in 
terms of its history and conduct across many cultures, the two major issues concerning them 
that this thesis is primarily concerned with are: 1) the usefulness of organisational theories to 
understand them, and 2) the taxonomic difficulties of determining the boundaries of these 
organisations. In the former case, a review of relevant empirical theory is undertaken in the 
next section. In the latter case, the application of systems theory to NGOs is a relatively new 
undertaking with some researchers using the idea of "communication networks" under a 
systems framework to better define third sector boundaries (Corry, 2010; Ferreira, n.d.; 
Ferreira, 2014) while others like Walby (2007) trying to reformulate the concept of a system 
in order to reach a "synthesis of complexity theory with social theory" ( 450). However, 
while this emergent systems literature with its generally positive assumptions about systems 
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theory in a social context has had some impact in the field, in general it is best to remember 
that it is still a contested field of non-unified principles. 
2.2 Public policy, administration and organisational theory 
To extend on the point made in the previous section on the lack of consensus in the 
field as to the applicability of any particular organisational theory to nonprofit organisations, 
this situation is made more difficult by the plethora of philosophical, organisational, and 
behavioural theories that can be applied to the other stakeholders in the grants system. For 
example, how does a Citizen Agent react to Government policies? Are policies driven from 
the grassroots, or by elites in society? Do asymmetries in power and influence amongst 
stakeholders create a policy monopoly by certain groups? 
Focusing for a moment on Government as a stakeholder and its key roles as policy 
creator, implementer, and enforcer-roles which act as key drivers for the grants system-
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) suggest that government policies are in actuality the way in 
which Government conducts hypothesis testing: "If Xis done at time t1, then Y will result at 
time t2" (xxii). For this reason, they assert that all "policies imply theories" (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984: xxiii). But what theories generate Government policies? Does formal 
economic theory dominate? Narrow Public Value theory, or a wider Value theory of public 
"good"? Older notions of Weberian bureaucracies and specialist decision makers, or more 
recent Public Management theories like New Public Management (NPM) with its focus on 
efficiency and "transaction cost economics" (O' Flynn, 2007)? Is it some combination of 
social and political philosophy? Or are organisational theories more closely aligned to public 
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policy formulation? For example, does the "garbage can" model, ,vherein the Government 
could be conceived of as "a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings 
looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to 
which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work" (Cohen et al., 1972: 
2), offer the appropriate level of analysis? Or is Kingdon's (1995) multiple streams model 
which according to Cohen-Vogel and McLendon (2009) adheres to some aspects of 
rationalism and incrementalism but explains policy formulation mostly in terms of the 
agendas of the agents involved better suited to such analytical endeavours? Or does some 
other yet-to-be-discovered organisational behaviour theory entirely hold sway? At this time, 
it is probably best to reiterate Saetren's (2005) observation that "we are not even close to a 
well-developed theory of policy implementation" (573). This state of affairs can tempt any 
researcher into asking whether the entire system is just a "soup" of "organized anarchy" and 
chaotic processes. 
However, certain organisational theories were worthy of greater review because they 
apparently did serve as frames of reference for the survey participants themselves. Although 
it is doubtful the participants could elucidate in detail the formal theories, there were enough 
commonalities in their responses to suggest that the participants' perspectives reflect a 
complementary system of multiple frames (Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Davies and Mabin, 
2001; Daellenbach, Davies and Ashill, 2006). 
The first frame encountered was a resource-based view in the conceptualization of 
public sector grants offerings to NGOs. It is important in the context of this study, because it 
allows the researcher to highlight how "resource dependent" such organisations can be: 
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Resource dependence is the term used to describe the state of needing 
outside resources for survival. This dependence causes organizations to 
work to maximize the amounts and stability of these funds and also 
work to minimize the effects of this dependence on the organization. 
Organizations must interact with and maintain relationships with those 
who control nonprofit resources at levels varying with the importance 
and concentration of resources (Katz and Kahn, 1996, cited in Vance, 
2010: 12). 
Parts of neo-institutional theory which identifies major organisational pressures to 
conform to a standard (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) has also informed this research as a 
frame of reference, most notably in the stakeholders' assumption [Note: This "assumption" 
arose primarily in the context of the participants' description of their operating environment.] 
that all nonprofits operating in the similar culture, region and regulatory environment of 
Tasmania will exhibit similar patterns of behaviour. This is a phenomena identified by prior 
researchers as "institutional isomorphism" (Scott, 1987, cited in Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1991: 147; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, cited in Dolnicar, Irvine and Lazarevski, 2008: 109). 
This frame is especially useful is explaining how a nonprofit's fundamental mission "can be 
threatened" (Lazarevski, Irvine and Dolnicar, 2007: 2) when grants are accepted: 
Organisations experience extreme pressures to appear accountable in 
order to demonstrate and maintain their legitimacy as 'worthy' 
recipients of scarce funds. As a result of this pressure, institutional 
isomorphism occurs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), whereby there is a 
tendency of organisations within the same field to conform and take on 
similar structural characteristics (Lazarevski, Irvine and Dolnicar, 2007: 
2). 
Some of the principles of social network theory also info1m this research as a possible 
frame. These principles articulated by the participants in their descriptions of the interplay of 
organisations in their field help explain how some organisations (specifically the resource 
poor) have been encouraged to seek out relationships with other organisations or funding 
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agents (who are either more resource rich or are seeking to promote certain social causes) 
(Daellenbach, Davies and Asbill, 2006). 
Finally, some aspects of a life cycle frame wherein "organizational challenges vary 
across the stages of the organizational life cycle'' (Quinn and Cameron, 1983, cited in 
Daellenbach, Davies and Asbill, 2006: 77) has allowed the researcher to think about the 
resource dependent nature of nonprofits not only across their respective history but across 
their efforts at forming relationships with other system elements. This potential frame arose 
via the participants' multiple references to different organisational issues on an evolving 
basis. 
2.3 Government and public policy 
As this research is primarily interested in a particular tool (namely, grants) that many 
governments use to carry out public policy, it might first be prudent to review some of the 
key terminology when talking about Government. First, it is probably unwise for any 
researcher to view any government as an "undifferentiated entity" (Hood, 2007: 134) because 
that is not the conclusion of the weight of research in the field of public administration. 
Rather, a more accurate perception of government would be to view it as a multi-tiered 
organisation dominated by the multilayered goal structures and drives of its members (Downs, 
1967). Indeed, Colebatch (2010) describes researcher perceptions of government in the 
following way: 
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They tend to find that 'the government' is not so much a coherent entity 
as a broad category of participants, with distinct and often conflicting 
agendas; one participant described the Australian federal agencies 
responsible for employment and for welfare as 'tectonic plates colliding 
or pulling apart' (4). 
Neither is there consensus on what theory or theories drive government systems since 
any overview of the field of organisation studies would point to a plethora of candidates (see 
for example the entry for government in The Oxford handbook of public management) such 
as administration science, best practices, bureaucracy, cameralism, democratic administration, 
efficiency, "hold the mean", NPM (new public management), public choice, public interest, 
public trust, scientific management, etc.-with no one theory dominating over time or across 
multiple geographies and cultures. Most researchers would agree on the following simple 
premises however: 1) that government is a (perhaps the) key stakeholder in the design of 
public policy, and 2) that it has a range of tools in its "toolset" to affect the behaviours of 
those it governs, which include a host of regulatory and economic instruments ( of which 
grants is one such instrument-in simplest terms they are a payment by government to an 
individual or organisation that requires certain conditions be fulfilled). Perhaps another area 
of agreement would be that government is directed primarily by standardization in the form 
of general rules consisting of "laws, programmes, principles, and protocols" (Mulgan, 2009: 
24). Along these lines, Mulgan (2009) also uses this quote by Alfred North Whitehead: 
"civilizations advance by extending the number of operations we can perform without 
thinking of them" to point out that strategy in government and business are two separate 
approaches (24-25). 
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In business, strategic thinking often begins with organizational 
capabilities and then looks for how they be [sic] used in different ways 
to create as much value as possible .... Public strategy has traditionally 
begun the other way around, with goals: it then designs organizations 
and programmes to meet them and treats any additional capacity as a 
threat to focus. It's often seen as illegitimate for bureaucrats to seek 
new roles (Mulgan, 2009: 25). 
Just as conceptions about government must perforce take into account multiple 
operating principles ( see for example Allison and Zelikow, 1999 whose three distinct 
frameworks envision government as a rational actor, as a collection of organisations each 
with their own standard operating procedures, and as a purveyor of "solutions" derived not 
from rational analysis but as "resultants" from the cauldron of conflict and compromise), so 
too the literature would lead one to believe must our conceptions about public policy. 
Government policy has been described as authoritative choice, as hypothesis, and as 
objectives by Bridgman & Davis (2004), while Dye (1992) describes it more starkly as 
"whatever government chooses to do or not to do" (2). Again, there are some very limited 
areas of agreement in the research. The process of creating public policy, usually referred to 
as the policy cycle, has been described in rather uniform terms: " ... albeit variations, the 
policy cycle usually includes the following stages: agenda setting, problem definition and 
analysis, policy tools selection, implementation, enforcement and evaluation" (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2003, cited in Parag, 2006: 2) unchanged much from a classic interpretation (Harold 
and Lasswell, 1951, cited in Bridgman and Davis, 2003: 99) as a "sequence of intelligence; 
recommendation; prescription; invocation; application; appraisal; and termination". It is a 
sequence or a set of stages however that does not "embody formal rationality" (Bridgman and 
Davis, 2003: 101 ), and there is no agreement over whether policy problems are "sui generis" 
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or whether there are "patterns that can infom1 policy practitioners" (Bridgman and Davis, 
2003: 102). 
Perhaps United States Supreme Court judge, Justice Stephen Breyer, in his book, 
Breaking the vicious circle: Toward effective risk regulation (1993), which described the 
regulatory process in the United States, may also have left us with a good analogy about the 
public policy process as well. We need only replace the terms "Congress" and "regulatory 
agencies" used below with "Australian government" and "Australian government departments 
and agencies" to let Justice Breyer's analysis stand-in for the public policy process both here 
and elsewhere. Using systems theory terminology, Justice Breyer holds that the regulatory 
process in the United States begins with the public perception of problems at large. The 
public overestimates certain risks while underestimating others, and they then communicate 
their fears to Congress that in tum writes regulatory statutes which "appear to give discretion 
to agencies but actually tie their hands and prevent flexible responses to the public's 
perceived 'problem"' (Gouvin, 1995: 477). These statues must then be implemented by 
certain regulatory agencies. However, "different agencies (and even different departments 
within the same agency) approach similar problems from different directions leading to the 
formulation of inconsistent policies" (Gouvin, 1995: 478). For example, an agency "guided 
by the principle that all policy should 'err on the safe side' will almost always reach a 
different conclusion from an agency that scrutinizes the bottom line for demonstrable 'cost 
effectiveness'" (Gouvin, 1995: 479). Justice Breyer goes on to suggest that the use of an 
overarching "super-regulator" might lead to a more rational process by "mak[ing] explicit, 
and more uniform, controversial assumptions that agencies now, implicitly and often 
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inconsistently, use in reaching their decisions" (Gouvin, 1995: 484 ). However, the criticism 
of that suggestion as presented by Gouvin (1995) would also hold true if such were attempted 
in the public policy arena. Super-regulators cannot reconcile or "harmonize" different 
perspectives-the example given is the disparate points of view of an environmentalist and an 
economist-he or she would simply be reduced to making a choice between their positions, 
choices which in the aggregate may be consistent but no more rationally derived than the 
product generated in the public policy crucible (Gouvin, 1995: 484-485). 
One can certainly point to many research gaps in public policy field-for example, the 
role and operation of government analysts has been focused on only in select jurisdictions 
(Howlett and Wellstead, 2010: 3-4), much work still needs to be done in the areas of policy 
cohesion, policy dynamics, boundary-spanning policy regimes, regime durability, agency 
beliefs, and barriers to policy making (Jochim and May, 2010), there has been a lack of 
systematic research into the role of policy transfer and diffusion (Stone, 1999), there are 
"multiple, sometimes conflicting conceptions of the public interest" (Perry and Rainey, 1988: 
184), and the role of interest groups and public engagement is not yet fully understood. For 
example, Marsh (1986) holds to the following position: 
... arrangements are deliberately designed to limit participation in key 
decisions on the presumption that the government's authority will be 
sufficient to elicit public and interest group compliance. This authority 
is derived exclusively from the most recent general election (30). 
This stance takes us back to some factors affecting public policy evaluation both locally in 
Tasmania and in Australia as a whole. Evaluation is geared toward the (short) electoral cycle 
in this country, therefore policy is weighted toward "short-term policy payoffs" according to a 
Productivity Commission Annual Report (2010): 
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There are also political economy forces at play. In federations, the costs 
of collecting data and evaluating policy in a state or territory usually fall 
only on that jurisdiction. While most of the benefits and the political 
risks of identifying poorly-performing policies also accrue to that 
jurisdiction, some of the benefits of learning from policy successes and 
failures can accrue to every jurisdiction and all Australians (22). 
In summary, the problem with analysing tools or instruments of public policy such as 
grants are at least three-fold: 1) they are not necessarily linked "with any one particular 
approach to the public and government" (Hood, 2007: 135), 2) their selection by government 
actors are more in accord with the actors' "interests or beliefs" rather than as a product of 
some process of technical choice (Sabatier, 2000, cited in Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007: 8), 
and 3) their use reflects elements of decision making, application of power and influence, and 
social control by government in varying measure (Hood and Margetts, 2007) not yet 
completely understood. 
2.4 Systems theory 
Systems theory is utilized in this thesis as a result of the difficulty in orienting the role 
and function of Government on a theoretical basis in its selection of grants as a public policy 
tool. Broad enough from a process perspective to trace the workings of the grants system 
under study, systems theory can also incorporate other organisational or philosophical 
theories if the data derived from the study should happen to highlight a particular theoretical 
orientation. 
At its heaii, systems theory is a philosophical set of beliefs with its origins in 
Aristotle's assertion in his work Metaphysics that "the whole is greater than the sum of its 
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parts". At first blush, this view stands in stark contrast to the more modern philosophical 
approach of scientific reductionism which holds that a system of interrelated pmis can be 
explained solely through the examination of the parts and the relationships between the parts. 
Aristotle's more holistic approach set the stage for the study of emergent (and sometimes 
unpredictable) behaviour which arise from systems. Systems are naturally found in and are 
studied by a wide range of modem disciplines such as biology, cybernetics, ecology, 
economics, management, physics, political science, and psychology. It was thus an 
interdisciplinary desire to explain systems wherever they are found that drove the evolution 
of thinking in terms of systems rather than components-a desire which produced from 
authors in disparate fields such seminal works as Ludwig von Bertalanffy' s General system 
theory: Foundations, development, applications (1968), C. West Churchman's The design of 
inquiring systems: Basic concepts of systems and organization (1972), Russell Ackoff' s 
Redesigning the future: Systems approach to societal problems (1974), and Peter Senge's The 
Fifth Discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization (1990) to name just a few 
that have made cross-contributions to social science research. 
At the core of this approach is Bertalanffy' s use of nested hierarchies to bring order to 
the myriad levels of systems since systems operate in an environment that contain all other 
systems (like a giant collection of nested Russian dolls), so some ordering principle is needed 
to separate all the levels of "separate" systems, their parts, and the environment. In the main, 
this is a subjective choice: 
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Although concrete systems and their environments are objecNve things, 
they are also subjective insofar as the particular configuration of 
elements that form both is dictated by the interests of the researcher. 
Different observers of the same phenomena may conceptualize them 
into different systems and environments. For example, an architect may 
consider a house together with its electrical, heating, and water systems 
as one large system. But a mechanical engineer may consider the 
heating system as a system and the house as its environment. To a 
social psychologist a house may be an environment of a family, the 
system with which he is concerned. To him, the relationship between 
the heating and electrical systems may be irrelevant, but to the architect, 
it may it be very relevant. The elements that form the environment of a 
system and the environment itself may be conceptualized as systems 
when they become the focus of attention [my emphasis added]. Every 
system can be conceptualized as part of another and larger system 
(Ackoff~ 1971: 663). 
Although some researchers reject the "rigidity" of terms such as "parts" and "whole" steeped 
in hierarchical divisions (see for example Walby, 2007), the meta-hierarchical approach of 
systems theory would not have been unfamiliar to process-based philosophers such as Alfred 
North Whitehead who used the terminology of processes to "cone up" to higher-level events 
as described in Process and Reality (1929). Neither does this approach stand in opposition to 
the use of scientific reductionism, rather in some sense they can be seen as complementary 
approaches. Perhaps the most famous example of this in the literature is the study of ants. 
The study of an individual ant through a reductionist approach can enlighten us in a number 
of ways regarding the ant's constituent parts and its use of them. However, the systems 
approach is also quite useful when it comes time to explore that ant in context of its place in 
an anthill, as part of a larger society of its fellows. Then, and only then, does it exhibit 
behaviours influenced by its role in a much larger system. 
In terms of this research, systems theory offers several key advantages as a descriptive 
tool: 
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1. It is free from any other overarching organisational or philosophical 
theories and is inherently descriptive in its nature and purpose. 
2. It allows the researcher to have insights into how organizations 
"have the ability to create their own ecosystems by forming 
relationships and alliances with other actors that work to help them 
survive" (Morgan, 2005: 25). 
3. It encourages the exploration of "shared interests inside the system" 
(Morgan, 2005: 32). 
4. An offshoot of systems theory, called systems dynamics, posits that 
basic patterns of structured behaviour, called system archetypes 
(Senge, 1990; Stacey, 2010), are responsible for a myriad of system 
problems. System dynamics also offers tools (like causal loop 
diagramming) that allows the researcher to exhibit these archetypes 
in an organisational context. 
5. Some within the field believe that good system descriptions can 
"directly shape strategy and policy-helping to guide where the most 
useful interventions can be made. Alternatively, they may clarify 
where the most promising experiments and pilots can be set up to 
test and compare different approaches" (Mulgan, 2009: 91). 
6. Although there is no "science of systems-intervention" (Gall, 2011: 
165), some scholars believe that in the very act of explicating these 
archetypes of problematic behaviour, organizations have started a 
process of intervention which may help them to change unwanted 
behaviours (see for example Meadows, 1999; Meadows, 2008). 
It is hoped that by describing the stakeholders of the Tasmanian public sector grants 
system in a systems map derived from the principles of systems thinking in general and 
system dynamics in particular, the dynamic interplay of the stakeholder behaviour will come 
to the fore and any behaviours which distort systems, such as rule-beating which is "evasive 
action to get around the intent of a system's rules" (Meadows, 2008: 136), and are indicative 
of system archetypes, can be more formally analysed. 
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2.5 Complexity theory and complex problems 
In general, we can say that the larger the System becomes, the more the 
parts interact, the more difficult it is to understand environmental 
constraints, the more obscure becomes the problem of what resources 
should be made available, and deepest of all, the more difficult become 
the problem of the legitimate values of the System (Churchman, 1968: 
77). 
The major problem with traditional organisational theory according to Maron ( 1999) is 
that it is "a science of stable systems" (237) but in fact there are actually "relatively few social 
events [that] are the result of simple one-way causation; rather they result from complex 
interactions among a number of variables" ( 41 ). Such a philosophical stance is becoming 
more commonplace as there has been a movement across several decades now away from 
describing organisations as machines and more towards adopting a new metaphor-viewing 
them instead as "living systems" (Stacey et al., 2000: 133). Even if we do not all agree on the 
"systems" part of that metaphor, it is becoming "more natural" to speak of their complex 
behaviour (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989: 8). In part, this is due to the considerable production 
of literature loosely gathered under the rubric of "complexity theory". In brief, complexity 
theory with its focus on non-linear relationships amongst entities (as opposed to the linear 
relationships more commonly found in traditional systems theory) suggests that organizations 
are "'complex adaptive systems' that coevolve with the environment through the self-
organizing behaviour of agents navigating 'fitness landscapes"' (Coleman, 1999: 33). If 
organisations are complex adaptive systems, then by extension "they display the same feature 
as all other complex adaptive systems-they repeat archetypal patterns as they evolve, but the 
actualization of those patterns is always different" (Stacey, 1996: 173). 
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In actual fact, complexity theory "is not a unified body of theory; it is an emerging 
approach or framework" (Walby, 2007: 456). Derived from multiple disciplines, the debate 
over its use in the interpretation of organisational and social issues is far from settled. At the 
heart of the debate are the salient points that complexity theory is not yet "model-centred" 
and might therefore always be relegated to faddism and metaphor (McKelvey, 1999; Byrne, 
2005); also, some hold that view that "social processes are far too complex for complexity 
theory to deal with, or profoundly elucidate, without the aid of existing social theories" 
(Stewart, 2001: 353). The researcher acknowledges these concerns and the use of complexity 
theory herein will be modest and non-mathematical, rather some key ideas from this approach 
will inform the frameworks established by the current research and will be used in broad 
strokes in the recommendations on follow-up research efforts. 
As Richardson (2005) points out, "complex organisations are open systems" (9). This 
insight into the relationship between complexity and systems theory guided the researcher's 
framework throughout. Two principles derived from this insight were uppermost in the 
researcher's awareness: I) that the interaction of organisational members (and interactions 
between organisations) help us understand the "behaviour of the system" (Richardson 2005, 
8), and 2) the system will "organize itself to be maximally sensitive to events that are critical 
to the system's survival" (Richardson, 2015: 10). 
Since the researcher is interested in determining whether the "complexity" of the 
public sector grants system is increasing, it would be prudent to note the other relevant bodies 
of work that can be brought to bear on that term. First, in organisation theory, complexity 
according to Anderson (1999) is used as a "structural variable" (216) and is based on the 
number of "activities or subsystems within the organization" (Daft, 1992, cited in Anderson, 
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1999: 216) along several dimensions--verticaL horizontal, spatial, and environmental (216). 
Anderson goes on to explain how social scientists in describing organisations are ultimately 
forced to simplify complex systems with nonlinear components through modelling into 
simpler forms by "abstracting out what is unnecessary or minor" (217). The researcher has 
noted this position, and it (along with Levy's (2000) reservations on intricate modelling 
versus the search for "deep structure and patterned behaviour" (83)) has helped steer his 
investigation to the use of a rather parsimonious systems description of the public sector 
grants system (see Chapter Three), deferring strategies for more holistic and reductionist joint 
approaches to future efforts. 
Finally, the term complex has a particular meaning in the "wicked problem literature" 
which is derived from the realms of organisational behaviour and urban planning: 
Complex problems are sometimes called 'wicked' problems because 
many of their characteristics are not reducible to their constitutive parts. 
When solved, the solutions do not function as recipes, which can be 
applied to other, like problems (Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002: 7). 
According to Briggs (2007), these problems are "highly resistant to resolution" (3), because 
their social complexity rather than their technical complexity "overwhelms most current 
problem-solving and project management approaches" (4). Given that these problems are 
multi-causal with their cause-and-effect relationships only recognizable "in retrospect" 
(Briggs, 2007: 3), likely to cross the boundaries of multiple organisations, and usually involve 
changing the behaviours and expectations of multiple stakeholders (Briggs, 2007: 4), it 
becomes clearer why some problems involving social change seem intractable despite 
repeated policy action (Briggs, 2007: 5). 
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There are various schemes to classify problem sets and to identify the wicked 
problems among them. Horst Rittel, who first used the term "wicked problem." recognized 
the benefit of social interactions over linear thinking processes to tackle these types of 
problems and developed IBIS (Issue-Based Information Systems), which draws out 
stakeholder perceptions of the problem and "what constitutes an acceptable solution" 
(Conklin, 2005: 7). Perhaps the most famous of these classification schemes is Cynefin by 
Snowden and Boone (2007) which encourages business leaders "to shift their decision-
making styles to match changing business environments" (7), that is, the contextual level of 
complexity in their problem solving efforts. 
In terms of this research. the author notes two recommendations from the Australian 
Government's Public Service Commission 2007 report, Tackling wicked problems: A public 
policy perspective. First, the report calls for the use of "high levels of systems thinking" (33) 
when tackling wicked problems: 
This big picture thinking helps policy makers to make the connections 
between the multiple causes and interdependencies of wicked problems 
that are necessary in order to avoid a narrow approach and the artificial 
taming of wicked problems. Agencies need to look for ways of 
developing or obtaining this range of skills ... (33). 
Second, the report suggests incorporating case studies on wicked problems into the 
Commission's "programmes that focus on the skills needed to deal with social complexity, in 
order to achieve high levels of systems thinking and a basic understanding of behavioural 
change" (3 7). It should be noted that in this thesis ( see section 5. 7), the researcher suggests 
that the public sector grants system (illuminated via systems thinking analysis) with its 
numerous stakeholders \Vith their various takes on tackling social problems and who are 
connected via a variety of linkages and interdependencies might provide one such case study. 
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2.6 Literature review methods 
In addition to accessing mainstream published documents, the following methods 
utilized in this literature review included database searching, bibliographical appraisal, and 
expert consultation in conjunction with an examination of English-language articles, books, 
theses, and government publications identified through the sources listed below. 
For the subject areas of third sector organisations and government grants, the 
following sources were used: 
1. National Library of Australia (Trove): http://trove.nla.gov.au/ 
2. OATD: Open Access Theses and Dissertations (metadata comes 
from over 800 colleges, universities, and research institutions): 
http://oatd.org/ 
3. University of Tasmania Library MegaSearch: 
http://www.utas.edu.au/library/ 
4. WorldCat (which is the world's largest network of library content 
and services): http://www.worldcat.org/ 
In addition, for theses-only searches, individual country theses repository searches were 
used: 
1. Canada: 




3. Hong Kong: 
(Hong Kong University Theses Online): 




(DIV A Portal): http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/search.jsf 
6. UK: 
(British Library EthOS): http://ethos.bl.uk/Home.<lo 
7. UK & Ireland: 
(Capac): http://copac.ac. uk/ 
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8. United States: 
(OAister): http://oaister.worldcat.org 
(ProQuest Dissertations & Theses): 
http:/ !search. proquest.com/pqdt/advanced?accountid= 14245 
The overarching full keyword search included the following keywords and Boolean 
operators: [((Government OR Federal OR State OR Local OR Council) AND Grants)) AND 
(Public Sector OR Not-for-Profit OR NFPs OR Non-governmental Organisation OR NGO 
OR Government Peripheral Organisations OR GPO OR Third Sector Organisation OR TSO)] 
OR [(Compliance OR Burden OR Red Tape)] OR [(System OR Systems Theory OR 
Feedback OR Complicated OR Complex OR Complexity) OR (Stakeholders OR Push Back 
OR Unintended Consequences OR Evasive)]. Additional searches were undertaken using a 
subset of the keywords above plus variations in spelling of keywords such as "organisation" 
versus "organization". 
For philosophical and organisational theory, the reviewer relied on the following 
sources in addition to those sources named above to provide a general overview of the 
theories that could be relevant to the topic at hand: 
1. Credo Reference: http://search.credoreference.com/ 
2. Google Scholar: http://scholar.google.com.au 
3. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
The results of the literature review were interesting in that only a handful of books, 
articles, publications, or theses had a direct bearing on the major topic areas of this research. 
The review most certainly helped to engender the need to select an exploratory research 
method to probe this fertile, mostly untapped ground. However, a clear limitation of the 
review is the researcher's reliance on English-language materials and the reliance on refereed 
39 
journals as primary sources. It is clearly possible that a review conducted via multiple 
languages and with a different sampling frame of journals would have produced other results. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
Despite the challenges posed by the lack of prior of research efforts in describing the 
workings of the public sector grants system, the literature review highlighted the chief 
theoretical tool, systems theory, that will help frame the dynamic interplay of all the 
stakeholders involved in the grants system. Once the stakeholders are placed into a systems 
theory-derived framework and their interactions interpreted via that lens, then the complexity 
of those interactions can be explored further. As will be discussed later in the thesis (see 
sections 3 .1 and 6.2.2), various other theoretical "lenses" ( especially those centred on specific 
organisational, public administration, and philosophical theories) could also be used 
eventually to further explain the phenomena encountered. However, material for the 
literature review was selected in a very straightforward, pragmatic fashion: Third Sector 
literature (to describe the key stakeholder known as NGOs), systems theory (to build the 
initial theoretical framework to explicate the interplay between the various stakeholders), and 
complexity theory (to help in a deeper examination of the conceptual framework). In the 
opinion of the researcher, this material was necessary (but it cannot be said to be necessarily 
sufficiently complete) to provide a working foundation so that more formal analysis could 
commence. The researcher is not suggesting that the stakeholders in any grants system 
operate in a tahula rasa organisational state devoid of any theoretical underpinnings, rather 
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by way of analogy, as Freud's psychoanalysis was developed due to his explication of the 
role of the family in the development of an individual's personality, so too the researcher 
believes that more descriptive theories will be forthcoming once the dynamics of the grants 
system is better known, a process that will be informed by the perceptions of the stakeholders 
themselves. In this spirit, the researcher did not include in this review several topics that 
were investigated in depth (including, but not limited to, dyadic exchanges, leadership and 
organisational goal setting, and various resource allocation models) but found the 
acquaintance with such material to be helpful throughout the research endeavour. To 
summarize, this thesis will operate at the intersection of the literature guided by systems 
theory. 
In Chapter Three, the researcher will outline the research methods used to conduct 
this instrumental qualitative case study. A description of the theoretical framework will be 
given. The research design, description of paiiicipants, and methods of data collection 
methods will be presented. Also, the steps taken to ensure ethical treatment of all participants 
will be covered. 
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CHAPTER3 
Research Design and Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
Exploratory research is often used when prior research is scarce and the data is 
difficult to collect. Exploratory research questions, usually qualitative in nature, are used 
"when there is little known in a particular research area" (Barker et al., 2002, cited in Elliott 
and Timulak, 2005: 149). In this case, there are many theoretical gaps in the literature as to 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector grants as an instrument of public policy. 
Also compounding this problem are three data gathering difficulties: 1) the trouble of 
gaining survey access to high level executives in organisations like NGOs due to the time 
pressures of those positions, 2) the bureaucratic nature of governments and their general 
reluctance (and some might say "inability" of single government agents) to discuss policy 
instruments like grants in an overall public policy context, and 3) the competitive 
environment of public sector grants which tends to make all stakeholders suspicious of each 
other and recalcitrant in sharing their particular troubles for fear of communicating weakness 
both to competitors and internal agents. 
For all these reasons, the formulation of the research questions in this thesis 
presupposed only the most basic level of conceptual knowledge of the topic and relied on a 
combination of two major types (definitional and interpretive) of exploratory questions. 
Research Question One, (Are there any ,\ystem archetypes noticeable in the public sector 
grants system?), utilized a "definitional" question to ask, "What are the defining features of 
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this phenomenon?" (Elliott and Timulak, 2005: 149). Research Question Two, (h the 
complexity of the public sector grants system increasing, and (f'so, why?), used an 
"interpretive" question to ask, "What changes led to what other changes?" (Elliott and 
Timulak, 2005: 149). 
This chapter uses six subsections to address issues concerning the research design and 
methodology. Section 3.1 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 3.2 reviews the 
research design and development of the research instrument. Section 3.3 relates the 
procedures used for collecting the research data. Section 3.4 discusses the primary method 
used for data analysis. Section 3.5 addresses reliability and validity issues relevant to this 
research effort. Section 3.6 relates how this research was conducted under an ethical 
framework. 
3.1 Assumptions and theoretical framework 
As pointed out in the literature review, the literature domains encompassing NGOs 
and public administration cannot provide a definitive theoretical lens through which the 
operations ofNGOs can be fully understood. However, if the researcher chooses to operate 
at the intersection of the literature on systems theory, NGOs, and public administration, then 
that affords the researcher an opportunity to select a theoretical "lens" which not only allows 
them to describe the general functioning of nonprofit organisations but also allows the 
researcher to be informed of how the participants themselves view their activities in light of 
more traditional theories. This is why systems theory, which is neutral in its stance on how 
the stakeholders it describes operate, was chosen as the lead element in the theoretical lens. 
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For example, within an overarching systems theory-based descriptive framework, one 
can easily imagine the interplay of one or more of the numerous public administration 
theories available to describe the stakeholder known as Govermnent. However, one would 
not be forced ascribe to them any particular theory. Whether the actor called Government is 
rational or irrational, a monolith or collection of unequal departments, a budget maximizer or 
empire builder, interested in outcomes or an uncaring bureaucracy, it, along with all the other 
stakeholders, simply occupies a placeholder position in such a framework for the purposes of 
describing the general operations of the system in toto. 
The researcher must then be attentive to how each set of stakeholders view their 
operations and the dynamic forces at work between their organisations and others as more 
and deeper narratives are brought in from the field. These "lived experiences" of key 
stakeholders-in this research, CEO and grant level officers of Tasmanian NGOs-will f01m 
a deepening pool of potential frames to be assessed for use in both of the theoretical 
framework, "the theory on which the study is based," and the emergent conceptual 
framework, or "the "operationalization of the theory" (Theoriticalframework vs. conceptual 
framework, 2011: 1 ). Therefore, in the spirit of phenomenological inquiry the goal will be to 
eventually construct a conceptual framework solid enough to describe the detailed 
interactional dynamics of the stakeholders as they perceive them in this and future research 
efforts and then to tie those perceptions back to more formal theoretical underpinnings. 
In order to "map" the interplay of all the forces at work in the public sector grants 
arena, it was first necessary to make several assumptions. Perhaps the very first and most 
basic assumption is that a systems theory-based description can adequately display the 
stakeholders in a recognizable context both to the subjects at hand as well as to future 
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subjects (and researchers). The second assumption is that this systems description would be 
robust enough to encompass all NGOs in the state of Tasmania regardless of their Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) classification, scale of staff, and scope of operations. The third 
major assumption of the study is that the tem1 "complexity" can eventually be adequately 
operationalized in an organisational context and add to the explanatory power of the 
framework derived herein. 
A theoretical framework provides "a general representation of relationships between 
things in a given phenomenon" (Regoniel, 2010: para. 4). To show all the elements at play 
in the public sector grants arena, this thesis as previously stated shall rely primarily on the 
power of the descriptive nature of systems theory and its ability to place stakeholders into a 
grouping of relationships within an environmental context. A systems-oriented diagram 
(Burch & Wood, 1989, cited in Bridgman and Davis, 2004: 25) which shows the general 
public policy process (see Figure 1) was adapted by the author to form a more detailed 
theoretical framework (see Figure 2) for a closer inspection of the public sector grants 
elements. 
In Figure 1, the actor called Government processes the resource inputs of support, 
land, labour, etc. generated by another actor called Citizenry into outputs called policies, 
which in turn impact Citizenry whose demand for services and responses to government 
policies are fed back again and again through the system as ever-present inputs to 
Government. This input-process-output-feedback approach is exemplary of the systems 
theory approach to describing phenomenon at large. 
In Figure 2, the actor called Government (aka the Second Sector) has as its central 


























*From: Bridgman, P. and Davis, G. eds. 2004. The Australian policy handbook. 3rd ed. Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin. Reprinted with the permission of Allen & Unwin. 
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Figure 2 
Theoretical Framework/Systems Diagram using Vensim • 
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* Vensim PLE is a systems diagramming tool from Ventana Systems, Inc. It is free for educational use 
and available at: http://vensim.com/. 
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connected to other government actors-Local Government (or Councils), the Governments of 
all the other Australian States, and the Federal Government of Australia. As in Figure 1, the 
State Government uses resources (such as tax revenue, non-tax revenue, capital receipts, etc.) 
as inputs and produces Policies in order to address issues in the Environment, the physical 
and social context in which the public grants system is situated, which are causing 
stakeholders to place Demands upon the Government. 
Policies are translated into more detailed government public policy instruments (such 
as grants, contracts, direct aid, budgets, etc.) which are simply operationalized policies. The 
Policy Implementation actor (drawn as a box overlapping another box) represents those 
people and agencies in the Tasmanian State Government responsible for overseeing the 
policy instruments that have been created (e.g., negotiating contracts, monitoring 
performance of those contracts, and handing disputes)-although it has been argued, most 
notably in Majone and Wildavsky (1979), that implementation and policy are intertwined and 
are not separate process stages or functions. These policy instruments become part of the 
Environment, and the responses of the actors or stakeholders in the Environment to these 
instruments are fed back to the Government in many ways. In other words, actors in the 
Environment are affected by these Policies but can also affect policy-making through their 
feedback (see Glossary of Tenns). This feedback could come in the form oflobbying, media 
articles, polling of public opinion, etc. Other major organisational actors in the Environment 
include private sector businesses (First Sector), NGOs (Third Sector), For-Benefit 
Corporations (Fourth Sector) as well as Quasi-private (or Quasi-public) Sector organisations. 
Other categories representing large groups of actors in the Environment included in Figure 2 
are Special Interest Groups, Lobbyists, Media, and the General Public. This is by no means a 
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comprehensive listing however. Numerous actors exist in the social environment, and some 
defy aggregation into larger, general categories. In this case, other actors who could have a 
significant feedback effect relating to public sector grants might include such stakeholders as 
think tanks, policy research institutes, academics, individual advocates, etc. 
As for NGOs, public policy in the form of public sector grants has significant impact 
on their operations because it affects their core constituency-the clients for whom they 
provide services. It is important to make taxonomic distinctions regarding the clients of 
NGOs. First and most broadly speaking, there are Citizens in Need-this group contains all 
people within the State Government's sphere of influence that could benefit from 
Government aid in some measure at a particular point in time. Then there is the Client Base 
of Appliers for Grants-which is a subset of the group Citizens in Need (hence a box 
overlapping a box), or those people who are in need but who also fit into some NGO's 
definition of an appropriate Client Base that can be serviced by one or more of their programs 
(programs that are generally funded through awarded public sector grants). The latter is not 
to be confused with the Client Base of Non-Appliers for Grants-which is also a subset of the 
group Citizens in Need, but in this case are those people who are in need but are being 
serviced by NGO programs not funded through public sector grants. An alternate way of 
thinking about these categories is to ask the following questions regarding the total amount of 
people in need in Tasmania at any given time: 
• How many are being helped by NGO programs funded by grants? 
• How many are being helped by NGO programs not funded by grants? 
• How many are being helped by other government policy instruments? 
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• How many are being helped by other means (e.g., aid from other 
individuals or from other Sectors)? 
• How many are not being helped at all? 
In Figure 2, there is a dotted line relationship between Third Sector organisations and 
a box called Pool of Potential Applicants. Here, the Pool of Potential Applicants is a 
placeholder representing the theoretical possibility that every NGO could apply for every 
possible public sector grant for which they meet the application criteria. Which leads us 
naturally to the question: Why don't all NGOs apply for every grant they are eligible for? 
Professor David Adams (2010, pers. comm., 29 September) proposes the following reasons: 
• They were unaware of a grant opportunity. 
• They were intimidated by the application process and decided not to 
apply. 
• They began the application process but abandoned it. 
• They were advised not to apply for this particular grant. 
• They felt that using resources to make the application would detract 
from the time spent with clients or in day-to-day operations. 
• They felt that they did not have the time or the resources to make the 
application-e.g., smaller NGOs typically do not have professional 
grant writers on staff. [Note: This in part would correspond to study 
results from McGregor-Lowndes and Ryan (2009) which found that 
grant paperwork compliance costs "are clearly regressive with small 
nonprofits bearing a significantly higher burden" (21 ). ] 
• They felt that they had insufficient help from external resources 
(including Government) to make the application. 
• They felt that the grant was too small ( or too large }-e.g., Do small 
NGOs feel intimidated by larger awards which they may believe are 
reserved for larger organisations? Do large NGOs use valuable 
resources to apply for small awards? 
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• They did not need the grant at that time (e.g., they might not have a 
fundable program in place yet). 
• They missed the application deadline. 
• Prior rejection(s) affected their decision whether to apply. 
• Their perception was that "the fix was in" and that certain grants 
always go to certain NGOs. 
For every grant therefore, we have a bifurcation of Third Sector organisations into 
those NGOs who apply for it, or the Pool of Applicants, and those NGOs who choose not to 
apply, or the Pool of Non-Applicants. Each of these sub-pools is again bifurcated in the 
natural order of the process. Those who apply either become recipients of the grant 
(Awarded Grants box) or are not so favored (Not Awarded box). Those who do not apply 
can be divided into groups who simply do not need the grant money at that time (Pool of 
Non-Needy Non-Applicants) and those who do (Pool of Needy Non-Applicants) but still fail 
to apply possibly due to one or more of the reasons postulated above. 
3.2 Research design and interview instrument development 
Over the course of several years, this study evolved from an initial starting point of a 
much more limited narrative analysis of a specific Tasmanian public sector grant (the 
Community Grants Program) into an exploratory qualitative instrumental case study intended 
to provide an examination of the Tasmanian public sector grants system as a whole: 
l) "exploratory" both in terms of the dearth of prior research into the topic and in the hope 
that it will eventually tum into a "theory seeking" endeavour (Bassey, 1999), 2) "qualitative" 
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because it follows a constructivist paradigm under which reality as Mertens (2005: 231) 
explains "is not absolute, but is defined through community consensus" as well as the study 
participants presenting in a phenomenological flavour their perceptions of this reality, 
3) "instrumental" in the sense that the "instance" of public sector grants allocations can be 
utilized to address the wider issue of "well-being" from a multidisciplinary perspective, and 
4) "case study" because the exploration was bounded by activity, time, and participant access 
(Creswell, 2007; Mertens, 2005). In this thesis the cases are not an end unto themselves 
however. An overarching interest in the wider topic of well-being is the "external interest" 
here that is the final focus of the researcher: 
The case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it 
facilitates our understanding of something else. The case still is looked 
at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, but 
all because this helps the researcher pursue the external interest. The 
case may be seen as typical of other cases or not. ... Here the choice of 
case is made to advance understanding of that other interest (Stake, 
2003: 137). 
Convenience sampling (the sampling method employed herein) is a method in which 
the participants are readily available at the time of data collection. Although this method runs 
the risk of being biased (from over selection, under selection, overlooked potential 
participants, etc.), it is often used in social research as a good way to get an initial first 
impression of the actors in the phenomenon to be studied, especially when exploring a "new 
setting" (Schutt, 2009: 170). Ideally, a random sampling of all stakeholders in Figure 2 
would be utilized and the multiple perceptions of the grants system thus generated would 
infonn the overall framework. However, such sampling was not feasible given the time and 
resource restrictions. Rather, in discussions with Professor Adams, the following question 
was raised again and again: "Which stakeholder perceptions held out the possibility for being 
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the richest contextually?'' Interviewing single Government bureaucrats who possibly had a 
narrow "silo" focus on their own limited responsibilities in the grants process ( e.g., 
application, awards, reporting, acquittal, etc.) would probably not be a rich enough data vein 
to start with. This issue would also arise for other stakeholders such as Clients or Citizens in 
Need who might be able to elucidate their own circumstances quite well but lack experiential 
knowledge of the other players and how they interact. The key actors who could immediately 
account for major transaction costs in the system would therefore be the NGOs. In these 
organisations, however, only a select few members have a "forest for the trees" perspective 
on the entire grants process. It was determined that the CEO and grants officer would have 
the best ability to articulate this systemic vision of their interactions with Government. 
Furthermore, it was determined that these officers should have considerable experience with 
the grants process. Since the typical situation in practice is likely to find only larger NGOs 
having the resources to dedicate professional staff to grant activities, it was determined early 
on that the sampling focus should be on higher level officers in larger, established NGOs. A 
structured interview instrument (pilot questionnaire-see Appendix 2) was established to 
gather data around the following major issues: 
• Job position of respondent. 
• Number of grants applied for/awarded in the past year. 
• Whether there was a gap in the grants awarded and the money 
needed to fulfil the organisation's stated outcomes in its applications. 
• Transaction costs of grant applications (time needed for each 
application section, time spent coordinating with government 
personnel on grant related matters, reporting systems, compliance 
regimes, etc.). 
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• Reasons for application successes or rejections. 
These major topic areas were developed inductively from a detailed review of the 
Productivity Commission's "Contribution of the Not for Profit Sector" study (2010) in which 
NGOs were allowed to comment on deficiencies in the current system. Since customer 
satisfaction measures have been studied in the private and nonprofit sectors as "leading 
indicators" of systemic problem areas (Anderson and Fornell, 1999; Niven, 2008), these were 
used to tailor the pilot as well as future survey configurations. The individual questions were 
mostly derived from prior questions in that study along with modified questions from the 
Australian Council of Social Service's "Community Sector Survey" (2010) and the 
Productivity Commission's "Charitable Organisations in Australia" inquiry report (1995). 
The pilot also drew heavily from the terminology, definitions, categories, and format of those 
studies. Additional questions were added that focused on the transaction costs of finding 
grants, preparing applications, reporting to government acquittal systems, and perceived 
reasons for grant rejections if any. Some open-ended questions on key concerns in the grants 
process were also included. 
In June 2011, the questionnaire was submitted to the nine TasCOSS Board members 
(high level members of their respective organisations) at one of the organisation's workshops. 
Two questionnaires were eventually returned to the researcher and the general feedback from 
that workshop was two-fold: 1) the fifteen question survey was too long and too data 
intensive, and 2) the survey did not "capture" the inherent difficulties their organisations had 
in dealing with the grants system. Based on this feedback, it was decided that the research 
instrument should be modified and action taken to broaden the participant pool to also 
include grants officers as well as CEOs. After the written instrument had been revised (and a 
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follow-up oral interview added), those TasCOSS NGO chief executives who had shown 
interest in the study (five in total) would receive an introductory email (see Appendix 3) 
which, if responded to favourably, would ask for the nomination of a grants officer in their 
organisation to be surveyed as well. This email would then be followed up by a written 
survey (see Appendices 4 & 6), with each survey tailored to either the chief executive or 
grants officer. Once the written surveys from each participant in an NGO were returned, then 
a semi-standardized open-ended interview would be administered to each participant (see 
Appendices 5 & 7). The introductory emails were sent out in November 2012 with survey 
responses received from December 2012 through March 2013. During this period, one NGO 
(CEO & grants officer) dropped out of the study with the CEO never returning the survey and 
the grants officer stating in an email message: "I commenced your survey but quite frankly 
found it too labour intensive and did not have the time to complete it." This left eight 
participants (4 CEOs and 4 grant officers from 4 different NGOs) remaining in the study. 
This number of participants falls within Riley's ( 1996, cited in Evans, 2013: 41) suggested 
goal of between eight and twenty-four interviews to achieve a theoretical saturation point. 
In-person interviews were conducted from May to June 2013. Table 1 below shows an 
overview of the participants. 
In this study, both the written and oral research instruments favour the standardized 
approach because the "questions are written in advance exactly the way they are to be asked 
during the interview" (Patton, 1987: 113 ). This allows the researcher to capitalize on the 
inherent advantages of this approach: 
55 
Table 1 
NGO Data Collection Summary 
NGO NGO Size NGO CEO Grants (by ABS (by Category) (by Annual Gender Officer Classification) Income) Gender 
Social Services Over NGO "A" Large $10,000,000 Male Male 
Between 
NGO "B" Social Services Medium $1,000,000 and Female Female $10,000,000 
Between 
NGO "C" Law, Advocacy Small $100,000 and Female Female 
and Politics $1,000,000 
Between 
NGO "D" Social Services Medium $1,000,000 and Male Male $10,000,000 
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Because the interview is systematic, interviewer judgment during the 
interview is reduced. The standardized open-ended interview also 
makes data analysis easier because it is possible to locate each 
respondent's answer to the same question rather quickly, and to 
organize questions and answers that are similar. In addition, by 
generating a standardized form, other evaluators can more easily 
replicate a study in new programs, using the same interview instrument 
with different subjects (Patton, 1987: 113 ). 
3.3 Procedures for data collection 
The sources of data in this thesis include written surveys ( ongoing from November 
2012 to March 2013) and oral interviews (ongoing from May 2013 to June 2013) with 4 
CEOs and 4 grant officers from 4 different Tasmanian NGOs, field notes from the oral 
interviews, organisational documents such as annual reports, and analyses of documents 
derived from the literature review. These "intensive interviews with a few individuals" are a 
traditional way to approach such an exploratory topic (Smith et al., 1997, cited in Yardley, 
2000: 217). In addition, a reflexive journal or diary (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) was kept 
detailing the emergent design of the research instruments and other methodological decisions 
in order to provide a type of"audit trail" (Koch and Harrington, 1998: 887; Shenton, 2004: 
72), although the researcher makes note of the debate within the qualitative research field as 
to the utility of audit trails (Cutcliffe and McKenna, 2004). Although the researcher was an 
external, etic, non-participating observer (Turnock and Gibson, 2001) throughout the study, 
the researcher (being the primary instrument of data production and analysis) must also point 
out that his prior assumptions and experiences cannot be divorced from the research 
proceedings in this study (Merriam, 1990: Creswell, 2007). Yardley (2000) points to many 
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different qualitative research traditions and goes on to suggest that those approaches which 
draw from the well dug by phenomelogical philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
and Ricoeur do not require us to abandon our "ingrained assumptions and categories;' and 
she highlights those researchers such as Kvale (1983) and Ray (1994) who hold the position 
that "the meaning of all phenomena is created through interpretation and discussion, action 
and interaction" (217). 
The study participants were told the researcher's interest in the topic was in the 
context of conducting of a Ph.D. level research effort at the University of Tasmania, and they 
were not informed of the researcher's prior research experiences with NGOs (which was 
none) or government agencies (also none), other prior research, or work experience. The 
participants only became aware of the researcher's demographic attributes during the in-
person interviews. 
The written questionnaires were used to generate some background data on how 
extensive a particular NGO's interactions with the public sector grants system was and to 
assess the subject's perceptions about some of the transaction costs inherent in the system 
(e.g., time necessary to prepare a grant application or time spent in consultation with public 
sector grants representatives). The oral questionnaire was to some extent an emergent 
instrument as patterns started to suggest themselves through the written questionnaire 
responses. Here, the researcher took the opportunity to drill down deeper into transactional 
difficulties that were highlighted in those written responses and in the literature reviewed. 
The oral surveys (which all took place at the participant's workplace and were all conducted 
in English-the native language of all participants) due to their semi-structured nature were 
less formal. Although each participant was asked the same questions in the same order, they 
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had ample opportunity to expand their answers into other territory. Also, each participant 
was given a chance at the end of the interview to talk about any general or specific concern 
they had with the public sector grants system. Written field notes were taken during the oral 
interviews in order to capture broader impressions of the subject's reaction to each question. 
Various documents were requested after the oral interviews. The CEOs were asked to 
provide mission and client statements since inception of their organisation. Three CEOs 
offered their most recent annual reports, however none provided either mission or client 
statements. Some stated reasons were that they were not generated in the past as well as they 
were too difficult to retrieve. The grants officers were requested to provide some 
representative grant applications from the organisation's inception. No grant applications 
were provided to the researcher (although some were described in detail during the interviews) 
for one or more of the following stated reasons: 1) past applications were not kept 
indefinitely and were therefore discarded, 2) past applications were not available in digital 
formats and were therefore not easily retrievable, 3) none were available in redacted form 
(proprietary data removed) and the effort to do so was considered too time consuming, 4) the 
subject was not comfortable providing that data, and 5) some were promised for future 
review but were never forthcoming. Document analysis also included the technical literature 
and background material on NGOs and government operations found during and subsequent 
to the initial literature review, and these materials, specifically literature concerning 
operational concerns of public sector grants, were used to supplement the primary survey data 
(Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Corbin and Strauss, 2007). 
The written survey results were transferred into a Microsoft Excel worksheet. The 
oral interviews were recorded by the researcher using an Olympus DS-7000 digital recorder 
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(no objections were raised to these recordings); the interviews were transcribed verbatim 
using an Olympus AS-7000 transcription kit and entered into Microsoft Word document 
format. The rest of the material \Vas transcribed or transferred into PDF documents. 
3.4 Method for data analysis 
The plan for data analysis consisted of transcribing all written interviews, oral 
interviews, field notes, and document analyses into a format amendable for use in the 
qualitative analysis software, NVivo version 10. NVivo with its powerful tools for 
searching, querying and visualization was selected for its ability to discover connections 
within the data and also because of its widespread use amongst students and faculty in the 
Tasmanian School of Business and Economics (TSBE) at the University of Tasmania. The 
researcher attended an NVivo training session on 11 May 2012 conducted by Dr. Megan 
Woods (a faculty member of the TSBE) and was impressed by the software's numerous 
visual display features. The researcher then relied primarily on the books by Bazeley (2007) 
and Gibbs (2002) for further guidance as well as online training videos provided by the 
developers of NVivo, QSR International, available at this web address: 
http://www.qsrinternational.com/support_tutorials.aspx. The researcher would like to point 
out that he is still a relative novice in the use of such software. Other researchers with more 
advanced training might have been able to derive different or more detailed data 
representations. 
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The responses from both the high level and grant level officer written questionnaires 
were imported from their Microson Excel worksheet into NVivo. From there, holding places 
were constructed for each written question (i.e., by codeable column so all answers for each 
question were in one place) and for each respondent (i.e., by codeable row so all answers 
from each person were in one place). Each respondent was assigned the following 
classification fields: Response No., Name, Gender, Level (CEO or Grant), NGO name, NGO 
ABS category, Total# of Staff, Total Annual Income, Date Incorporated. From there, the 
data could be filtered (e.g., by NGO classification) and word frequency queries used-
displayed as Tag Clouds and Tree Maps-to highlight which words were most frequently 
used in response to a particular question. Matrix coding queries (to see intersections in 
themes-i.e., content coded at X and Y) were then utilized. 
In regard to the oral interviews, the responses from both the high level and grant 
officers were taken from their transcription format (Microsoft Word) and imported into 
NVivo. The interview questions were formatted under Heading Style 1, and the interviewer 
comments were formatted under Text Style Quote so as to clearly separate the dialogue of 
interviewer and interviewee. Holding spaces for each question number and for each 
participant were set aside, and word frequencies for each response were generated. The oral 
interview field notes, researcher journal, and document analyses (having all been refonnatted 
into PDF documents) were also transferred into NVivo. 
Data analysis continued by parsing the data via three coding passes (see section 4.3 
and Appendices 8-12 ). The first pass, referred to as descriptive coding, produced initial 
concepts from the data. Here, words and phrases that represented ideas in light of the 
study' s theoretical framework were gathered into 121 distinct entities, or "nodes". In the 
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second coding pass, an interpretive pass, these nodes were reordered or clustered into 12 
categories, each of which formed a connection or link between multiple nodes from the first 
pass. In the last pass, referred to as abstract coding, the categories were grouped under 4 
different themes. These themes, enhanced by the subjects' narratives, helped formulate the 
conceptual framework of the public sector grants system (as it reacts to a funding shortfall), 
and it is then used to address the research questions (see section 5.1 and section 5.2). 
3.5 Reliability and validity issues 
The literature of qualitative research is replete with arguments for and against the use 
of various criteria for determining reliability and validity of a study. Indeed, the very terms 
reliability and validity are often rejected under the constructivist paradigm of qualitative 
research which instead often favours "trustworthiness" criteria along the lines of Lincoln & 
Guba's (1985) credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Trustworthiness 
usually becomes operationalized by the qualitative researcher in their use of several popular 
methods such as "audit trails, member checks, memos, and so forth" (Morse et al., 2002: 6). 
However, as Morse et al. (2002: 6) point out "rigor does not rely on special 
procedures external to the research process itself'. Morse et al. (2002: 7) go on to state that 
while audit trails record a researcher's decisions, they "do little to identify the quality of those 
decisions,'' a view echoed by Cutcliffe and McKenna (2004). Member checks as a 
verification strategy is also problematic since disguised "decontextualized" results would 
naturally confuse individual participants looking for their own story (Koch and Harrington, 
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1998: 885) and may "actually invalidate the work of the researcher and keep the level of 
analysis inappropriately close to the data" (Morse et al., 2002: 8). Furthermore, Morse et al. 
(2002: 4) decry the fact that there has been a shift from understanding the researcher's use of 
methods in the course of inquiry [my emphasis] to external evaluators simply using a 
checklist of evaluative methods to pass judgment on a study's rigour in a post-hoc fashion. 
Emden and Sandelowski (1999) posit that this uneasiness "with the 'criteria' approach to 
determining goodness in qualitative research" (4) is in part due to a shift in postmodernist 
thinking about complexity. 
In this study, the researcher was guided by the use of the following verification 
strategies (paraphrased below from Morse et al. (2002)) during the process ofresearch to 
help ensure both reliability and validity of the data and ultimately ensure a rigorous inquiry: 
• Methodological coherence. Continually asking whether the 
research question "matches the method, which matches the data and 
the analytic procedures" (12). 
• Using an appropriate sample. Asking whether the sample is made 
up of the participants "who best represent or have knowledge of the 
research topic" (12). 
• Collecting and analyzing data concurrently. Approaching the 
research in an iterative fashion to maintain congruence "among 
question formulation, literature, recruitment, data collection 
strategies, and analysis" (10, 12). 
• Thinking theoretically. Using macro-micro perspectives to 
constantly perform "checking and rechecking" as new data gives rise 
to new ideas (13 ). 
• Theory development. Moving " ... with deliberation between a micro 
perspective of the data and a macro/theoretical understanding" (13). 
As to the overall quality of the research, the researcher has been guided by Yardley's 
(2000: 219) outline of the characteristics of good qualitative research-sensitivity to context, 
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commitment and rigour, coherence and transparency, and impact and importance. These 
principles are not a checklist of rigid prescriptions, and they can be used "irrespective of the 
particular theoretical orientation of the qualitative study" (Smith, 2003, cited in van Rooyen 
et al., 2008: 21 ). Here, the researcher has tried to remain sensitive to context through his 
commitment to grounding participant's interpretations in the data-rich verbatim transcripts 
and by placing the findings of the study wherever possible within the context of the limited 
literature available (van Rooyen et al., 2008: 21). The researcher has tried to demonstrate 
commitment through his prolonged engagement with the topic ( 6 years) and by his 
development of the skills in the research method (van Rooyen et al., 2008: 21). The 
researcher pursued rigour by seeking "theoretically sufficient" data in this difficult to survey 
population. This sufficiency refers to "a point at which the researcher has developed 
categories suggested by the data with adequate explanatory power" (Dey, 1999, cited in 
Quayle et al., 2012: 18). The researcher tried to foster coherence by justifying why 
qualitative research under a constructivist paradigm was chosen to fit the research goal of this 
study. Transparency is exhibited by disclosing "all relevant aspects of the research process" 
(van Rooyen et al., 2008: 22) and by keeping an audit trail of"coded transcripts, reflective 
notes about interviews and the analysis process, memos detailing the development of 
categories and their properties and dimensions, and diagrams of relationships between 
categories" (Quayle et al, 2012: 20). Impact and importance is demonstrated by providing 
new insights into: 1) how the larger issue of complexity in its relation to resource allocation 
under scarcity could be approached using such micro-cases as the public sector grants system 
examined herein (see section 5.6), and 2) how the concept of ·'well-being" could be re-
examined (see section 5.3) in light of the research herein. 
64 
There are some final quality issues that the researcher would like to make plain. An 
attempt was made to limit biased data reporting through a guarantee of anonymity and 
confidentiality made prior to the launch of each interview instrument (see Appendix 3). All 
cases are included in this thesis (and the exact number of cases was provided) to counter "the 
criticism that qualitative research relies only on cases that support conclusions" (Silverman, 
1993, cited in Meyrick, 2006: 805). Deviant case analysis was undertaken (see section 4.4) 
and an explanation of why some cases contradicted some emergent patterns was given 
(Meyrick, 2006: 805). Limitations on the scope of the research effort however precluded the 
use of multiple and independent coders, triangulation of "methods, samples, theoretical 
approaches, sources" (Denzin, 1978, cited in Meyrick, 2006: 806), or triangulation's 
presumptive successor technique of "crystallization" (Tobin and Begley, 2004). In their 
stead, the researcher provided his advisors on an ongoing, regular basis copies of all data 
(including full transcripts), coding efforts, and data interpretations. Numerous discussions 
with advisors regarding theoretical frameworks, findings, and generalizability issues were 
undertaken. A summary report of general findings was provided to all participants (see 
Appendix 13) in the attempt to provide a respondent validation instrument [Note: Only one 
participant (CEO level) responded with the short comment "Thanks for the summary report. 
It reflects my experiences". A second participant (Grants Officer level) who attended the 
same conference as the researcher approximately one year after the summary report was sent 
informed the researcher that they did not reply to the summary report because of a job 
transition within their organization and that the study findings "made sense".] Finally, all 
survey instruments and coding categories have been provided in appendices to this thesis to 
help address replication concerns. 
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3.6 Ethical considerations 
Every attempt was made to minimize risks to all of the participants involved in this 
study. A Social Science Minimal Risk Application was filed with the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network (HREC) and approved on 13 June 2010. After all 
interviews took place, a final ethics report was approved by the Tasmania Social Sciences 
Human Research Ethics Committee on 15 July 2013. 
The voluntary nature of the subject participation in all parts of the written and oral 
instruments was stressed both in writing and by the researcher in person in the case of the 
oral interviews. Data safety and response confidentiality was also emphasized. Coding was 
specific to each subject and each person will be identified either as the CEO or Grants 
Officer, with each organisation being identified only as NGO "A", NGO "B", NGO "C", or 
NGO "D". In the discussion of findings, every effort is made to obscure individual and 
organisational identities. In the summary report (requested by every participant), only an 
outline of findings and themes is utilized in addition to providing general discussion points. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained why a qualitative approach was employed in the research. 
The research method chosen ( written questionnaire, oral interview, document analysis) 
helped provide the empirical evidence for achieving the study's primary objectives: 
modelling of public sector grants system in Tasmania and providing descriptions of 
unintended consequences in that system. To that end, the theoretical framework chosen fi)r 
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describing this complex system was a parsimonious extension of an existing systems-oriented 
public policy framework. Data gathering and data analysis procedures were described under 
an ethically sound human subject protection-oriented research process. The study results will 





This chapter will present the major results of the analysis of all material making up 
this research project. This analysis consists of two sections. In the first section (see section 
4.1 ), the researcher concentrated on the written and oral surveys of the respondents to 
highlight key issues in the public sector grants system in which the respondents participate. 
Four major categories of issues were derived from the surveys relating both to stakeholders 
such Government and NGOs, and to concepts such as Competing and Complexity. In the 
second section (see section 4.3), the coding process which generated thematic responses to the 
respondent organisations' reactions to funding shortfalls (an overarching theme) is detailed. 
This chapter utilizes three major subsections to present the research findings. Section 
4.1 relates the four general topics of interest which arose from the initial review of the 
research data. These topics of interest centred on two particular stakeholders of the grants 
system-Government (see section 4.1.1) and NGOs (see section 4.1.2) and on two specific 
concepts-competition between the grants system actors (see section 4.1.3) and complexity in 
the grants system (see section 4.1.4). Section 4.2 discusses how these issues helped form the 
conceptual framework, while Section 4.3 discusses how the three coding passes of the data 
illuminated four major themes of grants system behaviour-additional funding, adjusting 
programs and client base, adjusting organisational focus, and cost cutting ( each of which is 
explored in its own subsection). An additional subsection, Section 4.4, looks at outliers and 
discusses why some data contradicted some emergent thematic patterns. 
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4.1 Data analysis/Part 1/Issues 
Case-based issues have been collected under numbered general points of interest and 
key excerpts from the surveys are used to illustrate these issues. The transcript data is not 
provided as "proof' of credibility (Glaser, 1978), rather it is to provide a theoretical chain of 
evidence for future researchers. Furthe1more, following Whitehead's (2004) example-"as 
many quotations as possible were included, and these ... [are] ... of sufficient length to 
maintain the context of the information presented" ( 516). 
These issues were collected under the auspices of this study's pre-existing research 
questions and prior research into the various topics at hand. As such, this and the subsequent 
analysis in section 4.3 does not follow a traditional "grounded theory" approach of 
suspending one's knowledge of the problem at hand (Glaser, 1998) to allow the problem to 
"emerge" (Glaser, 1992). Indeed, many qualitative research methods use different analytical 
approaches. 
Descriptive-interpretive qualitative research methods go by many 
'brand names' in which various common elements are mixed and 
matched according to particular researchers' predilections; currently 
popular variations include grounded theory (Henwood and Pigeon, 
1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), empirical phenomenology (Giorgi, 
1975; Wertz, 1983), hermeneutic-interpretive research (Packer and 
Addison, 1989), interpretative phenomenological analysis (Smith, 
Jarman, Osborn, 1999), and Consensual Qualitative Research (Hill, 
Thompson,Williams, 1997). Following Barker, Pistrang and Elliott 
(2002), we find the emphasis on brand names to be confusing and 
somewhat proprietary. Thus, in our treatment here, we take a generic 
approach that emphasises common methodological practices rather than 
relatively minor differences (Elliot & Timulak, 2005: 147-148). 
Johnson et al. (2001) go so far as to suggest that it would be difficult to label any qualitative 
method as "pure". In this vein, the researcher in the second part of the data analysis (see 
section 4.3) takes one such common research method element, a coding process conducted in 
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discrete stages, and uses it to develop higher level constructs. To that end, this study does 
have a similar goal to grounded theory's ultimate aim-to generate a theory or framework 
applicable to organisations beyond those in the sample (Glaser, 1978). 
4.1.1 Government 
Eight major issues arose in the course of the initial review of the research data 
concerning the stakeholder known as Government. These issues are in highlighted text 
throughout this subsection with each issue discussed in turn. The categories of issues relating 
to Government were as follows: 
I. Government (local, state, &federal) was the primary source of 
funding for all of the NGOs in the sample. 
2. Governments can direct grant awards on the basis of "hot topic" 
social issues. 
3. There might be an inverse relationship between government funding 
and general economic climate. 
4. Government typically funds NGO "programs" or "projects" ---not 
staff development or recurring costs-and.funding is usually tied 
into the political cycle (e.g., grants of a duration of three years or 
less in Tasmania). 
5. Government interest in a service client base and the programs to 
serve it changes frequently over time and not in time horizons best 
suited to NGO programs. 
6. Government can change the grant requirements midstream: NGOs 
have trouble adapting requirements to changing conditions in the 
field. 
7. Government is not a monolith at any level; in each level, there are 
issues in dealing with separate government.functions. 
8. Government is still perceived to be managing risk rather than 
assessing outcomes. 
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1. Government (local, state, &federal) ivas the primary source o.ffundingfor all of the 
NGOs in the sample. 
For each NGO, estimates were provided of government funding as a percentage of their 
total funding. These were 99% for NGO A, 90% for NGO B, 70% for NGOC, and 85% for 
NGO D. These figures are in line with a recent not for profit survey in Australia and New 
Zealand which holds that public sector grants and contracts were "the most significant 
funding source" for both New Zealand (69%) and Australia (79%) organisations surveyed 
(Grant Thornton, 2013: 30). However, it should be explicitly noted that with the exception of 
NGOC, this study's sample ofNGOs were derived from the social services subgroup-a 
subgroup that gets "their primary funds through petitioning the govemment"-and this is the 
"comparatively impoverished part of the nonprofit sector" (O'Donnell, n.d.: para. 7). 
Despite some talk by the survey participants about some general efforts to diversify their 
funding sources, the researcher was left with the overall impression that the NGOs in this 
sample were firmly fixated on government as their primary funding provider well into the 
future. This attitude by these nonprofits is reflected in a U.S. study's results by Vance (2010) 
which holds that "revenue predictability, and risk avoidance, is a goal for many nonprofit 
managers" (14). Interestingly enough, Vance's (2010) study demonstrates that "lower 
percentages of government funding are correlated with increased survival when compared to 
high levels of government funding" ( 1 1 5). Also of note, in a literature review by Brooks 
(2000) assessing the hypotheses that public spending displaces or "crowds out" private giving, 
that public spending leverages or "crowds in" private giving, or the independence of the two 
sources of funds, the following result was reported: 
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Specifically, a fairly convincing picture emerges that crowding-in 
arguments have no strong empirical basis: the claim that government 
funding stimulates giving is generally devoid of both statistical and 
policy significance (211 ). 
Fundraising from other sources, while considered important by almost all participants, 
was considered as an activity requiring specific skills sets for each source, and as such, was 
something of a distraction from their primary funding source. One of the grants officers 
offered the following about attracting public sector grants; 
NGOC: ... it is certainly in some ways easier because it's a process that 
we know better, trying to obtain corporation sponsorship is a little bit 
more complex. The other side of things is, you know, that with the new 
ACNC [Note: The regulatory body, Australian Charities and Not for 
Profit Commission.] there's a limit to the sort of commercial activity 
that you can be involved in and still retain your charitable status .... So 
we get the most of our money from government and we certainly feel 
the pressure to diversify because all, all the pools are shrinking, not just 
private sector pools. So, but it's a little bit different for us, perhaps, 
because we are not largely privately funded. But, when you are, your 
funding means that your staff come and go very directly, there is 
pressure to be constantly on the front foot and making sure that we have 
money flowing in, and that's a, you know, priority. 
while one of the CEOs interviewed sums up their resignation on this point with the 
following comment: 
NGO D: ... because the fundraising dollar is getting harder and harder 
to attract. We would love to get away from government funding but we, 
[pause], it will never occur. 
2. Governments can direct grant awards on the basis of "hot topic" social issues. 
This CEO points out that whatever issue might be foremost in the national 
government's agenda, the same issue might not have any relevance at a pmiicular 
state or local level. 
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NGO B's CEO: You know, need is, is large and govermnents target 
and, you know, some of the targeting, I would have to say is based on 
some research or ability to, you know, meet a need in a community. 
Some of it's based on, you know, there's a national push on for a certain 
sort of demographic to be given services, and Tasmania can be caught 
up in that even though it may not particularly be an issue here that it is 
in other states. 
3. There might be an inverse relationship between governmentfunding and general 
economic climate. 
This relationship was first explicitly addressed in the following statement: 
NGO A's CEO: There's a sort of inverse relationship between the 
health of the Tasmanian community and economy and funding for 
organisations like [Note: NGO name removed.] in the wrong way, if 
you know, you know, so as the economy and social conditions can 
actually tighten and worsen for people, then government support we 
would hope would rise. 
4. Government typicallyfunds NGO "programs" or "projects "-not staff development or 
recurring costs-and funding is usually tied into the political cycle (e.g., grants of a 
duration of three years or less in Tasmania). 
NGO A's Grant Officer: ... there are individual still and profit grants 
that we apply for around things that we are focusing on, but the majority 
if not all of the government money we have applied for in my time has 
been around quite specific programs and related to government agenda 
as opposed to our development. I can think of some exceptions. There 
are, paiiicularly at the federal level there are efficiency and 
development type grants, and the Department of Health and Aging, for 
example is one I can think of where they offer, with each age care 
around there are some opportunities around service developments that 
would assist us in generally delivering our service. 
NGO D's CEO: So it's a three or five, a one or three year funding 
model and you do great work. But realistically something like that, if 
it's a three year model, it really takes you six to nine months to get it up 
and running. By the time you find out about it and you recruit staff and 
you train and they get to know their clients, then you've got that period 
of from nine months to probably two and a half years where the 
program is kind of ticking along and you might need to just refine it and 
73 
NGO D's CEO (cont.): things like that. But then that last six months it's 
really a struggle to keep staff because they know in six months' time the 
funding is going to end and so that, because the funding isn't recurrent, 
what you end up with is staff, because they have mortgages and families 
and things like that, start to leave. So retention of staff is a real issue. 
So really in a three year funding grant you probably get just under two 
years of actually good service delivery because it takes you a while to 
start it up .... 
NGO D's Grant Officer: Well, I think the problem though, if you've got 
a current project, it's almost impossible to get funding for something 
you are already running, so, so, on that basis there is often very little use 
in applying for that, so you do have to tailor what you've got to, you 
know, meet what's required. Having said that, if I take it more about 
things we'd like to do, I think, just, there's less money around for those 
sorts of things where you can say, this is what we think needs to be 
done. In Tasmania, you know, really there is a lot of grants that go up 
to maybe the $50,000 mark, but you can't run a program on $50,000, 
not fully funded. You might be able to fund point, you know, 3 of a 
staff person, sorry 0.6 of a staff person to, to add onto a program but, 
you know .... 
The cycle also seems to cause certain operational issues. 
NGO D's CEO: ... we've got a new program and we need an office. 
We go and say, we can only sign a contract for three years because 
that's when the funding-or even 12 months. And interestingly the, the 
Real Estate Act in Tasmania says that commercial leases should be no 
less than five years. We just cannot leave it at that. Now, three year 
funding is based on, wrapped around government political cycles as 
well because most elections are three to four years, but it has messy 
ramifications for us and our service delivery but also around those 
infrastructure things like, like leases, and as an organisation we don't 
own property. We might have a half dozen properties around the 
country that we own; we lease most of our properties. We don't own 
vehicles; we lease vehicles. So again I'm sure if we could go to a 
finance company, I mean a vehicle leasing company, and say that we 
can lease these cars for five years, there would be a much better deal we 
could do instead of leasing them for three years. You know, similar 
with all our IT, we lease all our IT because in three years' time or in 12 
months' time it's out of date. So we refresh all our IT hardware every 
three years, so obviously a little bit of a rolling basis. I don't know if 
that IT is the same, whether hardware would last five years if we had a 
five year contract, and we are obviously replacing software all the time, 
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NGO D's CEO (cont.): but, but those things outside of service delivery 
are a massive issue which I think hopefully will come out of your thesis 
study that they cause great problems for us ..... 
The same CEO also pointed out this unexpected difficulty in the three year cycle: 
But, what we want to do, because if it's a 3 year contract, and if we 
haven't spent all the money in the first year because we have had some 
delays in getting a full staff team or whatever it might be, and say 
there's $10,000 left over, we would like to roll that into the next... and to 
be honest...most of the government agencies are quite happy within that 
three year funding period to do that .... But, the paperwork you've got to 
go through to do that is just horrendous, and again there's no consistent, 
even within government departments about that, you know, so, some of 
them just want you to write a letter or they might have in, in their 
contracts, you know, if it's $10,000 or less you can automatically roll it 
over. Others, if it's, you know, whatever the figure, if it's $10 you need 
to advise us and we will come back to you. And what normally happens, 
so as I said we are right in the middle of our budgeting process now, so 
all the managers are doing their budgets, and I can't tell them whether 
they can roll that money over until probably middle of June, because we 
write to the department and then by the time they look at it and come 
back to us, so managers are basing perhaps their staffing on having that 
extra $10,000, and all of a sudden I'm, well, we are not sure. You can't 
put that staff member on or, you know. So the timing of the advice 
from governments around things like that is very slow. 
5. Government interest in a service client base and the programs to serve it changes 
frequently over time and not in time horizons best suited to NGO programs. 
NGO D's CEO: ... we, we definitely do that because you build up 
expertise and staff with the skills, but the issue with that question or that 
statement you just said is it won't be, it won't be us who get sick of 
applying. It's the program that will change around us because, you 
know, the government will put out a program say in the youth area. 
They'll either extend your contact if they look at it and all your KP Is are 
fine, or they'll retender it with a, with a bit of a variation because they've 
evaluated that first run of the program and you are often successful 
because, you know, if you've done a good job and, and of course you've 
got the expertise and runs on the board, and then so you've had that now 
for six years, for example, which is a, which is a good sort of security 
for staff in that program, and then, you know, we, we'd like to retender, 
you've built up all those relationships in schools, in the community, in 
the neighborhood houses and all that sort of thing, and then they'll either 
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NGO D's CEO (cont.): drop that program because of a policy response 
somewhere else or change it significantly. That really, I would have to 
rethink whether the skill sets of those people within those programs are 
appropriate for going forward into the next. 
NGO D's CEO: It's really frustrating if you get a grant for a specific 
community to go and do some work there, so somewhere in state or 
federal government or wherever they've identified that, you know, a 
suburb here is the hot spot, you go in there for three years and support 
the community and bang, you're gone. And the community probably 
aren't at the stage where they are self-sufficient, if you know what I 
mean by that. So, so as an organisation, not so much in Tasmania but 
nationally, particularly where we are going into remote indigenous 
communities, we are now saying we won't take funding to go there for 
three years and our Board nationally has made some commitments that 
we will not go there for, a couple of them, 20 years, because we don't, 
and we may deliver the service for the first three years as an 
organisation on a grant, but then it's also about training up those locals 
and the community leaders to actually deliver an ongoing lasting service 
because it takes 10 to 20 years to change the community, the mindset, 
particularly in some of those local, those remote areas. 
6. Government can change the grant requirements midstream; NGOs have trouble 
adapting requirements to changing conditions in the field. 
NGO D's CEO: ... the other thing that they do do, and I know this is a 
major frustration, they change the rules half way through contract 
periods a lot, and so eligibility for the program changes. I know with 
some of the federal government programs that's been a major concern 
for keeping the employment space where they might say that, you know, 
because a lot of that is also funded on activities or outputs, so they want, 
say, that, you know, a, a five year plus unemployed person, if you place 
him in a job you might get $6,000, and I know at the beginning of this 
last three year contract that was about the figure. I mean, if you place 
someone who has been unemployed for less than 12 months, it might 
have paid $500. In the budget last year they changed that $500 to $29. 
PG: $29? 
NGO D's CEO: Yes. So, if, if you, Peter, came in today recently 
unemployed with a whole heap of skills and an employer rings up and 
says, you know, I need a person with Peter's skills, we've referred you 
off and you got placed, we'd get $29 for that placement. If I was 
unemployed for five years and you referred me to the same employer, I 
would have less skills for starters, but the organisation would get $5,000 
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NGO D's CEO (cont.): or $6,000 for placing you. I guess obviously 
they'll say it's a fair bit of work to get me kind of job ready as well, but 
what we are finding across the country, we are still doing the same 
volume of work, but the funding is dramatically, and I'm talking 
millions, reduced because employers are taking more of the $29 people 
because there's more of them on the market and I've got lots of 
redundancies of people, so people are corning on to our books that are 
recently retrenched-and in this employment space obviously it's easier 
to get a job if you, yes, I mean just left or if you are currently in a job 
than it is for us to place a five year. And so there's that conflict also that 
the harder the organisation wants to place the five year unemployed 
person because they've probably got a lot of other issues that getting a 
job would be fantastic, but you try, and economically that's also better 
for us as an organisation, but you are also trying to match the, the needs 
and desires of the employer in this case .... So that's, that, change of 
eligibility and funding throughout a contract period is a pain in the bum 
for us. And there's not many occasions where we can go back and say, 
oh, look, can we change the criteria so, you know, we can deal with a 
broader group, say, for instance, they are not, but say for instance if, if it 
says it's supposed to be 15 to 19 year olds and we've got 13 and 14 year 
olds, now the current funding body of [Note: NGO program name 
removed.] are not that fussed about it, but they could come back to us 
and say, well, we said you are only dealing with 15 to 19 year olds, you 
just report on that, and then we don't look like we are achieving our 
KPis. So what I'm saying is there's, there's quite often a change from 
the funder to us about eligibility, but when we go back and ask them to 
possibly reflect a change it doesn't always work that way. 
7. Government is not a monolith at any level; in each level, there are issues in dealing with 
separate government functions. 
NGO D's CEO: We believe a lot of our youth programs possibly should 
be funded through the Education department because they are 
alternative education [Note: Next word unintelligible.]. These, these 
young people are school aged and they should be at school. Legally 
they should be at school. But they are funded through, you know, 
Police or Health and Human Services or the like, and trying to bring 
Education to the table is very, very difficult. And interestingly, 
Education gets the funding through Treasury, through an annual census 
for every student in their schools, so I might get that funding through, if 
the young person is in a school, it should apply to someone who is 
delivering a service to those young people. But trying to engage with 
Education in Tasmania is one area that is particularly difficult. You can 
get Police and Health and Human Services to the table, but not the 
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NGO D's CEO (cont.): three. Or what you find is again we say the 
clients have to tell their story; so do we, we have to tell their story over 
and over again to different funding organisations .... 
8. Government is still perceived to he managing risk rather than assessing outcomes. 
NGO A's Grant Officer: I think a lot of government reporting is not 
actually getting information about outcomes, it's about getting 
information about we gave them money and they did a whole heap of 
stuff. Whether that stuff actually had a positive impact on the 
community I think is not necessarily relevant yet. I think, I think 
agencies like, agencies like us are trying to get our own reporting more 
to be focused on outcomes than outputs, and I think government are 10 
years behind us. It is my feeling ..... Yes, yes. It's my feeling. We have 
been doing some of this work since the mid 2000s and we are just, we 
are just starting to see government agencies actually come in with 
reporting requirements that are more around outcomes than outputs. At 
the moment a lot of the reporting is still about hours delivered .... but a 
lot of the time the reporting, the reporting, the reporting requirements 
tend to come out for a start after the tender process, they tend to come 
out in contract negotiations, and a lot of the time there aren't systems 
there to capture the data, and so contracts will run for a period of time 
without being able to report because we don't have the system set up. 
We are doing a lot of investment around our own internal systems so we 
can get better reporting, because we think it's important to us. I think in 
time government will also ask for some of this data. But as a sector, 
you know, you know, with compared to other things, you don't get good 
data in the community service sector because we are still, you know, 
working paper files in the majority of what we are doing. So it's kind of 
underdeveloped in terms of systems and reporting but as a sector you 
are seeing a lot of people now investing in case management systems 
and that kind of thing, and I know the time, once the capacity is there 
the government will be able to call on that and get better data. But, I'm 
surprised you don't see more of it in tenders. Most of the time that's 
kind of after the fact; oh yes, now we want to know this, this, this and 
this. And sometimes for agencies like us it's a bit of a shock because 
sometimes we will get asked for things that we have no idea how to 
deliver. Some of them are completely unreasonable. So it seems to be 
a little bit of an afterthought, that kind of data collection, whereas often 
in federal jurisdictions it's set when you become a provider, this is, 
expectations are very clear about what data you will have to provide and 
then when you tender it's on the basis that you can provide that already. 
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NGO B's CEO: Oh, it's risk, totally, 100% risk. And, you know, that's 
what governments, but it's really interesting because I talk, I think about 
this a lot in terms of, you know, that's one of government core roles in 
any community is to manage risk. 
NGO D's CEO: I think it's, it's still in that risk area. I think there is a 
bit of a change, but it is, yes, management of risk has become. has 
increased definitely, particularly as government funding has become 
tighter, and who knows, the tax payers probably support that as well. 
But, they are more interested in the reporting around, yes, your 
compliance and your management of that risk than they are about 
hearing the good news stories about what outcomes you've achieved and 
how you've moved people positively. 
These eight issues regarding Government as a stakeholder in the grants 
system taken in toto paint the Government as a very powerful entity. The 
respondents view it as the agent of primary funding and the government's funding 
mechanism itself to be a bit of a "black box" in which various changing conditions 
in the overall system make this mechanism a highly dynamic one to which NGOs 
must constantly adapt. 
4.1.2 NGOs 
Five major issues arose in the course of the initial review of the research 
data concerning the stakeholder known as NGOs. These issues are in highlighted 
text throughout this subsection with each issue discussed in turn. The major 
categories of issues for NGOs were as follows: 
1. The organisational size of the NGO has a direct bearing on several 
grants issues. 
2. NGOs don't know how the reports they.file are actually used by 
government, especially in the assessment of the social impact to their 
sector. 
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3. NGOs rarely see government agents in the field assessing outcomes. 
4. NGOs consistently have to deal ·with gaps in program funding leji by 
grants. 
5. NGOs have a built-in dilemma. Under fiscal exigency, they have the 
tendency to cut programs last (but cutting otherfunctional areas 
might make acquiringfimding that much harde,J 
I. The organisational size of the NGO has a direct bearing on several grants issues. 
For example, this CEO questions the need for a large number ofNGOs in a 
small state like Tasmania: 
NGO A's CEO: So the state government funds, is it 230 odd different 
organisations in Tasmania? To me, somewhere along the way we 
actually need to say that's not good enough because that number of 
organisations, there has to be costs associated with having that number 
of organisations, where those monies that are currently meeting those 
costs would be better spent to clients. So I think somewhere on the way 
we, the community services sector, need to be saying that's not good 
enough. And that's not, it doesn't need to be, you know, [Note: NGO 
name deleted.J's big now but wouldn't it be better if we had five or six 
other organisations that were a similar scale and size that had the 
flexibility to do some of the local initiatives and things? .... We grow 
anyway. So what we are saying is, we, the sector would be best served 
if some of those smaller organisations or mid-level organisations came 
together, you know, so that then they could give us a run for our money 
better. Do you know what I mean? It actually could lead to a better 
outcome for Tasmanians, I think because there would be more money. 
I'm not saying the organisations are inefficient. They are efficient but 
they are small. Yes, to me, it's a very small bucket really. The amount 
of money that the state government put out to those 230 organisations is, 
you know, some of these large multinational organisations, it's their 
budget. 
While another CEO bemoans how larger NGOs can leverage their scale to deliver 
almost any program more cost efficiently than smaller NGOs: 
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NGO B's CEO: And, and also not only about how you write the tender, 
even though, you know, I'm pretty happy with our size because we are 
very grass roots, so we've invested pretty heavily in knowing our 
environment and writing tenders, so I think the quality of our tender 
would equal a large organisation who can afford a bigger team. But, if 
it's, what happens is the tender at the end of the day, it's about cutting 
costs of delivery and we could never compete with the cost 
subsidization of a large organisation. So my view is the large 
organisations in Tasmania, it doesn't matter which one, if they definitely 
want to win a program, they, they've got it. 
This Grants Officer explains how their organisation's larger size works against it in applying 
for small grants: 
NGO A: ... but certainly my guess would be we wouldn't find enough 
money to justify the extra resources to go and look for it, so we could 
put in for a lot more, 2, 5, $10,000 grants and I'm sure we'd be 
successful because we can put together a strong argument, but the 
amount of effort we'd have to put into applying for them may be greater 
than the amount of money we'd get back in the end. 
PG: I see what you are saying. 
NGO A: So certainly for small things like gardens and stuff, we rely on 
our own donations and pay for them that way rather than going through 
the whole process. 
PG: Oh, is that right? 
NGO A: Because even, even putting, for a $3,000 grant to, you know, 
build a shed at the back of one of our facilities so people can, you know, 
store tools and grow their own vegetables, the amount of regulatory 
mucking around, you know, council grants are a good example, the 
amount of work that's required to fill one of those in as opposed to just 
spending the $3,000 to do it ourselves, it's significant. And the worst 
part is that you can't farm it out to the local manger because they don't 
have all, they don't have the insurance details and, the insurance details 
and the financials, nor is it appropriate necessarily for them to have 
some of that data. 
which is also an opinion shared by this CEO: 
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NGO D's CEO: I would say that most of our management team don't 
apply for anything under $50,000 now to be honest, unless it's with a 
corporate that we want to build longer term relations, because it takes 
you, most grant applications, tender submissions have a four to six week 
window to write them, so you almost have to have, well you do a lot of 
work before even the tender is coming out of that, building relationships 
and from there, that it takes someone full time three to four weeks 
writing that and gathering all the information and researching, and then 
you've got to involve your finance people and I sign it off, and all that 
kind of stuff. Then you put it in and you probably wait up to six months 
before a decision is made. Then when you get the grants, yes, probably, 
probably at least 15% of any grant is used to fund the compliance and 
reporting back. And that's why I say, we could pick up lots of $10,000 
grants but it's probably going to cost us $8,000 to report back and it 
seems to be those smaller grants, because of, because they come more 
from foundations or business, they require, quite rightly they want to 
know what's happening with their money and then they tie us up in 
knots by reporting back, where we could spend $9,500 on service 
delivery and $500 on reporting back but that's [Note: Word 
unintelligible.]. And, yes, like even a very simple thing that takes, that 
costs us $1,000 is our, is our fee with our external auditors to do 
acquittal reports every year. So, if you've got a $100,000 program over 
three years, $30,000 a year, there's $3,000 immediately straight off the 
top just to provide your financial acquittals back. 
The same CEO suggests that the larger the organisation, the more time and resources it can 
dedicate to the entire grants process to the possible detriment of smaller NGOs: 
Now, I know an organisation like us, we've got our own IT systems and 
case management tools, electronic tools and all that so, but if you are a 
very small, two person operation that really does amazing work in your 
local community and you've got to spend half your time reporting back, 
that's not what we are here for, surely. I know that governments have 
got to be accountable and all that kind of thing, but. ... 
Others point directly to their ability to have professional grant writers on staff: 
NGO B's Grant Officer: We write good tenders. We, we just, we've got 
a good team. We are good at designing models for service delivery and 
the way we present our tenders, you know, we've got a few things we do 
in our tenders which we've had feedback from the government that 
other people don't do, which I won't share with you. 
PG: In general ... 
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NGO B's Grant Officer: Yes, just the way we present the written 
document, they find it easy to read. Yes, they just like our approach. 
NGO D's Grant Officer: Yes, I think that having a good grant writer is, 
is essential. If you are, you know, that's probably really one of the 
number one factors because if you can't write succinctly in a way that 
makes sense to somebody that may have no background in what you are 
trying to do, that's really important. 
2. NGOs don't know how the reports they file are actually used by government, especially 
in the assessment of the social impact to their sector. 
NGO D's CEO: And, you know, the frustrating thing, I'm sure we all 
will tell you, you put those acquittals in or you put your compliance 
report in .... 
PG: No one reads it? 
NGO D's CEO: No one reads it, yes, exactly. So that would be 
fantastic if you had to do a report every six months or whatever and a 
month later they came back and said, oh, you know, this is fantastic but, 
yes, we'd really like you to address those two things, and if in six 
months they were the same two things I'd be worried, but if they were 
two different things, it's refreshing and renewing the model of service 
delivery. That's what those reports should be about. 
3. NGOs rarely see government agents in the.field assessing outcomes. 
NGO D's CEO: Absolutely. We know what the needs are. Yes, yes, 
yes, yes. And the other, my final comment, I used to work in 
government many, many years ago, but I would love the, the people that 
put out the submissions and the people that monitor the compliance and 
the KPis to actually come out and see what's happening on the 
ground .... And that doesn't happen often, but it frustrates me that ... and, 
and if you talk to lots of people, if you are working with child and 
family of young people, they would like to come out and spend some 
time with the service and get to know what we do, and it gives them a 
great refresher but it's their leaders that don't let that happen, or that 
you are in Canberra and can't get out of Canberra, or whatever. .. .I think 
that would build a very strong partnership, and that's what it should be, 
between us and the funding body. ft would build a greater 
understanding of the needs that are actually out there and perhaps they 
would be a bit more flexible with their eligibility or whatever it might 
be. And I think it just also gives our staff that support, that, you know, 
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NGO D's CEO (cont.): they are not just giving us the money and 
saying, do x, y, and z. They are actually listening and concerned, yes, 
so it's that perception, morale [Note: Several words unintelligible.] well, 
which I think could really increase. 
NGO D's Grant Officer: Yes, I'll give you another example. It was to 
do with, I was working, still am, I was in a management committee for a 
particular initiative that's going on, and it was to do with literacy and 
numeracy. This topic came up in the context of what we are doing 
around literacy and numeracy and NAPLAN [Note: National 
Assessment Program-Literacy and Numeracy.], and you know 
outcomes under NAPLAN. And basically if, if a young person isn't 
turning up to school, you know, and they are not basically getting an 
education, their literacy and numeracy is poor, the problem is not the 
young person's ability, for example, to become literate or numerate. It's 
basically the issue is much more complex than that. So you look at, you 
know, what's the family going on, you know, is it a dysfunctional 
family? Even if it's functional, do they value education, are they 
encouraging their child, what's the culture that they are growing up in? 
Do their parents work, you know? Is there an example being set? All 
of those things is, all of the things about, you know, logistical, about 
transport to school, that sort of thing, so there are so many layers that 
really you need to look at to go work out why this young person isn't 
turning up to school. And basically there's a range of different people in 
this particular group and they are all saying that, and I had a senior 
bureaucrat with an education more or less say, if we just focused on 
getting them to school, that would solve it.. .. Yes, get them into the 
building. If you can get them in the door, we are all right. And you 
know, and for those of us that were sort of coming more from that 
holistic view, it was like, you know, we've got to be working with 
family services, we've got to be working, you know, with transport. 
We've got to be working within the school and, you know, we've got to 
be looking at alternative programs. We've got to be working with 
health, you know, all of those sort of things. And it is complex, and it is 
difficult, and it is time consuming. But, what you are going to do, you 
know, that's, and that's getting back to what you were saying before, 
what's going to add value. You just fund that way, you know, you fund 
retention programs, getting people into school and that sort of thing. Is 
that what you do? Well, yes you do, but you actually have to think what 
else do you find, and then that partnership or collaboration comes in 
making sure they are working with these other players to, you know. 
It's a lot of hard work. It's, it's resource intensive. It costs money 
because you are employing staff, and the bottom line for me is that if 
that's all you are doing, a lot of this comes down to, like I was saying 
before, what's the attitude of parents or that community. If you really 
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NGO D's Grant Officer (cont.): want to see social change, your ability 
to change things long term is as good as your ability to change attitudes 
within communities and the way people see the world. If you want 
people to be educated, what are you doing in a community that's got 
high levels of, you know, low levels of school attainment? To influence 
their community where it's valuing education and seeing it as important? 
Or you could just, you know, for a lot of them it's just about, well, you 
can do all right off the dole and, we are all right. 
4. NGOs consistently have to deal with gaps in program funding lefi by grants. 
NGO B's CEO: There's a lot of cultural shifts that need to happen in 
organisations like this and it's really hard work actually to, even though 
we have done a lot of work on it here, to overlay a business model on a 
social intervention model, and so when you ask me about, you know, 
the gaps, our workers would say there's massive gaps about the 
outcomes because they want to service to the best of their ability 
everyone who walks through the door. And my view is that if we've 
been contracted for $100,000 to service 50 clients, I'll want to know 
why you only serviced 40, and they say well we were trying to get a 
good outcome with them, and they may get a good outcome with that 40, 
but now I'm $20,000 short in that program because we didn't reach our 
target. So, I think there's an internal dilemma that happens in these 
organisations all the time, and we, you know, so we are pushing our 
workers to service 50 and I keep saying to them, well if you thought you 
could only do 40, we should have said 40 and only got $80,000 to start 
with. I don't have a problem with that. But, now we've employed this 
number of staff because this was the target we said we'd get. So there's 
always that dilemma in an organisation like this about getting the 
outcome that you want to achieve and what the government has paid 
you to do, and I, and you live with it in terms of explaining the business 
model, and we've done a lot of work about how much time we do spend 
with clients. 
NGO D's CEO: Yes, absolutely. Financially, there's not enough money 
to do, because a) there's not enough money to start with, but also, all the 
talk about reporting on clients, but a lot of, a lot of grants when they 
come out they'll say, you know, there's 100 clients in this area. We 
actually get the grant and get out there, there's 200 clients, if you know 
what I mean. So, so the actual, yeah the cohort that we are working 
with is changing quite dramatically .... We, to be honest, I think we all, 
we try to make the funds stretch. That also has some issues for the 
clients, even though you might be serving 200 instead of 100, you can 
do much better for those 100 if you just solely focused on them. So, 
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NGO D's CEO (cont.): you are spreading yourself thin, so we are 
stopping, we might see someone once a week, it might be once a 
fortnight, so, because you don't want to say no to anyone that's ever in a 
very difficult situation and, no, well, actually we've got our numbers for 
this week or whatever and say yes. 
5. NGOs have a built-in dilemma. Under.fiscal exigency, they have the tendency to cut 
programs last (but cutting other functional areas might make acquiring funding that 
much harder). 
NGO B's CEO: Well that's, that's what happened to us a couple of 
years ago. Two ways I'll answer that. We do everything not to affect 
our client programs, so up until two years ago we had seven sites in 
Hobart; now we've got four. We went to the cloud with IT, so what we 
did basically in one year, we took about $800,000 out of our overhead, 
which was massive, and that's how we still achieve client outcomes by, 
you just cut your overhead, and then that comes back to all those 
questions you were talking about earlier, about how do you report, how 
do you write tenders, how do you do all of that bureaucracy that's 
needed in any organisation when, in an organisation like this, you 
always cut the back room services, not the front room services. 
NGO D's CEO: Unfortunately we have, and we are right in the middle 
of our budgeting process now for the next financial year and they are 
very tight, and so what, what happens is the first thing you cut is either 
some of your management or you cut your staff training and 
professional development, or you might cut back on some of those 
infrastructures, things you rent, you know, cars and phones, but, 
because you, again you don't want to touch service delivery. 
The five issues regarding NGOs highlight some features of this stakeholder as the 
respondents posit some self-referential positions. First, they see themselves operating on a 
playing field which is not level-some of their fellow NGOs are seen to have distinct 
advantages within the grants system. Second, they mostly view their role in relation to 
Government in reactive terms. Although they see themselves closer on a day-to-day basis to 
the client population than the more "distant" government agencies that are assessing the 
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impact of their programmatic offerings, they tend to view their own behaviour as more or less 
a direct response to how Government treats them in the funding arena. 
4.1.3 Competing 
Let us revisit the first research question, "Are there any system archetypes noticeable 
in the public sector grants system?" In order to answer that question in a systems framework, 
one must remember that systems self-organise because "some form of competition is a 
requirement" (Richardson, 2005: 9). Here, six major issues that arose in the course of the 
initial review of the research data had their focus on the concept of competition within the 
grants system. These issues are in highlighted text throughout this subsection with each issue 
discussed in turn. The major categories of issues for Competing were as follows: 
I. A sector evolution from "cheapest wins" to "best value wins" is 
underway. 
2. Best practices are considered when developing programs to a 
limited degree. 
3. Prior success at securing grants is important to securing more 
funding. 
4. Good relations with the media and with government and its agents 
are extremely important to organisational success, as is 
organisational reputation. 
5. "Gaming the system" behaviour does take place. 
6. The zero-sum nature olthe grants allocation process makes"fiJr a 
very competitive environment and there is no consensus on whether 
government-required partnerships or joint tendering efforts are good 
for the sector. 
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1. A sector evolution from "cheapest wins" to "best value wins" is underway 
NGO D's Grant Officer: ... but there was a period where back in the 
19s, I guess, when I was involved with the community sector, where it 
was almost like if you are the cheapest, you know, you've got your best 
chance that people would be at risk of undercutting, you know, and 
delivering half-baked services because that's the only way you are 
competing, and then go, oh we'll just make it work. I think 
governments have got the, realized that cheapest is not best and so they 
took the value for money, and mostly speaking I think they are actually 
pretty legit around that. You know, they do treat that as a real concept 
and one that they are always trying to go, well we can't, if it looks to 
cheap then, and certainly again when I was on the other side of the 
fence though, if something seemed to be too cheap I'd be going, you 
know, this doesn't actually seem to be too much, so it might actually fail 
because it's actually unrealistic with its budget .... But, yes, but I think 
that, that is true that governments see the sector as being a cheaper way 
of doing business. But then, you know, the weird thing about it is 
suddenly they may start putting on layers and layers of quality managers 
and contract managers and so, you know, it's, the public service never 
seems to shrink, so it doesn't matter what they do, so, so, but I, but I 
also think there is a sense of shifting risk and that's not necessarily a bad 
thing because you are actually moving, public servants generally NGO 
speaking aren't specialists, and so you know, you are really engaging 
people who are specialists in delivering particular services and 
contracting out, so I think to that degree it's actually quite a legitimate 
way of doing things if you get people who know the business better than 
you might to do it well, it makes sense. 
2. Best practices are considered when developing programs to a limited degree. 
PG: Do you look at sort of best practice within Australia and the world, 
I mean, or are you .... 
NGO B's Grant Officer: Yes, we do. Mostly just Australia. We don't 
really look too far. Although actually that's not true because with our 
housing models, yes, there's a lot of good stuff coming out of the UK, 
so we do, we do look sort of in that direction, but we always look at 
what's happening lNote: Unclear if next word was "in state" or 
"interstate".] and try and, you know, assess if we can do it better, the 
same, what their best practice is .... Yes, I would say that the state is, 
well, housing is a good example. The state doesn't want to deliver, isn't 
delivering all of the same housing services it used to. It's putting it out 
to the NGO sector, and I think the expectation is that you will deliver a 
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NGO B's Grant Officer (cont.): better service for the same, if not less 
money. You know, that's not always going to add up. 
PG: Would you, would you be surprised if everyone in the survey said 
that exact same thing? 
NGO B's Grant Officer: Not at all. So you can probably take that as a 
given. 
NGO D's Grant Officer: I think, you know, and this is a trap 
governments fall into at times. They'll quite often, they do have 
opportunity at times to go and do the research and they have staff that 
look at things, and they'll go, this is fantastic, you know. Common 
Ground is a good example, if you know Common Ground-[Note: 
Word unclear.] idea-worked really well in New York, so you take that 
idea, pull it out of a city of, you know, millions and millions of people, 
and then try to apply it somewhere in Australia, now it's not that it won't 
work, but what you've got to do is think, well, why does it work in that 
context and what are the principles that would work in different 
contexts. The trap can be sometimes governments just can't say it 
works there so it's got to work here. 
3. Prior success at securing grants is important to securing more funding. 
NGO D's CEO: Yes, yes. Very true. There's no doubt that in this 
sector success does build success. You can tell your story. You can, 
you can show the impact you are having and we would, we, obviously 
any grant submissions where you, where you promote the value of our 
own services we are currently running, whether they are directly related, 
but it's about how we have positively changed lives, and that's, you 
know, say if you've got 10 programs you can easily get to 12 programs, 
kind of thing. 
4. Good relations with the media and with government and its agents are extremely 
important to organisational success, as is organisational reputation. 
NGO A's Grant Officer: I think it's about being well known in the 
government sector and doing a lot of advocacy work around issues. So, 
I think there is ... hard to put into dot points ... it's good relationships with 
government, solid experience, representation on peak bodies, so 
certainly in all the areas, so housing, homelessness, mental health, all 
the areas that we have, we have good representation on the kind of the 
peak bodies in that area, and because those peak bodies have influence 
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NGO A's Grant Officer (cont.): over the government reform processes. 
I guess that's how we input and so that's why we are well positioned by 
the time the actually tender comes around to know what the government 
is trying to achieve and how we can respond to that. I suppose in 
Tasmania with the state government, I mean there is, there is a fair bit 
of sector involvement in the development of government agenda, and so, 
and particularly in areas like homelessness, you know the sector has 
been quite involved. 
NGO D's Grant Officer: But I think reputation goes a long way and that, 
that means that organisations like ... you know we, we are not [Note: 
NGO name deleted.] in terms of our reputation or [Note: NGO name 
deleted.], we don't sort of fit in that sphere, but we are, we do probably 
have quite a, ah, we've become more known and we've got a good 
reputation I think one of the key things is having [Note: CEO's name 
deleted.] in the role. He's very good publicly. He's very good with 
media. And, you know, he's got some great relationships that he's built, 
and that work, that he's built, so whilst I would hesitate to say that, like, 
if, if you are saying well, everything's based on merit, reputation NGO 
shouldn't be a factor, I think it still is. And I've worked in government 
and I've been responsible for looking at funding, potential funding 
applications, and you do do more work when you don't know an 
organisation to work out well really what they are about. But if you 
know the organisation and know something about them, it can influence 
your decision to a degree. You've just got to be careful how much it 
does .... Yes, well it could be less or more, depending on their reputation, 
say, but, you know, that's, that's really the theory behind it. That's just, 
you know, what do you know, and we've worked with them in the past 
and they have consistently been difficult to work with and unresponsive 
to requests from us, you know, that's going to influence your decision, 
you know. And you may not appear on paper, but certainly that's a 
factor. 
5. "GaminR the system" behaviour does take place. 
This was perhaps the most difficult discussion topic. According to Gall (2011 ), every 
system (social or physical) "pushes back" against its own functioning, in sometimes very 
unpredictable ways. This supposition does bear certain parallels with another group of 
researchers' efforts detailing subversive "shadow" elements within social systems working 
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against formal requirements (Halpin and Hanlon, 2008; Murray, 2013; Stacey, 2007). 
Naturally, one would expect a certain sensitivity on the part of any system actor to draw 
attention to behaviour not circumscribed by the system they are operating in. This researcher 
had to be almost hyper-aware of what was being said and what was not being said in response 
to questions in this area. In point of fact, the grant officers were much more forthcoming in 
this area ( although much of information gleaned about this topic was gathered after the tape 
recording of the oral interviews was turned off) than the CE Os. All in all, this topic has been 
highlighted as a major area for follow-up research. 
NGO A's Grant Officer: I think certainly there are times where we feel 
perhaps other people oversell what they can do. I don't think anyone, in 
our sector I don't think anyone intentionally goes out to try and oversell, 
because at the end of the day you've got to deliver and the money's 
defined in a lot of the grant processes that we go through. There is a set 
budget. There are set service outcomes. So it's more about the how 
than the what, so I think that's really important, and so a lot of our 
submissions really focus on how ... .I guess the general, the general 
feeling though is, if I think of substantial tenders that we haven't been 
successful with, I suppose you could say that there is a feeling some 
people have perhaps overstated and then when it comes to, once the 
service is implemented, we can say that they would have delivered 
something very similar to what we had planned, and so we wonder what 
the differences are. But it's not always so clear. We don't always get 
that feedback, or at least I'm not aware if we do get that feedback as to 
why they were chosen. 
NGO C's Grant Officer: I don't think it's totally outrageous. I think 
people present the best case they can and I don't expect that people lie at 
all, but I think people always put their best foot forward, so I think that's 
more true than not true, but I don't see any, you know, anything bad 
about that. 
NGO D's Grant Officer: But, when you are asked to apply for a grant, 
quite often they want to know your statistics about unemployment, 
statistics around, you know, and so you do, you know, at times you are 
looking, sometimes you might look at a stat and go, actually that's not 
going to make a strong enough argument for us, where's a better stat 
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NGO D's Grant Officer (cont.): that we can use. So that risk of over-
exaggeration, so I think, look it's there and what you've got to try and do 
is say, well look, we know there's a need there, that's what we applying 
for, how do we best articulate that and provide evidence for it that's true 
and real and fair and not, you know, overplaying it, but it is a trap. So. 
6. The zero-sum nature of the grants allocation process makes.for a very competitive 
environment and there is no consensus on whether government-required partnerships or 
joint tendering efforts are good.for the sector. 
NGO A's CEO: ... it is a very competitive funding environment and we 
will not, when we get to the tendering we will often not share because 
we are competing. Once the tender's in, then we share. And so, so I 
think there is that sense of competition which does mean that you don't 
share .... They could have gone to an open tender and asked anyone to 
deliver the service. I'm not convinced that that approach, where making 
people work together, is necessarily, will necessarily lead to a better 
outcome as if they'd gone to an open tender. 
PG: Why do you feel that way, sir? 
NGO A's CEO: Because I don't know. You know, like, I, this group, 
the [Note: Program name deleted.) group, we've all met together, we've 
got a formal MOU [Note: Memorandum of Understanding.], lead 
contracts, the CEOs, we all meet together. We all love one another. But 
is that going to lead to a better client outcome? Because the costs 
associated with maintaining a relationship between the five parties and 
that sort of stuff, the transaction costs about that, are they going to be 
borne by cost of service delivery? Would it have been better for them to 
have said to one group, you deliver [Note: Program name deleted.]? And 
that's what I'm not sure yet, we'll have to wait to see the outcome of it. 
Another CEO expresses her reservations with the following: 
NGO B's CEO: Whether competitive tendering is the way to go is a 
completely different issue, you know what I mean, because if you, if 
you subscribe to the current system, you've got to put so much resource 
into tendering. However, I, I just think that it's really unimaginative, the 
way that governments have pursued their competitive tendering tool as 
a way of delivering social services. 
PG: You do? 
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NGO B's CEO: Yes, I do. I think it's, it's very limited. It's a, it's a 
competitive, you know so who wins is the one who can write the best 
tender in lots of ways, and I don't know whether that's necessarily the 
best response. 
The six issues raised by the respondents regarding the competitive nature of the grants 
system in which they operate point out the importance NGOs place on their current 
reputational standing to other stakeholders (and especially to Government). Respondents also 
seem to be indicating a paradigm shift in Government assessment from a "cheapest wins" to a 
"best value wins" approach. Finally, certain competitive behaviours and their relationship to 
how NGOs deal with their fellow organisations are highlighted. 
4.1.4 Complexity 
A major issue arose in the course of the initial review of the research data 
concerned the concept previously referred to as complexity. This issue is in 
highlighted text in this subsection and discussed within. The issues dealing with 
complexity were all subsumed under a single heading in the following manner: 
Generally speaking, the public sector grants process is perceived to be getting more 
complex. 
1. Generally .\peaking, the public sector grants process is perceived to be getting more 
complex. 
It is important to note here that "complexity" was mostly allowed to be an emergent 
topic in this study. The resultant picture is one of increasing task, information, and social 
complexity in each stage of the grants process with paperwork requirements seeing an 
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increase in the number and types of questions asked, in different (and variable) reporting 
formats depending on which government agencies (and their preferences based on proprietary 
software and hardware platfonns) are involved, the density of information required, the level 
of detail required at each milestone point, the evolution of program delivery models needed 
to support grant applications, the increasing number of channels the info1mation must go 
through at the organisational level for data retrieval, checking, and approval ( especially as 
NGOs mature and specialization spreads), and the number of government agencies that need 
to be updated ( e.g., multiple acquittal systems across multiple departments over the life of 
many overlapping programs). In larger NGOs like the ones sampled, this complexity can be 
tackled through specialization ( e.g., grant officers used to manage tendering activities, 
program managers who deal with contract compliance issues, and finance managers who deal 
with acquittals-all coordinated usually with the aid of back office technology for data 
storage, retrieval, and communication-technology which is usually capable of adapting to 
changing data requirements from the government). However, smaller organisations that are 
not in alliances with larger providers usually have no such recourse. In addition, the 
complexity of regulatory compliance (which by the accounts herein is inferred to be both the 
number and type of regulations from different government departments) is also increasing 
and affecting all NGOs regardless of size or scale of operations. 
PG: More complex? 
NGO A's CEO: Yes. And, and it's interesting because the ACNC 
[Note: The regulatory body, Australian Charities and Not for Profit 
Commission.] are saying they are going to help with some of that 
because, you know, you'll have report once type of thing, so if you, you 
know, if you are registered then you won't have to include all, some of 
that preliminary detail because it will be on their register. I've heard 
that before. 
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NGO A's Grant Officer: More complex. They are asking more 
questions. I don't think the requirements are more complex. I think 
you've got people sitting in government who are thinking, ah we really 
need to ask about that now, we really need to, there's new OH&S [Note: 
Occupational Health and Safety.] laws, we need to ask more data all 
about that. What I think is, is prohibitive for organisations like ours, is 
if we are applying for 10 major state grants over the year, that every 
single one of them will ask the same questions, they'll want some 
information, and these are organisations that already fund us for $20 
million a year. They know the answers to these questions, but they are 
asking us again because for probity or whatever else. One of, so I see 
that as a big frustration for our sector, and especially in a sector where 
we are applying for government grants but it's not for commercial 
reasons, it's not for profit. We just want to deliver the service. So there 
is a huge overhead for us in, you know, rewriting, in re-providing our 
insurance cover, insurance certificates of currency and, you know, our 
certificate of incorporation and our Board members' home addresses 
and driver's license numbers, and that at a federal and state level. 
There's a lot of duplication around that for our sector, which is pretty 
small, and there are not new entrants all the time, particularly in 
Tasmania. There was a lot of talk about being able to streamline some 
of this stuff; it has not come to fruition yet. Some of it is getting better. 
Some of the bigger government grants will say, you know, if you have 
already, if we already fund you, don't provide this, this and this. But it 
is still a cookie cutter approach to a lot of this stuff. ... Well, it takes time 
and because of the seriousness of this stuff, it's taking time away from 
people who should be focusing on other things. So carriage of the 
tender will all be the responsibility of me as a kind of centralized 
resource, or the responsibility of a state manager, these are, you know, 
senior management roles, so, but because of the importance of not 
missing that form that's required, we can't, it can't be found out. So 
you've got people, people who should be managing, you know, state 
wide services who are instead focusing on whether this particular PDF 
is attached or, it also creates, I mean it just creates volume of paper, you 
know, a lot of tender processes still require a printout of all of that stuff, 
you know, annual reports that can be found on websites, all of that kind 
of stuff You really do have to wonder whether some of it's, wonder 
whether some of it's ever looked at. But secondly, if it is required, you 
know, can we sign that it's available and provide it on request. Some 
things are moving that way, but not enough. 
NGO B's CEO: I think that how it affects us mainly is our finance area 
is a pretty small finance area, and we do have to acquit every grant, 
obviously, and those sorts of things. So it's, you know, just think it's 
hard for organisations of a certain size to invest in good systems, 
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NGO B's CEO (cont.): financial systems or whatever. And, I just think, 
in tenns of the time it takes for our two finance people is just beyond 
the, beyond the pale in lots of ways. 
NGO C's Grant Officer: Just that this, to use this most recent example 
that's uppermost in my mind, there were two parts to the application 
process. One was an expression of interest and the other was a, you 
know, okay you're over the first hurdle, go to the next. And, when I 
was doing my homework, there were, those two stages each had five 
major criterion and they had about six or seven questions under each. 
There, in terms of the application process, say you've got a much more 
rigorous set of information that's provided up front that then is used, 
you know, to measure your compliance down the path in terms of 
budgeting and all those kind of things and commitments that you put 
together, so you've got much greater focus on very particular KPis that 
can be measured and it's much more regular, I think, you know, the 
reporting processes. You know, you don't just get your money up the 
front and give a report down the end, you know, it's very regular staged 
reporting in most cases. That, that goes to a pretty high level of data in 
those cases. 
PG: Takes almost all day, would you say? 
NGO C's Grant Officer: Well, it can do, it can do. Not every day all the 
time, but when you have, you know, a rush of those things together, it's 
a very large proportion of time. 
NGO D's CEO: Yes, I'm just, well certainly this quality and safety 
reporting, which is everything from, you've got fire extinguishers to 
governance and consumer engagement, things like that. I think one, one 
of the frustrations we have is that systems don't talk to one another. So 
IT should be saving you time, but they won't give you the platforms that 
your system will talk to the government system, so you have to do, you 
know, different reports. We almost have to drive, drag data out and 
then rehash it to the government system, which is very old and clunky. 
So I mean, in some ways that are great across the sector, we have 
almost moved forward of the governments IT systems, but you still 
have to report under the government system. 
NGO D's Grant Officer: Yes. It's not becoming less complex. I think 
there's an awareness increasingly from government that, you know, they 
talk about reducing red tape and so I think the awareness is there. I've 
not seen any runs on the board in terms of reducing compliance. My 
bottom line is that, I'll pluck a figure out of the air really, but I think, 
you know, somewhere around 70% of all compliance tasks we are 
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NGO D's Grant Officer (cont.): required to do would be the same for 
any government department, whether it's state, Commonwealth, local 
government. It's going to be the same. So why not have just an 
Australian standard compliance, you know, for those quality areas and, 
and then you'd only have to have difference around the 30% that would 
be program specific. So, so my view is it's fixable if there's a bit of 
willingness. I mean, accountants do it with accounting standards, you 
know, that's all we really need to do, say well this is the objective 
standard and that's what all of governments sign up to do. That would 
reduce compliance. You could have one quality, national Australian 
quality system that you do all that in that in government departments 
can access and do their quality checks on you. So in terms of that area 
of compliance, and I'm talking quality, it could be much easier. 
All in all, complexity in the system is a very timely issue as this matter of reducing regulatory 
complexity by reducing bureaucratic "red tape" is being used by the current Commonwealth 
government as one of the major reasons for eliminating the ACNC. The ACNC's Annual 
Information Statement (AIS) is seen by some in the sector as just another layer of bureaucracy: 
Based on the Commissioner's 45 minute estimate it will take the 57,500 
organisations registered with ACNC a total of 43,125 hours to complete 
the AIS. That is the equivalent of a year's work for nearly 25 full-time 
employees to meet this obligation (ACNC adding to sector red tape-
Uniting Care, 2013: para. 6). 
In summary, there was almost universal consensus amongst the respondents that the 
grants system was becoming more complex across multiple dimensions. This complexity was 
seen to be affecting NGOs in a disproportionate manner-with larger organisations viewed as 
more inherently able to deal with growing complexity within the grants system. 
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4.2 Conceptual framework 
Having followed the guidelines which holds the theoretical framework operates on "a 
broader scale of resolution" (Regoniel, 2010: para. 4), the researcher can now move towards 
those issues which will help shape the more focused conceptual framework. First, we can 
take all the self-perceptual findings of Section 4.1 (8 findings related to Government, 5 to 
NGOs, 6 to Competing, and 1 to Complexity) and start to look at the system the interviewees 
are operating in based on their own contextual perceptions. This approach might be loosely 
comparable to actors describing their performances while acting them out. 
This sample would appear to view Government at all levels as a rational actor. 
Although no one in the sample could pinpoint the formula by which public sector grants are 
either created, awarded ( or by extension denied), or withdrawn, they do seem to share a 
uniform belief that there is a type of coordinated master plan amongst the three levels of 
Government to accomplish three specific goals: 1) to deliver goods and services to the 
community in a value-added way, 2) to maintain a mix of NGO organisations in their sector 
(although there is disagreement amongst the sample respondents about what constitutes a 
healthy mix), and 3) to minimize the risk of any "blow back" or negative consequences from 
the grant awards (primarily through the use of bureaucratic acquittal mechanisms). 
Furthermore, because the majority of their funding comes from Government, this sample 
group of NGOs more or less views their organisations as receptive implementers of 
Government policy rather than initiators (although some are quite proud in their purported 
ability to help shape Government policy). 
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In the theoretical model, Government was presented as an actor which establishes 
public policies ( of which the awarding of Grants is one) and is in charge of implementing 
those policies so as to provide services and support for certain disadvantaged citizens within 
its environmental domain. Using grant awards as a major source of funding, nonprofit 
organisations like the NGOs surveyed are also implementers of policy by virtue of their own 
programs and projects (which are acquitted by Government personnel). If the theoretical 
model is retrofitted with a "rational head actor with a plan" overlay to the Government 
stakeholder description and NGOs as self-described "happy sidekick (and dependent) actors" 
to Government's lead role, one possible course that future research might take would involve 
trying to determine the actual level of planning and coordination between all levels of 
Government to see how valid that perception of Government is, to tease out the nature of the 
dependency relationship NGOs have with Government, and to witness the types of outcomes 
from this "lead actor/sidekick" arrangement amongst the community at large. 
The author has constructed a series of figures (see Figures 3 through 7) that explain in 
more detail the theoretical model. To better explain the operations of the sampled group, 
Figure 3 is a more detailed high level view of NGO operations and is the beginning of the 
conceptual framework. In Figure 3, it is postulated that NGOs come into being usually with 
an organisational mission or client target group (and a sense of independence from particular 
Government public policy) as the genesis for its creation. This area bears further research but 
such a finding would help to explain the large number and diversity of NGOs in Australia as 
local concerned citizenry tackle the same ( or perhaps overlapping) social issues on a local or 
regional basis over time leading to a persistence (and perhaps duplication) of efforts from 
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Figure 3 
Conceptual Framework/Systems Diagram (Top Level View) using Vensim 
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various NGOs. It would follow therefore that larger NGOs evolve from smaller organisations, 
unless a massive infusion of funding suddenly becomes available to establish larger scale 
nonprofits ( again a topic for further study in the areas of corporate and philanthropic giving 
and nonprofit organisational development). Also of note, NGOs operating within a single 
country might quickly organize an international or extra-territorial arm of operations due to a 
disaster or a particularly threatened population elsewhere. It is assumed however that 
those type of creation events are rarer than the more commonplace version of localized focus 
and relatively slow evolution-as NGOs become better known their growing reputation aids 
their fundraising activities (which in tum leads to more programs, increased scale of 
operations, bureaucratic administrative practices, etc. in a complementary systems 
progression of positive feedback feeding funding feeding growth). 
During the creation process, for legal and operational purposes the NGO must be 
classified (e.g., Is it a peak body? Is it an advocacy-oriented organisation? Does it involve 
itself directly with public clients?, etc.). The interests, capabilities, and resources of the 
NGO's internal stakeholders (which is assumed on average to be a small core group of 
founders, Board members, and key employees) are assessed to determine what influence this 
NGO can have on its environment. This influence usually involves some ability to offer 
services or resources to a particular client base. This client base naturally follows on from 
the organisation's classification and mission but is also heavily dependent on its program 
types and quality of service offerings over time. Programmatic development can be seen to 
be naturally based on current (and expected) levels of Desired Funding. NGOs have a variety 
of means for raising funds other than public sector grants ( e.g., fundraising programs, 
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memberships, corporate or philanthropic donations, etc.) as shown in the centre of Figure 3. 
However, their programs are usually running on a continual basis and require near-constant 
funding efforts. Therefore, NGOs must always be aware of the difference between their 
Desired Funding level and their Actual Funding level. It would seem to follow, therefore, 
that an NGO selects a targeted client base from the much wider pool of all those in the 
environment who could benefit from their services. This selective targeting has much to do 
with the nature and parameters of the programs it offers. For example, an NGO might run a 
literacy and numeracy program but only for women aged 12-18, as dictated by the public 
sector grants funding specifications, even though there might be a much wider demographic 
which could benefit from such a program. These Actual Service Recipients help the NGO 
fulfil its larger organisational mission of reducing illiteracy issues in the general public where 
it operates, and these Actual Service Recipients help Government fulfil its public policy of 
reducing illiteracy in the population at large ( and in this example, amongst women 12-18 
years of age). As demonstrated in this example, however, individual NGO programs can 
often leave local demographic gaps across various social issues amongst the population due 
to non-overlapping and discontinuous grant funding specifications. Where outcomes are not 
assessed, the efficacy of each particular NGO program being offered is also naturally an open 
question. 
As this researcher encountered in the sampled NGOs, there is usually a funding "gap" 
when NGOs are heavily dependent on public sector grants (see category #4 in section 4.1.2). 
This gap emerges from the complexity of the social environment. An NGO with a public 
sector grant to fund a program of a certain client size might find itself with an increased 
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cohort, a cohort with multiple issues, and/or a cohort who cannot be fully serviced at that 
pmiicular funding level. When these gaps exist (and anecdotal evidence from the participants 
and the literature of the field points to a near constant state of funding gap maintenance), the 
organisation is usually under considerable pressure to close these gaps. Here is why that 
might be. From the finding that grant awards success breeds more success (see category #3 
in section 4.1.3), it can be reasoned that organisations that depend so much on past successes 
and organisational reputation to secure additional funding across all sources must pay strict 
attention to the quality of their service offerings and how those offerings feed back into the 
perception of the organisation by its clients and ultimately the funding sources on which it is 
dependent. To do otherwise would court organisational disaster. 
To close those funding gaps, the research herein generated only the four coherent 
strategic themes (listed on the right side of Figure 3) which NGOs can utilize. The researcher 
presents each of these in turn in the following section, takes into account their effects on the 
conceptual framework, and searches for any patterned behaviour in the emerging framework. 
4.3 Data analysis/Part 2/Themes 
In the first coding stage or pass used by the researcher, descriptive coding generated 
"a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, 
and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data" (Saldana, 2009: 3). 
These codes or categories can come from the "original language of the participants" or from 
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"the researcher's knowledge of previous theorising and findings in other studies" (Elliot & 
Timulak, 2005: 154 ). These codes, drawn mostly from the word analysis of the survey 
participants' transcripts in combination with concepts derived from stakeholder commentary 
in Australian government reports, are presented in Appendix 8. The researcher, in a bottom-
up approach, attempted to label discrete concepts into object- and issues-oriented categories 
like Bureaucracy, Community, Funding, Grants, etc.--each with their own subtopics. The 
second coding stage, interpretative coding, produced a category of categories: 
In this process we would be looking for similarities and regularities 
between the already established categories. Thus, we typically establish 
categories of the first order that categorise meaning units, categories of 
the second order that categorise the categories of the first order, and so 
on leading to a hierarchy of categories, with the bottom level including 
the meaning units and more and more abstract categories evolving ... 
(Elliot & Timulak, 2005: 155). 
In this second phase, the 121 categories or "nodes" (to use the terminology employed 
by NVivo) from the first phase were regrouped into 12 higher level categories (see Appendix 
9). Each of the nodes from the first pass is presented in a tree structure under the categories 
generated in the second phase (see Appendix 10). The organizing principle used in this pass 
was the attempt to form super ordinate categories of a similar nature by cutting and sorting 
categories "into piles at different levels of abstraction" (Ryan and Bernard, 2003: 103). Thus, 
categories such as Staff/Development, Staff/Expertise, Staff/Grant Writers, 
Staff/Management, Staff/Other Staff Issues ( e.g., Morale, Retention, Work Roles), 
Staff/Sustainable Employment, and Staffi'Understanding Organisational Model simply 
became the super ordinate category of "Staff Issues". 
The third coding pass, abstract coding, clustered the categories generated in the 
second pass into an even higher level of abstraction in order to discover "themes in texts" 
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(Ryan and Bernard, 2003 ). Here, the researcher was guided by the rule of "essential 
sufficiency," which means that "we are looking for the simplest way to fully depict the 
phenomenon" (Elliott and Timulak, 2005: 155). In this way, the potential paths an NGO 
could take to cover funding gaps, an overarching theme which emerged as "the essence" of 
the stakeholder organisations being studied was fleshed out by the creation of additional 
categories: 
We are looking for what constitutes the main findings contained in the 
categorisation or taxonomy, so that we can communicate them clearly 
to the reader. Thus, we may also ask of our results, What categories are 
required to communicate the essence of the phenomenon? (Elliott and 
Timulak, 2005: 155) 
These "thematic" results are presented in Appendices 11 & 12. They are discussed 
throughout this section of the chapter in light of their contribution to the refinement of the 
conceptual framework. 
In Clausewitz's On War (Howard & Peret, 1989), the author develops the concept of a 
critical objective when he notes that in each opposing force, "a certain center of gravity 
develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the 
point against which all our energies should be directed" (595-596). An NGO's centre of 
gravity, the factor that allows them the freedom to act and compete in their environment, 
appears to this researcher to be their funding since so much of their time, effort, and talent 
seems to be concentrated in this area. Funding allows them to hire staff utilize technology, 
develop programs for clients (thereby helping to fulfil its organisation mission), market 
themselves (thereby helping them to compete for additional funding), etc. Helping to feed 
this funding focus, participants describe natural organisational inclinations to evolve (to 
upgrade its technology, to professionalize its staff, to generate efficient internal processes, 
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etc.) and to extend its reach (to offer more programs, to reach more of the Potential Service 
Recipient pool, make its positions known to others in the environment, to affect public policy, 
etc.), especially when the organisation achieves programmatic success and has a good 
reputation in the field (see category #4 in section 4.1.3). Indeed, one could propose that 
NGOs are in locked in a perpetual cycle of trying to burnish their reputations and 
organisational "attractiveness" in order to secure greater levels of funding (for more on this 
fixation on funding see Austin et al., 2006 and Weerawardena et al., 2010). 
Funding shortfalls or gaps cause complex reverberations throughout the organisation 
and would seem to affect every aspect of operations. Some of these gaps are covered 
internally by the organisation by moving existing funds around (although this seems to be an 
adaptation more suited to larger organisations which have multiple programs and thus can 
afford to shift resources between them as needed). This is a short-term solution however and 
does not address the ongoing funding shortfalls. The researcher decided to make the 
conscious choice to gather nodes under categories which could reflect other solutions to 
closing the funding gap. That was the basic principle upon which the "underlying pattern 
recognition and category foundation" activities occurred (Malterud, 2001: 486). 
Other short-term solutions can include obtaining additional funding, cutting costs, or 
adjusting the NGO's "reach" by internally adjusting their programs (number or type of clients 
within programs, number or types of programs offered, number or type of programs in 
development), or by externally seeking help through partnerships or alliances, or by 
outsourcing or subcontracting out service delivery. In the long-tenn, NGOs can address 
funding shortfalls by either evolving into better fundraising organisations or by establishing 
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long-term partnerships, alliances, or subcontracting arrangements which could help tamper 
down funding gaps. Thus, funding is presented here as a nonprofit's key "pressure point," 
and an NGO's four potential adaptations to funding issues are offered as themes that help to 
further develop the emerging conceptual framework. 
4.3.1 Theme #1: Additional funding 
The first theme that arose from the end result of the coding process involved the 
theme of NGOs trying to find additional funding. One of the quickest ways to make up a 
funding shortfall is to seek additional funding. Several factors seemed to limit the 
participants in this study from broadening their funding reach into other domains to a greater 
degree. Public sector grants are a known quantity to them. So much of their organisational 
resources and processes have been utilized in producing grant information in government-
specified formats that exploring other areas is seen almost as a distraction from their key 
funding source. The respondents also claim different skill sets are required to plumb other 
areas. In addition, they maintain that the funding pools in those other areas are not as large as 
Government's (and are shrinking along with public sector grants pools). The additional 
funding theme is thus added to our conceptual framework in Figure 4. Figure 4 is the first in 
a series of four modified causal loop diagrams (see Glossary of Terms), with each describing 
one theme derived from the analysis. 
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4.3.1. l System behaviour 
In Figure 4, the difficulties in seeking out additional funding can be more readily seen. 
A natural reaction for organisations so dependent on public sector grants for their funding 
would be to seek out additional grants to make up for any shortfalls experienced. They could 
seek out other sources of funding depending on their competence and history with those 
fundraising sources but this requires an ongoing evolving organisational capacity to scan the 
environment for such opportunities. They must then have the ability, desire, and willingness 
to continually forge new relationships with outside entities like corporate or philanthropic 
organisations as well as to maintain older connections. At the same time as contingency 
funding efforts were ongoing, a learning organisation could be training to deal with funding 
gaps on a more systemic basis (for example, by imposing tighter restrictions on service 
parameters in each program offering-something potentially very difficult to achieve in an 
environment operating under a social service versus a corporate control model of operation). 
Thus, early on in this theme, a "vicious cycle," or a "deviation-amplifying loop" (Masuch, 
1985: 16), could present itself. 
Vicious Cycle: An NGO with a track record of success in obtaining 
government grants is likely to seek additional grants to cover shortfalls. 
Prior success in obtaining grants on a contingency basis can decrease the motivation of the 
organisation (and the level ofresources it earmarks for those efforts) to explore alternative 
funding mechanisms. In terms of systems "archetypes," the left-hand side of Figure 4 
described so far bears the hallmark of a variation of a "Shifting the Burden" archetype called 
''Addiction''. It is called Addiction because what results from following such a pattern is 
addictive behaviour focused on a symptomatic solution rather than a "fundamental" solution 
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(Anderson and Johnson, 1997: 125). This symptomatic solution "produces a side effect that 
systematically undermines the ability to develop a fundamental solution or capability" 
Anderson and Johnson, 1997: 125). Using the terminology of causal loop diagrams, this 
archetype is made up of two balancing loops (see Balancing Process in Glossary of Terms) 
and one reinforcing loop (see Reinforcing Process in Glossary of Terms). In this case, the 
two balancing loops combine to act as another reinforcing loop, pushing the system away 
from a fundamental solution. 
Moving left to right in Figure 4, another vicious cycle could be encountered if 
"gaming behaviour," or trying to manipulate a system's rules (or lack thereof) and procedures 
(or their inadequacy) to obtain a good outcome, is utilized by the NGO in question in its quest 
for public sector grants. Gaming behaviour can take many forms, from exaggerating the best 
case scenarios presented in grant applications, to overstating the problem areas they will be 
addressing, to disguising what the funding is actually covering, etc. Gaming behaviour has 
been noted wherever social systems are established (see for example Baker et al., 2008; 
Berne, 1964; Morreim, 1991). However, if an NGO games the system successfully, this 
could lead to additional addictive behaviour: 
Vicious Cycle: An NGO with a track record ofsuccess in gaming the 
grants system is likely to attempt additional gaming strategies in the 
future. This behaviour also reinforces an NGO 's dependence on grants. 
In the three loops to the right side of Figure 4, another systems archetype presents 
itself naturally. As the survey respondents stated, Government at all levels, especially in 
times of fiscal exigency, is increasingly under pressure from stakeholders to justify the 
efficacy of the expenditures of its grant-based (public) monies. This pressure often results in 
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Government devising and administering more and more complex application, reporting, and 
compliance systems in part to obtain quality measurements so as to reduce the "risk" of grant 
award decisions. In other words, Government is in a perpetual mode of dissatisfaction with 
the amount and quality of the data exchanged between itself and its grant recipients. 
NGOs feel threatened (and overburdened) by this increasing level of complexity in its 
interactions with the government and some have the choice to respond by gaming the system 
(as discussed above, the more successful gaming behavior an organisation exhibits, the 
greater potential that this behavior is reinforced). Fear of underfunding in a zero-sum 
funding arena places them by default in a field of intense competition which tends to 
naturally reduce NGO alliances that could provide aid to cover gaps-another potential 
vicious cycle: 
Vicious Cycle: An NGO is less likely to share data with other 
organisations it is in competition with for funding/or fear of losing its 
competitive edge, showing weakness, or potentially lessening the pool 
of available money. 
Taken as a whole, these loops form a systems archetype known as Escalation. In causal loop 
terminology, two balancing loops "will create a figure-8 effect, resulting in threatening 
actions by both parties that grow exponentially over time" (Anderson and Johnson, 1997: 
123). Each actor uses self-defence tactics because each views the other as a "threat" 
(Anderson and Johnson, 1997: 125). A suggested area for future study would be to explore if 
the composite results of this "cold war" are being consciously examined by any of the system 
actors and what effects it has on system complexity. 
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4.3.1.2 Thematic Summary 
The emergent theme of NGOs covering shortfalls in their program budgets by seeking 
additional funding seems at first glance not to be particularly revelatory. However, the search 
for additional funding has a significant impact in the conceptual framework as one of the four 
rather limited strategic paths that NGOs can pursue. It is a path fraught with peril as several 
archetypical traps lie in wait, including the potential to develop an dependence on certain 
funding mechanisms, to game the system to promote best possible funding outcomes, and to 
view other NGOs as competitors rather than as sources of cooperative energies. 
4.3.2 Theme #2: Adjusting programs and client base 
The second theme that arose from the end result of the coding process involved the 
theme ofNGOs adjusting their programmatic offerings or adjusting their target clientele 
when they encounter funding shortfalls. This second theme is shown in Figure 5. To achieve 
its Desired Level of Funding, NGOs can attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff so to 
speak and focus on those programs which prove to be self-sustaining through ongoing public 
sector grants. In addition, the organisation might be tempted to alter its target client base so 
as to serve its preferred clients through such self-funding programs. However, when this 
strategy is added to the conceptual framework, two potential Systems Archetypes become 
immediately apparent. 
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4.3.2.1 System behaviour 
With the first Archetype, "Success to the Successful," an NGO's decision-making process 
regarding which programs should remain in its retinue of offerings is explored. The upper 
two reinforcing loops in Figure 5 are examined under the assumption that at any given time, 
an NGO will have programs "underway," that is to say, programs which have been funded, 
staffed, and are currently serving clients. At the same time, however, an NGO is likely to 
either have programs which are not yet fully funded ( e.g., programs being trialled or 
programs in development partially in response to changes in client demographics, to different 
social issues as they come to its attention, to feedback on its existing programs, etc.) or 
programs not currently funded by public sector grants. In these circumstances, the NGO 
might not be aware which of its other programs are "grant-worthy" and which are not due to 
the ever-changing shift in public policy focus by Government at all levels. Hence, an NGO 
often finds its own portfolio of programs in an arena where they are competing for a limited 
pool of resources. If there are two competing programs for example, success here is usually 
measured by how grant worthy each program is (i.e., not on other criteria such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, or community outcomes). If one program starts to gamer more grants than the 
other, then this program would tend to get more resources dedicated to it. The typical result 
being is that the other non-grant funded programs are eventually starved of funds in favour of 
those programs receiving grants in the near term. 
The Success to the Successful Archetype endemic to competing programs can also 
foster a vicious cycle in terms of client base: 
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Vicious Cycle: NGOs that ahvaysfavour grant-worthy programs can 
find the nature of their client base changing over time regardless of 
their organisational mission. 
This vicious cycle is also a side effect reinforced by another System Archetype called 
"Drifting Goals," which is composed of two balancing loops with each loop undermining the 
hoped-for balance the other loop is trying to achieve. In this case, there is the potential for an 
NGO to succumb to a "drifting away" from target clients to grant-worthy clients (a client 
base favoured by current public sector grants). In other words, the gap between an 
individual NGO's target clients (clients targeted through the organisational mission), grant-
worthy clients (clients that the public sector grants favor), and (potential) clients not covered 
( or under-covered) under grant guidelines would be growing over time as ever-changing 
social conditions produce more variety in those that could benefit from service delivery and 
there is an inevitable delay in the change of client focus by NGOs and Government. An 
interesting follow-up research area would be to explore these "gaps" in the coverage of public 
policy instruments. How large a part do they play in the persistence of social problems?-a 
persistence which in tum feeds the cycle of program need and service delivery by NGOs. 
Ultimately, changing the focus of the programs and client base can be an indication of 
mission drift-"when a nonprofit unintentionally moves away from the organization's 
mission" (Hurvid and Anderson, 2013: para. 3) in order to "secure funding in more 
challenging economic conditions" (Hudson, 2010: para. I). By drifting into service areas 
where they do not have expertise or the proper management structure (Hudson, 2010), the 
negative consequences of chasing the funding dollar can feed back into an individual NGO's 
distinctiveness in the field and its reputation (see Figure 3), and thus ultimately in its ability 
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to fundraise, to maintain organisational focus on its mission and goals, and, critically, to meet 
Government's "compliance" regulations for nonprofits (Hurvid and Anderson, 2013: para. 6). 
4.3.2.2 Thematic Summary 
The emergent theme of adjusting programs and client base highlights one of the more 
problematic aspects of an NGOs evolution in a zero-sum environment. As it adapts to 
funding shortfalls by favouring "grant worthy" programmatic offerings and oftimes changes 
its client base in pragmatic fashion to those who can serviced by grants, an NGOs ability to 
maintain its mission and goals is frequently tested. 
4.3.3 Theme #3: Adjusting organisational focus 
The coding process generated a third theme that coalesced around the issue of closing 
funding gaps. By adjusting organisational focus, the dynamic tension between two 
sometimes competing energies in the organisation is displayed (see Figure 6). Competition in 
this field (uniformly described as intense by the respondents) is a type of social Darwinian 
selector that favors larger NGOs with more professional staffs who have an intense drive to 
acquire funding-competition only partly offset by government's intentional seeding of the 
field with grants to a diverse range of NGOs. 
Although there is no fundamental reason an NGO cannot achieve a more balanced 
outcome, NGOs over time can be pushed onto a track of either offering high quality client 
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Figure 6 
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services or evolving to become highly efficient in acquiring funding. In part, this is a 
response to a natural impulse to hire and maintain larger and more dedicated staffs around the 
money-raising side of the organisation, because more professional staffs are able to fill out 
grant applications more efficiently, complete more and a wider range of applications, and are 
able to handle the increased number of reporting/compliance mechanisms that successful 
grant awards bring. 
4.3.3.1 System behaviour 
In Figure 6, we can visualize these dual pressures under the systems archetype 
"Success to the Successful," which was encountered before when competing programs within 
an NGO were examined. If we think of the funding side of the organisation and the client 
services delivery side of the organisation in competition for resources, it then becomes 
possible to imagine scenarios where NGOs are pushed by their own success in one of these 
areas to further increase specialization in this area. Indeed, there are examples in the field of 
certain "umbrella" NGOs who occupy the top of a collective pyramid and who choose to 
outsource the actual service delivery to other organisations in this structure. 
Because of the systems archetype of "Limits to Success," a very successful (fund-
acquiring) NGO might have trouble maintaining excellence in both the money-raising and 
service delivery operations over the long-term. Its fear of competitors is reduced somewhat 
by its success in fundraising. This reduced fear can lead to its subcontracting service 
delivery (or acting as the top of the pyramid to a cluster of sub-NGOs). These growing 
actions to subcontract out services initially lead to success, which encourages even more of 
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those efforts. Over time, however, the reinforcing process of expanding services by 
subcontractors "will encounter a balancing process as the limit of that system is approached" 
(Anderson and Johnson, 1997: 124). As the NGO approaches the system limits, its efforts 
generate only "diminishing returns" (Anderson and Johnson, 1997: 124). Here, the limits 
would be the NGO' s inability to control the quality service levels of its subcontracting agents 
over time and its own sense of mission drift-i.e., the staff perception that an NGO set up to 
help people is now primarily a fundraising organisation that offers decreasing amounts of 
direct client services. This system behaviour can lead to a reinforcement of the decision to 
specialize in one or the other area of operations. 
4.3.3.2 Thematic Summary 
The emergent theme of adjusting organisational focus speaks to the strategic choice 
faced by all NGOs in their selection of internal operational focus. Should an NGO 
concentrate on acquiring funding or on servicing clients? Is there a chance that a balanced 
outcome can be achieved, or does an imbalance simply serve as an evolutionary tool leading 
to organisational specialization? 
4.3.4 Theme #4: Cost cutting 
The coding process generated a fourth theme that coalesced around the issue of 
closing funding gaps, namely, that of cutting costs which was a highly sensitive issue to most 
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of the respondents surveyed. According to the consensus of the study respondents, cost 
cutting activities usually target an NGO's programmatic offerings last. Everything else, 
including staff, back office technology, infrastructure, etc. is targeted first (see section 4.1.2). 
This strategy is replete with short and long-term consequences for the organisation. For 
example, by selectively cutting the funding or support side of the organisation, an NGO 
might quickly find itself unable to continue its existing programs or maintain its funding 
levels ( due to loss of experienced funding personnel). 
4.3.4.1 System behaviour 
In Figure 7, the gap in the Desired Level of Funding starts to interact with the 
organisation's quality service goals (goals that operate across its entire range of programs). 
The gap in funding can quickly cause a gap in an NGO's desired performance level and its 
current level of performance. The NGO can respond to this gap between its goal and actual 
performance by either "taking corrective action to achieve the goal, or by lowering the goal" 
(Anderson and Johnson, 1997: 123). If the funding gap is persistent and prevents the NGO 
from taking corrective action to achieve its quality service goals, this archetype suggests an 
inevitable lowering of its quality goal. This gradual lowering of the goal over time can also 
cause the entire organisation's performance level to "drift" downward. As Anderson (2009) 
points out: "This drift may happen so gradually, even without deliberate action, that the 
organization is not even aware of its impact" (60). 
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Figure 7 





l System Archetype~ "Drifting Goals" j 
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As explained by the survey respondents, if an NGO chooses cost cutting as its main 
strategy to close funding gaps, then it can expect a gradual degradation of quality services 
since maintaining high quality service delivery requires such a large investment in both 
personnel training and quality process development. There would also appear to be a link 
between an NGO' s quality of service delivery to staff morale and retention, client feedback, 
and organisational reputation. Serious degradation in services over time would likely 
reinforce the funding gap leading to another potential vicious cycle and a downward spiral. 
Vicious Cycle: NGOs that get addicted to cost-cutting as a way to close 
funding gaps are subject to a gradual lowering of quality standards 
which in turn has an adverse impact on their organisation's reputation 
and ability to raise funds. 
If the funding gap can be successfully addressed, this archetype holds out the hope that a 
situation could develop where goals and standards continually improve-however, more 
study is needed to determine just how successful NGOs that become addicted to cost-cutting 
. . 
are m reversmg course. 
4.3.4.2 Thematic Summary 
The emergent theme of cost cutting to make up funding shortfalls probes the strategic 
track that many NGOs take by necessity. However, NGOs might not be aware of the 
archetypal traps that can await them if this strategy is employed. It would appear that an 
NGO in a cost cutting cycle could see its service quality erode which in turn affects its 
organisational reputation and its ability to raise additional funds. 
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4.4 Outliers 
Following Meyrick's (2006) suggestion, deviant or negative case analysis was 
undertaken, in part to explore those subjects' "experiences or viewpoints [that] differ from 
the main body of evidence" (Hsuing, 201 O; para. 1 ). Unfortunately, low respondent 
feedback on the general breakdown of findings derived from the second section of analysis 
leaves the conceptual model in need of further exposition to a new future sample. On the 
twenty points raised in the first section of analysis, there was general (but not uniform) 
agreement from within their collective dialogue on each of the major points with the notable 
exception of the respondents from NGOC on certain issues. As stated before, NGOC was 
the only NGO in the sample that did not have an ABS classification of Social Services. 
Rather, it fell under the ABS heading of Law, Advocacy and Politics as it is a peak body and 
as such does not interact with clients from the general public. It was also the physically 
smallest in terms of staff (with the CEO being the only full-time person). It applies for a 
small number (10 in 2013) of public sector grants and each of their grants has a single 
fulfilment agency to which they have to report. Their other government paperwork is also 
much less in comparison to the social services NGOs as the grants officer there explained: 
We are a peak body, so the sorts of things that we are getting our money 
for are slightly different and, you know, the compliance and those sorts 
of elements of the grant are slightly less for us. And recently when we 
had our quality audit from the Commonwealth government on the grant 
program that we get from them, it was principally about our govern-
ment's arrangements and two whole sections of the compliance 
standards we didn't have to, to meet. So, I think that might be where 
some of the difference is coming in. 
Given their more limited interactions with government across the spectrum of the 
grants process, it was not surprising to note slightly different responses to issues of 
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complexity (see section 4.1.4). This NGO sees such complexity (whatever the level) more 
along the lines as the cost of doing business, whereas other respondents were much quicker to 
talk more about the burdensome aspects of complexity in the grants system. As Riessman 
(1993, 23) points out, "A transcription is already an interpretation." Also, by using the 
respondents' source material to shape our metaphorical conceptions, "as investigators we, in 
turn, interpret their interpretations" (Andrews, et al., 2008: 154). Adhering to these warnings, 
the researcher suggests that more nuanced questions around these two sides of the complexity 
coin should be developed in future research. Also, the researcher suggests more variety in 
NGO classifications and in the number of grants received per year per organisation in future 
sampling efforts. 
In addition to that particular case, other areas where the perceptions of the 
respondents is not uniform is in the area of competition (see especially point #6 in section 
4.1.3 which delves into government enforced joint tendering, alliances, etc.). Since joint 
tendering is relatively new to the NGO domain in Tasmania (and at the Commonwealth level) 
and several of the respondents were in the process of their first major experiments with these 
new arrangements, there was considerable ambivalence expressed (sometimes in the same 
transcribed paragraph) about the efficacy and efficiency of such arrangements. For example, 
this grant officer speaks of joint tendering as improving the business of everyone involved yet 
leaves the impression that this approach is still very much an involuntary effort: 
NGO B's Grant Officer: I guess like with the two, the two programs I've 
just been talking about we didn't have a choice, you know. The 
government is like, you can do this collaboratively or, you know, out the 
door, so you know, it's improving everyone's business, it's not just 
improving our competitors, you know. It's a bit of a, you know, ... .It's 
not that simple, you know. Sure if we can get $2 million by ourselves 
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NGO B's Grant Officer (cont.): we'd rather have it ourselves but, you 
know, if we can't get it by ourselves and we have to collaborate, we'll 
collaborate, you know. 
The researcher makes note of this and suggests that the life cycle of these types of govern-
ment initiatives be explored in greater detail in future queries to tease out in part if any long-
term collaborative efforts are generated from them. 
Finally, the researcher was surprised to encounter the great difficulty in securing 
historical data about the grants process in this sample ofNGOs. This is in part due to past 
record-keeping efforts being concentrated in paper files, with such files potentially dispersed 
throughout the organisation. A greater confounding factor which presented itself was staff 
turnover. Almost everyone interviewed occupied their position for less than five years. The 
grants officers in particular could provide very little historical perspective on the grants 
process in their organisations. Furthermore, according to a majority of the respondent's 
accounts, there is also a corresponding high rate of turnover in the government departments 
dealing with grants (potentially leaving few subjects with a long oral historical record about 
the grants process). One grant officer put it thusly: 
NGO D's Grant Officer: ... and I've had the experience of working on 
the inside. The amount of turnover that public servants and people 
moving around and, you know, where I worked I, the Commonwealth 
department, saw an entire unit change in personnel over the course of 
six months. So you are dealing with people who have no background, 
subject matter expertise. They've got no idea. They are bureaucrats, 
they know how government works, but they don't know anything about 
what you are doing. And that's phenomenally difficult to manage. You 
are, essentially you are training up, you know, and there is advantage in 
that. If you've got the scope to do it, you can actually, you know. But, 
yes, it's just, that's, that's ridiculous. Surely you can manage that thing 
better and keep some personnel and just lose a few, but yes. So, you 
know, there are some government departments where the culture is, you 
cannot be in a position for longer than three years and then you get 
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NGO D's Grant Officer (cont.): tapped on the shoulder and moved 
elsewhere. Yes, and once that's the case, it makes it really difficult 
because you get no longevity. So. 
Another factor which came into play was the issue of data privacy. Future research should 
explore how such historical evidence (which could be a prime area for demonstrating 
increasing complexity in the grants systems) could be ethically obtained within a reasonable 
timeframe. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The thematic analysis undertaken in this chapter allowed the researcher to explore 
some organisational strategic pursuits that were understood and commonly used by the 
respondents. This analysis fleshed out the conceptual framework posited by the researcher to 
a degree that the researcher is now confident that the framework is now contextually rich 
enough to offer several insights into the public sector grants process and to indicate directions 
for further research and refinements. Analysis was not stopped at this current level because 
"the constant comparison of incidents in the data to elicit the properties and dimensions of 
each category or code" reached some sort of theoretical "saturation" of categories ala 
grounded theory (Evans, 2013: 41 ). Additional literature review and sampling of other 
actors in the public grants system could keep the search for new categories an ongoing 
process for many more years. As Mathison (2012: 169) points out however: 
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Within the time and resource constraints of a PhD study however, 
limitless literature sampling means that new data may continue to 
emerge well beyond a reasonable timeframe ( cf. Dey, 1999; Partington, 
2002; Thomson, 2007). Dey's alternative measure of 'theoretical 
sufficiency' (1999: 257) responds to this potential difficulty by 
suggesting that sampling cease when data that is sufficient to theory or 
theoretical construct development is obtained. Supported by Seidman 
(2006), the concept of sufficiency addresses, in part, Glaser's (1992) 
concern that the process of coding may result in data being 'forced' 
into categories to achieve saturation, while still providing some 
boundaries in terms of time and resources. Following Jeon (2004) and 
Rice and Ezzy ( 1999), theoretical saturation was considered to be more 
closely related to the quality of the data obtained rather than the 
frequency and total volume of the data. 
This sufficiency approach mirrors the researcher's "strategic choice" on when to stop 
studying a case's complexities, as put forth by Stake (1994): "Not everything about the case 
can be understood-how much needs to be? Each researcher will make up his or her own 
mind." (238). Thus, in this spirit of "theoretical sufficiency," case analysis can now turn to 
other matters as the current conceptual framework is now demonstrably sufficient to raise a 
number of issues with the identified actors on the public grants system stage. It can also be 
used to refine the research questions to move forward with follow-up research endeavours, 
some of which will be discussed in Chapter Six. It also favours the researcher with some 






A thorough review of the emergent themes combined with elements from the 
literature review allowed for the extension of the theoretical framework of the public sector 
grants system into the conceptual framework focusing on NGO operations that was 
considered in Chapter Four. This framework helped illustrate commonly recognized systems 
behaviours such as "gaming" and relationship building amongst stakeholders, as well as 
certain responses to funding shortfalls which emerged as a loci of concern for the survey 
participants. Their responses were shown to potentially follow certain system behavioural 
patterns, or archetypes, that can be postulated as endemic to this system's conceptual 
foundation. Figures 3 through 7 created by the author visually try to capture these 
behavioural patterns so that insights into the grants system can be more easily garnered by 
examining the linkages between the various issues system actors face and their subsequent 
likely responses. The initial research questions can now be re-examined in light of these 
insights. 
It is not suggested that these survey findings are generalizable, however their 
"uniqueness" might indicate how these findings could "extend" to other cases (Stake, 1994: 
238). This perspective will also be used to frame follow-up research endeavours. 
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5.1 Discussion of findings in relation to research question one 
Research Question One: Are there any .system archetypes noticeable in 
the public sector grants system? 
Based on the conceptual framework, five system archetypes presented themselves as a 
result of analysis. In the archetype called Shifting the Burden-Addiction, it was suggested 
that the "easiest" way to make up a funding shortfall is to apply for additional grants. This 
dependence of public sector grants can blind an organisation to other funding opportunities 
and inhibit the building of organisational capacity to search out funds from other sectors. 
In the archetype called Escalation, Government and NGOs can get locked into a cold 
war of complementary fears. Government fears centre around the negative publicity effects 
of poor grant award decisions, thus government is constantly trying to minimize this risk by 
requiring ever more complex reporting compliance from NGOs. NGOs, seeing only an 
increasing arc of burdensome paperwork requirements and a shrinking pool of funding, also 
have the potential to respond fearfully by viewing fellow NGOs as natural competitors and 
competition in this zero-sum arena as a standing ban-ier to alliances and to the sharing of data 
amongst fellow NGOs. Furthermore, natural "push back" behaviour against system 
requirements can result in gaming the system as Liddell William's reference to an issue 
raised by Liz Plummer of Saving Animals From Euthanasia illustrates: 
Almost every grant we apply for wants to fund a 'project'. We battle 
every day just to carry out our core business and to keep volunteers to 
enable us to do this. Other Grants will not fund everyday running costs. 
We are getting better at creativity with respect to how our huge vet 
account can become a 'project' (Williams, 2009: para. 19). 
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Government recognizes this gaming behaviour and further tightens its requirements and the 
cycle carries on. 
In the third archetype, Success to the Successful, NGOs are hampered by not knowing 
which of their current or developing projects will be "grant worthy". If a project suddenly 
becomes grant-worthy, then it has the potential to drain resources away from other (even 
long-standing successful) projects. In large measure, project success would seem to be 
determined by the acquisition of grant funding not on objective standards of project 
efficiency or effectiveness or by measures of social outcomes. 
Under the fourth archetype of Drifting Goals, another side effect of grant dependency 
appears. This is a "drifting away" from target clients to grant-worthy clients as target groups 
specified by grant specifications rather than the organisational mission are focused on. Also 
covered by this archetype, cost cutting measures meant to preserve existing programs can 
cause an organisational drift to lower quality service standards over time as the resources 
needed to maintain high quality standards start to evaporate. 
Under the fifth archetype, Limits to Success, there is a natural tension inherent in the 
system design which posits competing elements within an NGO that push it to specialize 
either in raising funds or in delivering high quality services. Although there is no 
fundamental reason an NGO cannot strike a balance between the two, it is obvious that some 
NGOs do get channelled into one end of the spectrum or another. Because of the competing 
skill sets involved in both types of operations, some NGOs evolve into specialist fundraisers, 
while others try to focus mainly on service delivery. Those that attempt a middle way and 
perhaps try to outsource service delivery are in danger that they might meet with initial 
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success but in giving up control of its quality service levels to its subcontracted agents, over 
time initial success could give way to decreasing service quality levels. Concomitant with 
those actions, the ripple effects of reducing the importance of direct service delivery could be 
reflected in other organisational areas such as morale, retention, recruitment, etc. which in 
turn could affect the organisation's reputation and ability to raise funds. The presence of 
these five systems archetypes embedded in the public grants systems design immediately 
gives rise to a plethora of follow-up questions. 
First, one could focus on the archetypes themselves. We can start by assuming that 
the "pressure point" of funding gaps will most likely always be a part of the system. 
Supporting that assumption, a recent Grant Thornton Not for Profit survey (2013) covering 
Australia and New Zealand found that funding is "the most significant challenge" facing 
nonprofits: 
A significant number could not plan more than 12 months ahead based 
on their current funding, and it was clear that many would not survive 
for more than six months if their current funding was not renewed ( 4 ). 
Given this assumption on continued funding shortfalls, how should the system archetypes be 
addressed? If the archetype Addiction is a "natural" feature arising from grants systems, is 
there a more "healthy" mix of funding sources that each NGO should strive for? Does the 
systems archetype Addiction exhibit any parallels to a physical addiction, perhaps in the 
sense that they both become more fixed over time? To deal with an Escalation archetype, 
should NGOs found to be gaming the system be censored in some way, or will penalties 
simply encourage more elaborate gaming behaviour? Should alliances and joint tenders 
amongst sector actors be encouraged or mandated? Given the ongoing competitive, zero sum 
nature of grant applications, would such alliances truly foster meaningful data exchange? 
131 
Lower transaction costs between Government and the sector? Amongst sector actors? 
Should successful fundraising NGOs be allowed to gather a cluster of non-affiliated NGOs 
under their domain for purposes of grant applications? In dealing with the archetype, Success 
to the Successful, should grants be made less program oriented and more open-ended, thereby 
allowing more freedom to the NGOs to use the money as they see fit? Will staff training and 
infrastructure concerns ever be allowable grant expenditures? Should community outcomes 
be an explicit factor in grant awards? Under Limits to Success, one could ask whether there 
is a natural NGO life cycle. If so, is a focus on service quality for a particular client base 
truly sustainable over time? To deal with Drifting Goals, what aid can or should be given to 
NGOs which need to resort to cost cutting as a strategy? What guidance should be given to 
NGOs which seek to outsource their service delivery? How can the vicious cycles aided by 
these archetypes be broken? By illustrating the patterned behaviours and perceptions of the 
key stakeholders in the grants system, can their behaviour be changed by explicitly telling 
stakeholders how they are likely to think and behave? Can illuminating the Systems 
Archetypes to the stakeholders allow them to focus on longer term solutions thereby 
potentially bypassing these cycles? Or does the presence of the vicious cycles indicate a need 
for a more radical change or redesign of the system? 
Second, another important area of inquiry would be any inherent biases in the current 
system. While the "burdensome" nature of grant paperwork has to some extent been 
researched (see for example the study conducted by McGregor-Lowndes and Ryan (2009) 
which found that "government grant paperwork forms the bulk of a nonprofits total 
paperwork burden with grant submissions being the most costly to complete" (21) ), one could 
also ask whether Government at each of its levels as a matter of policy tries to arrange for an 
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"optimum" (in terms of number and category) set ofNGOs for its particular level-or is 
Government more interested in NGO diversity (e.g., mission, client base, size, and scope of 
operations)? Is Government neutral on such issues as a matter of policy but biased in practice? 
For example, when dealing with larger grant awards, does the grants system naturally favour 
larger NGOs who have the professional staff to produce high quality grant proposals? Does 
the grants system naturally favour NGOs with longer track records and/or records of past 
involvement with the grant-awarding Government agency? Large nonprofits and charities in 
Australia with incomes over one million dollars must have their financials audited, medium 
sized nonprofit financials are "reviewed," while smaller organisations merely have basic 
financial data recorded (Dingle and Green, 2014). Does the government have an innate 
distrust for smaller, less regulated organisations? Or perhaps they are worried about their 
basic decision making behaviour (see for example Emery, 2008; Stone et al., 1999; Tucker et 
al., 2005)? Such questions regarding the relationship between organisational size and 
nonprofit success might be especially timely given the evolution of such organisations 
according to Keast, et al. (2012: para. 10): 
Conventionally, NFP organisations have been mostly small in size and 
largely operate from a voluntary ethos. In recent times, however, as a 
result of the policy changes which call for more business-like operating 
models, the social services sector has become increasingly populated by 
a set oflarger NGOs, which are run as businesses (Lyons, 2001: Ryan 
1999). These larger organisations are able to draw on a wider pool of 
resources and capabilities than smaller organisations and are brought 
into the mix because of their significant capacity. 
The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies report, How long is a piece of 
red tape? The paperwork reporting cost <~f government grants, measured the difference in 
paperwork compliance costs for small and large nonprofits: 
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The average cost of compliance for small organisations was 2.76% of 
revenue. compared with large organisations at 0.36% of revenue-that 
is, 7.6 times greater for small organisations. This finding is consistent 
with what other researchers have found in small business. both in 
Australia and elsewhere (Ryan, et al., 2008: i). 
This report when on to explain that smaller organisations have higher compliance costs 
because paperwork was being done by higher level (and higher paid) organisational members: 
One reason for the greater costs of compliance in small organisations 
relates to who did the work. In small organisations the CEO or manager 
( on a higher hourly rate) did more of the compliance work (31 %, 
compared with 11 % in large organisations). In larger organisations, 
where division of work was more specialised, much of the compliance 
was done by the finance manager ( 4 7%, compared with 25% in small 
organisations) with a lower hourly rate (Ryan, et al., 2008: i-ii). 
If there is an inherent bias due to size, would the nonprofit sector benefit from a mechanism 
to level the grant application submission ground ( e.g., Government or third party staff helping 
prepare grants for less capable NGOs)? If biases do exist, what are the ultimate effects on the 
grants system as a whole? 
Third, one could adopt a more micro-level focus and investigate typical staff reactions 
to system features. How does staff within Government and NGOs adapt to the current system 
design perhaps to the detriment of overall system health? For example, do staff at "average" 
NGOs naturally try to migrate to more successful fundraising NGOs in order to obtain more 
secure employment? Do staff at NGOs instinctively desire to be associated with public sector 
grants funded programs knowing that these programs have a set lifespan and thus offer some 
job security? Are Government staff employed in the grants area indifferent to grant funded 
programmatic outcomes because their career paths in this domain are relatively short and not 
rewarded by such measures? What effects, if any, does the cross-over in personnel between 
Government and NGOs have on the grants system? For example, are former Government 
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staff who were previously employed in the grants area especially valued and targeted by 
recruiters for NGOs given their knowledge of the inner workings of the public sector grants 
processes? How tightly or loosely coupled are the relationships between key personnel 
amongst NGOs and Government and how do these relationships affect the grants system 
overall? 
Fourth, one could focus on more macro-level concerns such as what role should 
competition and cooperation amongst NGOs play in the system? Are cooperative grant 
applications amongst multiple NGOs across a community, region, state, etc., a more viable 
approach (e.g., the Safer, Stronger Community focus in Australia) than individual 
organisation applications? Is it desirable to get additional stakeholders ( e.g., private citizens, 
community groups, scholars, etc.) involved in the programmatic activities ofNGOs? 
Fifth, one could investigate the actual results rather than the by-products of a grants 
system. Is there a better way to assess the aggregate effect of multiple programs from 
multiple NGOs on a community over time? Should government implementation managers be 
used to assess the community impact of each grant? Of grants focused on a client base? On 
a region? Should the implementation data be fed back to the NGOs and general public? 
What is the political cost of grants that "fail" to meet hoped-for objectives? How are best 
practices in the sector recorded and used? If the major strength ofNGOs is their ability to 
utilize knowledge that is "local, contextual, and sticky," (McKelvey et al., 1998: 83), how is 
this localness of knowledge further leveraged by sector actors? Finally, is institutional 
memory more impmiant to certain stakeholders in this system than to others? 
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5.2 Discussion of findings in relation to research question two 
Research Question Two: Is the complexity of the public sector grants 
system increasing, and flso, why? 
According to Richardson (2005), while there is no universal measure of complexity, 
complexity can be said to increase "with the number of distinct components, the number of 
connections between them, complexities of the components, and the complexities of the 
connections" ( 49). Starting from this position, there are many interrelated issues which can 
now be teased out and developed further from this initial research question on complexity in 
the grants system. In the course of the study, complexity was left as an intentionally vague 
term to see what concepts the survey participants would raise. It was conceived however as a 
category distinct from the concept of "difficulty" in concert with the practice of past 
researchers (see for example Bloom's Taxonomy of six levels of complexity in learning 
(1984)). As such, the researcher was exposed to various levels of perceived complexity in 
terms of "time, space, and interactions" (Miller and Page, 2007: 234). 
System Complexity. In essence, this dimension of complexity is asking whether the 
overall system has been growing. It can be approached initially by a two-part inquiry: 
1) What is the growth in each sector involved in the grants process?, and 2) Is this growth 
making it easier or harder for the system to function? Since "one of the greatest pressures on 
funding is the sheer number of Not for Profit organisations in Australasia competing for a 
limited pool of money" (Grant Thornton, 2013: 4), it would be interesting to research how the 
Tasmanian grants system has grown over time. This would involve a historical analysis of 
the number of system elements involved as well as growth within each stakeholder category. 
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For example, how many government departments initially handled grant offerings? With 
how much staff per department? How many government reporting systems were there? On 
what technology platforms did these reporting systems rely on? How many NGOs were 
initially awarded public sector grants? What were the reasons given for the initial (and 
subsequent) grant offerings? How has the pool ofNGOs awarded grants grown over the 
years? How have NGO grant applications evolved over time-e.g., what alliance or joint 
tendering structures have been used to apply for grants? 
Also of interest are the questions of whether there is a unique Tasmanian NGO life 
cycle or whether the pattern in Tasmania fits a broader organisational life cycle pattern. 
Questions in this area could include: How many NGOs (in each ABS category) are created 
each year? How many merge with other NGOs? How many cease to exist? What were the 
causes for NGO dissipation? This analysis can also be done on the dimension of social issues. 
Which social issues were addressed by the initial set of NGOs? How has the social issue 
coverage evolved over time? Taking a cue from Page (2011 ), we can also focus the systems 
complexity analysis on the issue of diversity and its multiple measures because systems with 
too much diversity "may well produce either chaos or randomness" (253). Here, the 
researcher would have to explicitly state the taxonomy to be used, but NGO number, size, 
and ABS category in addition to the number, size, and location of funding sources are ready 
made for such exploration of diversity in the grants system. 
Organisational Complexity. Exploring this dimension of complexity in a micro-
approach manner is one way to determine how the network of relationships within a grant-
applying organisation has grown directly as a result of grant activities and to ask whether this 
growth is beneficial or detrimental to the organisation and its mission. For example, in a 
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small start-up NGO, a network ofN=l persons might be responsible for the entire grants 
process whereas in a larger, more evolved NGO, a network analysis could point to a vast 
network of exchanges necessary to perform grant activity. Also of interest would be the 
number and type of data retrieval/processing "permissions" or checkpoints that have to be 
passed as the organisation's management and processes evolve and professionalize over time. 
Naturally, this analysis could be extended to an inter-organisational perspective since larger, 
more national-oriented NGOs usually must confer with outside entities (such as large 
accounting and tax preparation firms) to complete their grant activities. In addition to the 
mapping by grant activity, this mapping can also be divided into the connections needed by 
each organisational position ( e.g., various executive level, legal services, budget & finance 
personnel, grant staff, accounting, reporting, & taxation personnel, program personnel, 
information technology personnel, etc.) encountered, or by stage of the grants process ( e.g., 
environmental scanning, application, notice, award management, acquittal). Further 
extensions of this analysis could see this mapping aid in the development of a transactional 
complexity cost measure (see Transactional Complexity below). Also, this analysis could 
form part of a larger life cycle analysis of representative Tasmanian NGOs under the 
assumption that this mapping would become denser and more diverse as the organisation 
evolves over time (and presumably grows in both scale and scope of operations) and more 
connections are needed. 
Another more macro-approach would be to look at the evolving collection of grant-
funded organisations as a "network" of agencies unto itself in order to determine this 
network's overall efficiency. What is the network's rate of growth? What is the dropout rate 
in the early part of the network's formation? In its more mature life cycle stage? As Provan 
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and Milward (200 l) point out, there is no magic number of individual organisations in a 
successful network: 
While there is no theoretical upper limit to the number of agencies that 
can be part of a network, after surpassing a certain size, any network 
will become less effective because of increasing coordination costs .... 
( 418). 
Rather than absolute numbers, Provan and Milward (200 I) point us to the possible use of 
effectiveness measures more centred on assessing the range of services offered, how often 
clients must access services outside the network, duplication of service efforts, which 
services are actually needed, and the "strength of the relationships between and among 
network members" ( 418). 
Task Complexity. As an offshoot of organizational complexity, task complexity of 
grant activities can be studied in greater depth. Whereas organisational complexity lies 
mostly in the interconnections needed to perform a task involving grant activities, task 
complexity breaks down each task into its component levels of difficulty. At each stage of 
the grants process, internal agents in NGOs must gather, collate, organize, display, 
communicate, seek approval for, edit, and distribute information. This information comes 
from a variety of people sources such as other organisational members ( as indicated by intra-
organisational complexity) or outside sources (as indicated by inter-organisational 
complexity-the requiring of aid from experts, consultants, government assistance, etc.) or 
from a combination of such sources ( e.g., through meetings, brainstorming sessions, 
consultations, etc.), as well as from internal (e.g., prior grant applications, organisational 
documents, archived materials, etc.) or external (e.g., government reports, sector reports, 
media, etc.) documentary sources. Task complexity is made up of both subjective and 
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objective components (with a high level of correlation between subjective task complexity 
and objective task complexity according to Nadolski et al. (2005, 4)). Other sources of 
difficulty in defining task complexity lie in the task duration, the subject expertise required 
for each task, and the frequency of similar tasks (Bystrom, 1999: 98), as well as the education, 
experience and ambition level of the agent (Bystrom, 1999: 48). For each task, the category 
of cognitive difficulty inherent in the task can also be analysed as more complex tasks require 
higher levels of "understanding, sense-making and problem formulation" (Bystrom and 
Jarvelin, 1995: 30). According to Bystrom and Jarvelin (1995: 30), this type of task 
complexity analysis lends itself quite well to qualitative process-oriented diary research: 
The process analysis method developed for diary data analysis allows 
examination of relationships between task complexity, the types of 
information needed, the number and types of sources and channels 
considered and used, as well as reasons, successfulness and effects of 
their use. The analyses can be done at the level of individual tasks 
which is necessary if the effects of task complexity on information 
seeking are to be identified. The analyses can also be refined on the 
basis of worker and situation -related factors (30). 
One of Bystrom and Jarvelin' s (1995: 29) conclusions is that, "As task complexity increases, 
so the complexity of information needed increases." However, it still remains to be 
determined what the relationship is between micro-level task complexity and wider system-
level task complexity in fulfilment of grant activities. 
Transactional Complexity. Another way to proceed is to use the task complexity 
analysis outlined above to detem1ine the information required for each task, and then add a 
cost function for each piece of information gathered (Edmonds, 1999: 72). This analysis 
could be applied for both human and machine-based information processing tasks related to 
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grant activities. Edmonds (1999) holds that complexity (at least computational complexity) 
and processing time are related: 
It is hard to imagine a difficult task that can be done without some time 
spent on it, either in execution or preparation. Thus the complexity of a 
task can come to be associated with the amount of processing time it 
requires (47). 
Thus, future researchers could try to combine the information retrieval and processing times 
of individual task activities related to grants to formulate an aggregate measure of transaction 
costs. Or by extension, it might be possible to extrapolate a systems measure of transactional 
complexity on a cost basis if a researcher wished to know what the cost consequences are for 
a system for a particular change in grant data requirements. 
Network Complexity. Similar to the mapping suggested for determining 
organisational complexity, in this complexity category the data itself (rather than the human 
handlers) is the main item of interest. In this case, the data can take the form of simple 
queries to Government agencies, requests for computations or fact-checking from external 
experts like accounting firms, or partial or complete internally generated data packets related 
to grant applications, monitoring, or acquittals. How the data is gathered (presumably in 
pieces from multiple, disparate sources and reassembled into a recognizable whole) and its 
travel path would provide insights on two fronts. First, this would help to answer questions 
along the lines of: How many ( and how often are they needed) internal and external data 
elements need to be utilized to complete the grants process? Second, this would help address 
issues related to reporting to multiple government agencies under multiple reporting systems 
by following the data to networks external to the NGO (i.e., primarily government systems 
but also other external subsystems can be included). The data can be traced and mapped as it 
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moves to and fro from organisational subsystems to the government subsystems and back 
again. Combined with the other types of complexity analysis previously mentioned, the 
researcher with this approach might be just that bit closer to the answer of just what (human 
and data) resources are needed to complete the grants process and what is the overall 
transactional cost of that endeavour. 
Competitive Complexity. Looking at this complexity area, the researcher might start 
to ask questions along the following lines: How has the grant pool of money grown over 
time? What is the relationship between the size of grant awards and other environmental 
factors like overall economic conditions? Does the number and type ofNGOs in the 
environment affect the level of the grant pool? How do organisations view their relationship 
to one another in a zero-sum funding environment? It is on this plane of analysis that the 
researcher is trying to assess both how competitive the field has become and how complex 
the relationships amongst the organisations in the field have become. It is suggested that a 
taxonomic itinerary of competitive versus cooperative behaviours be enumerated by the 
researcher and the system scanned for the prevalence of such behaviours. Additional 
questions could include: Do organisations (and peak bodies) reward inter-organisation 
cooperation and collaboration? What would be the "natural" rate of collaboration in the 
system if the current model of funding and regulatory restrictions were altered to emphasize 
other points along the competition/collaboration spectrum? 
Environmental (Public Policy) Complexity. This is potentially another large 
research area which could be mined for its value in demonstrating complexity in the grants 
system. How does a stakeholder like Media which has the tendency to highlight (in a single 
factorial way) specific problem areas in public policy affect the overall health (a multi-
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factorial analysis) of the system? Or, to put it another way, does highlighting past 
deficiencies in a certain part of an overarching public policy build pressure to eliminate such 
deficiencies?-if so, does this selective pressure in general help the system (by creating the 
impetus to move needed resources to a problem area) or harm the system (by reducing 
resources for other social programs which might have an even greater need)? Additional 
resources set aside for a particular social issue instead might increase the number of clients 
served in the short run by those organisations setup to do so, but in the long run might also 
dilute those very services (Lipsky, 2010: 200). Does Government use complexity "tools" 
( e.g., registration and auditing, regulations, compliance mechanisms for grant awards, etc.) 
either as a conscious or backdoor method to control the number and types of organisations in 
the pool of nonprofit organisations? How much of public policy relating to specific issues and 
programs is affected by each of the stakeholders? Does their relative influence change over 
time, and if so, why? 
Model and Behavioural Complexity. Edmonds (1999) holds that in dealing with 
models of complexity, we are actually talking about two different models. The first model 
illustrates the system elements and their interactions, while the second model shows "the 
resultant overall behaviour" of the system (Edmonds, 1999: 72). Future researchers will need 
to take note of the first case when trying to trace complexity throughout their models: 
If a framework is agreed upon then the complexity of something can be 
objectively determined by different observers with respect to this 
framework. So once this framework is established complexity 
judgements can be consistently made irrespective if [sic] who is doing it 
as long as they keep within the rules that the framework entails. This is 
not so different from many other 'objective' judgements and facts 
(Edmonds, 1999: 52). 
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In the second case, when asking whether any grants system under study becomes more 
complex over time, the researcher will need to closely examine emergent behaviour from the 
system actors: 
In a world of thoughtful, interacting agents, complexity might emerge 
as those agents begin to 'game' the system and, eventually, each other. 
There may be inherent forces in systems that drive out predict-
ability ... .In these types of systems, the actions of the agents result in the 
destruction of the regularity, and an increase in complexity (Miller and 
Page, 2007: 236). 
In this study, the survey participants shared their nearly uniform expression of 
agreement that complexity is increasing across multiple dimensions. From the perspective of 
the respondents, system, organisational, transactional, and network complexity specifically 
have significantly increased during their tenures. As part of a future research agenda, 
propositions can be developed for each of the levels of complexity listed above to test 
whether that perception of increasing complexity is more widespread amongst a more diverse 
set of stakeholders in the system (hopefully not lost in that analysis would be the clients' 
perspective on obtaining necessary goods and services through each stakeholder in the grants 
system-and also through the wider public policy system taking into account the 
participation of other sectors). For more on this discussion point, see section 5.6. 
5.3 Extending the analysis to include the concept of "well-being" 
As the researcher indicated in section 3.2, the grants system can provide insights into 
the wider issue of social "well-being" which can now be looked at. This exploration might in 
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turn provide some insights into new schemas and structures that could one day supplement or 
even overtake the current grants system. 
There is a considerable body of work comprising research efforts into the subject of 
individual and social well-being (see for example Diener, 2000; Kahneman et al., 1999; 
Myers, 1992). However, well-being as a function of resource allocation is not a very well-
codified phenomenon because allocations can take place under the auspices of a variety of 
social and ethical principles with differing results. For example, health care services might 
be allocated based on some combination of the following principles: 'justice, beneficence, 
non-maleficence, utility and autonomy" (Calman, 1994: 72). Although fields like health care 
and education have led the way in the evaluation of the allocation of scarce resources, 
"western governments of all political persuasions" (Smith et al., 2012: para. 1) have 
encountered an ever-changing landscape of evaluative criteria which can include cost-benefit 
analysis, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, evidence-based reasoning, marginal analysis, 
multi-criteria decision analysis, objectives, program budgeting, and stakeholder satisfaction 
to name just a few approaches (Smith et al., 2012). For the individual, their objective and 
subjective sense of well-being may largely depend not only on the distributive equity of the 
systems in place in their society but also on the efficacy of that distribution and ultimately the 
quality of the services that distribution allows. 
For purposes of this study, let us focus on two areas ofresearch into well-being that 
are particularly deficient-namely, individual-oriented [Note: The individual in this case is a 
member of a social system and therefore a consumer of system-based resources.] measures 
and more macro, systems level evaluation measures of allocational efficacy. Measures have 
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been developed for organisations ( even large organisations like Governments, for 
departments, and for individual programs within organisations) but measures at either ends of 
the spectrum are more lacking. Let us first review some basic assumptions. 
1. Money is always a zero-sum game (Glouberman and Zimmerman, 
2002: 21 ), and money taken from one area of social services always 
means less for some other part (Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002: 
11). 
2. Public policy is merely a name for a set of interacting complex 
subsystems which have the common goal of allocating goods and 
services to the general public. Public policy itself is a subsystem of a 
wider national cultural system and is embedded in a dynamic 
environment consisting of numerous sectors and agents within each 
sector (Meek, 2010). 
3. The objectives of public policy at its highest level of conception are 
always difficult to elucidate because they are "multiple, conflicting and 
vague" (Pressman and Wildvasky, 1984: 193). Resource allocation 
therefore is "an exercise in the management of unce1iainty" (Calman, 
1994: 73). 
4. Complex problems ( of which optimal allocations across these numerous 
subsystems is one) lend themselves more to holism and synthesis rather 
than to reductionism and analysis (Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002: 
10). 
5. Links between funding levels and policy (and process, and program) 
evaluation have been evolving over several decades but still remain 
exploratory (Smith et al., 2012). Multiple metrics operating under a 
variety of social and ethical principles are available for policy 
evaluators at all organisational levels. 
6. All social systems generate inequalities. 
7. Social inequalities are growing in Australia (Douglas et al., 2014). 
To make this exploration of well-being more accessible, let us first take an individual-within-
a-system-based approach to evaluation. Let us put ourselves in the shoes of a Tasmanian 
citizen who is in need of help. 
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Let us suppose our hypothetical Tasmanian is much like the young person mentioned 
in the Introduction to this study who is disadvantaged in multiple areas-in this case, in the 
areas of education, housing, mental health, and employment. Let us also suppose that this 
person is a young woman who eagerly wants to improve her situation but is relatively 
uninformed about opportunities for assistance. Where does she start? Perhaps she tries to 
contact a local Government office such as Centrelink or a local NGO. Immediately, several 
assumptions rise to the fore regarding the concept of Place, or her current geographical 
location and the accessibility of aid in that location, and Space, or the medium by which 
services are delivered ( e.g., through appointments with an agent at a particular place, 
correspondence by mail or phone, or by virtual transactions operating in cyberspace), and 
Time, or what part of the aid process is particularly relevant to this person. 
Our current allocational framework is still heavily weighted toward individuals 
seeking out agencies which occupy physical spaces (buildings) in fixed geographical 
positions and which operate on schedules ( e.g., weekdays 9am-5pm) sometimes more 
convenient to its workers than to its service recipients. In this woman's case, we must further 
assume that if no agencies exist in her current location then she has the means and 
wherewithal to get to an agency in another location. What might happen if this person 
contacts a local NGO? Remembering that NGOs are under pressure to survive, and their 
survival often is reliant upon public sector grants money funding specific programs, it is 
unlikely that any one NGO has the sufficient scale and scope of expertise necessary to 
address all of this young woman's problems. Indeed, especially in the mental health area, 
one would be hard-pressed to find an NGO that has psychologists or psychiatrists on 
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permanent staff to address such concerns. However, by "evaluating" this person (and doing 
nothing else), an NGO might be able to fulfil some of its obligations under a particular 
program fostered by public sector grants. Evaluation alone would not be sufficient service 
for this young person however. How can any one NGO with its limited programs further 
help this young woman? One way they could help would be to recommend other NGOs who 
have complementary programs which could lend additional assistance. However, what are 
the odds that any given NGO worker will know what every other NGO in a particular 
geographical region offers in the way of programs which could help this particular woman? 
The same is likely true regarding resources that are available in the government and private 
sectors. 
Key Assumption: By allocating services through a combination of distinct programs 
across a multitude of physical entities representing the NGO, Government, and the private 
sector, the current framework can exhibit the following deficiencies. 
1. Deficiency in Place (General)-the onus is mostly upon the client 
(despite their physical or mental health) to make contact with one or 
more agencies in order to generate service delivery. 
2. Deficiency in Place (Physical Resources)-there will be some 
geographical regions that will lack physical contact points for clients 
in a variety of social service areas, while some regions will have 
overlapping, redundant coverage in certain social service areas. 
3. Deficiency in Place (Knowledge)--there is no fast, easy way for 
agents (or clients) to access and comprehensively assess what 
services that may be relevant to them are available in their current 
geographical area, furthermore, agents may simply not have the 
training or expertise to direct the client to the next logical service 
agent. 
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While some Tasmanian agencies might make use of virtual space to conduct 
transactional or information-related activities ( e.g., Centrelink claims processing, long-
distance education (Paine, 2014), or remote services (Telehealth, 2014; Ryan and Robinson, 
2001) ), the virtual environment is not currently being used to assess social service allocations. 
Key Assumption. The current framework allows each agency contacted by an 
individual in need to remain an isolated data "silo". This silo-based data approach can 
introduce the following deficiencies. 
1. Deficiency in Space (General)-Due to a combination of privacy 
rights issues, regulation issues, and multiple, non-compatible 
hardware, software and data platforms in use by various agencies 
(and within agencies) across each sector, data must be "pulled" 
from the client at each point of contact. 
2. Deficiency in Space (Knowledge )--No general profile of each client 
is possible that illustrates their need for and use of services from 
each sector. 
3. Deficiency in Space (Abilities)-No longitudinal assessment of data 
across platforms to assess the welfare of clients on a local, regional, 
or state level is currently possible. 
Finally, individuals like our hypothetical young Tasmanian woman might reach out to 
more formal agencies only when she has exhausted help from more localized sources such as 
friends, family, local community organisations, or her local parish. However, by the time she 
requires more comprehensive direct assistance, many of her problems might have become 
exacerbated beyond which any one agency contact point could handle. By focusing only on 
the "delivery" part of social service allocation, the current system is likely deficient regarding 
the following Time-related factors. 
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Key Assumption. The current framework being focused on alleviating symptoms 
might not be able to address an individual's root problems or to keep an individual from re-
experiencing symptomatic behaviour in the future. These deficiencies could be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Deficiency in Time (General)-The current system is set up to 
address a client's current needs in a reactive manner (by either 
Evaluating them for services or by Offering them services). The 
system does little however to address a potential client's needs in a 
more proactive manner by Screening citizenry and offering services 
or education in a more prevention or pre-emptive mode, or in a more 
proactive manner after services have been offered by the Active 
Monitoring of their condition and Determining necessary follow-up. 
For example, it is relatively easy to spot how an individual's progression over time 
could exacerbate multiple social problems in a concurrent manner. In the case of the young 
woman, an early removal from formal schooling combined with a disconnection from her 
family home might have seriously impacted her chances at long-term employment. Over 
time, this combination of problems could lead to numerous and profound physical and mental 
health issues ( conditions often addressed by the individual through the self-medication of 
addiction). Of course, addictive behaviours could in tum impact her ability to help transfer 
immediate direct aid into long-term problem-resolving solutions. However, if a more timely 
sense of her growing needs were caught by Screening, early intervention could take place. 
Targeted follow-up by multiple agencies after services have been offered can also serve as a 
more proactive approach to make sure her issues are being addressed in a more holistic 
manner over time. 
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5.4 Reframing the problem under a higher order change paradigm 
By explicating elements and behaviours of the Tasmanian public sector grants system, 
it is hoped that ultimately this systems description (and the understanding it engenders) can 
lead to system improvement. However, this goal reflects an orientation toward first-order 
change thinking in that the continued existence of the current structure is assumed. From the 
perspective of higher order change, we should also be concerned with doing things in a new 
way (Bergquist, 1993; Weick and Quinn, 1999). 
Some of the key deficiencies in the current allocation system have been enumerated in 
the previous section, and with that analysis in mind, the researcher can explore in general 
terms what a newer, more client-centric framework might entail and then go on to look at 
some of the potential system level effects of such an alternate framework. Under this 
alternate framework, agencies, especially government agencies, would evolve from entities 
that a citizen must contact for help to entities that can tell you whether you are at risk. 
Government would be in partnership with both the NGO and private sectors (possibly aided 
by third-party data brokers) in order to collect, analyse, and distribute the individual data 
distributed amongst each entity in any sector that a citizen touches. 
Profiles of each citizen could then be developed and advice, information, education, 
and services could all be "pushed" to the citizen via a variety of channels rather than having 
to "pull" them into physical organisations. This reorganisation would be developed under the 
mantra of rules and data simplification wherever the citizenry is directly involved, because 
complexity of rules, regulations, and data-gathering should never be used by the bureaucracy 
to "scare away" potential applicants (Pressman and Wildvasky, 1984: 90). 
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For example, taking Amazon.corn's famous "Where's My Stuff?" clickable query as a 
model, simple plain English pathways ( or plain answers in whatever language the client 
prefers as multiple language translation is fast becoming a standard feature in a variety of 
technology platforms) can be created for the average citizen along the lines of "Where can I 
get help with X?" Algorithms can be developed to take into account which social problems 
might be tied together in a conjoint manner. So, for example, a citizen asking for help with 
job training might also benefit from help with certain educational opportunities (e.g., like 
computer training offered by a local NGO). At the individual citizen level, their social well-
being is constantly being affected; therefore their assessment must also be ongoing over time. 
For some issues, they will undergo Screening in a proactive manner to assess their danger 
level, for other issues they might reach a threshold where some entity can begin to offer 
counselling, education, or services, and for some issues they might be in a post-service 
Monitoring phase where follow-up measures are being packaged and tailored to their needs 
from a variety of entities. 
This is a framework with a strong data-based foundation committed to data sharing 
and transparency. For example, at the system level gap analysis would be routinely 
undertaken across a variety of dimensions: geographic-by neighbourhood, Council area, 
region, state, etc., demographic-by key client variables such as age, gender, race, income, 
etc., within sector-to identify key needs and potential "niche" opportunities for new 
organisational entrants, and sectorial-to see what social services are being under or over-
represented. By capturing all client activity across all organisational touchpoints, 
Government as well as other stakeholders would have the ability bridge channels and have a 
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historical perspective of experiences and outcomes on both an individual client and on an 
aggregate citizenry basis. 
An outcomes-based approach would be the key focus of the new framework and 
would be heavily weighted in evaluation criteria at all levels for all stakeholder organisations. 
The world "has become far too complex, too multidimensional, for decisions to be 
centralized or concentrated at the top" (Connelly et al., 1999: 2). It is easy for Government 
workers to look out their windows in Hobart to try to determine local conditions, but much 
harder to do when considering rural Tasmania. Government agents would be more dispersed 
in order to gather intelligence first-hand. Career government agents responsible for social 
service delivery would take more ownership of particular regions by utilizing a longer time 
horizon when dealing with them with the expectation that their job reward structure would be 
adjusted accordingly. Regional implementation (or outcome) managers working in a nested 
manner with local Councils would serve to oversee funding channelled to a particular region, 
to facilitate cross-Council assistance where appropriate, and to help populate a local 
repository of best practices (which can then be amalgamated into a larger state-wide 
depository). By extension, Federal outcome managers would be dispersed away from 
Canberra so that local conditions can be better understood over the long-term. Through the 
use of data-intensive queries, stakeholders like Government would be able to better assess 
how funding flows through the system across each sector, and through aggregate analysis 
determine how well the needs of its citizens are being met by its public policy funding level 
and mix. 
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5.5 Macro-micro linkages in a new framework 
If resource allocation is truly a "wicked" complex problem, is a measure of system-
wide allocational effectiveness even possible? If a whole-of-government, whole-of-society 
approach is adopted along the lines of the one outlined in the previous section, the data 
derived from such an approach would go a long way in providing such a measure. The 
researcher would like to draw a parallel with population-based health management 
frameworks that use a combination of epidemiological quantitative analysis, demographics, 
and economic theory to simulate how future disease will impact various parts of society. 
Large epidemiological-like population studies of social well-being are probably not cost 
effective for any Government to undertake on a continual basis, however, such explorations 
with long time horizons could be supplemented in the near- and mid-term by paying attention 
to a variety of stakeholder-derived leading and lagging indicators. For example, in the 
absence of a large scale survey of population mental health, a data intensive framework 
would draw out a multitude of proxy measures such as mental health-oriented visits to 
hospital emergency rooms, calls to mental health-oriented help lines, levels of Centrelink 
benefits related to mental health, the use of screening mechanisms by general practitioners 
throughout the state, the number and type of psychotropics being prescribed, the number of 
mental health-related incidents police have responded to, etc. Using multidimensional 
analysis, stakeholders can then explore proximate and distal causes for social issues 
highlighted by these indicators across multiple public policy dimensions ( e.g., health, welfare, 
social inclusion, etc.). As stated, these indicators would be truly client-centric with a variety 
of "customer satisfaction," "complaints received," "on-time delivery," and "error rate" 
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measures factored in across processes generated by all agencies. Of note, even when dealing 
with highly-complex multidimensional quantum states, it is not necessary to measure every 
dimension: "It takes only a handful of measurements to get a high-quality image of a 
quantum system" (New technique uses.fraction ... , 2014: para. 9)-parallels in social system 
measurements should be sought out that could mimic that type of systems clarity. 
Under this framework, Government has been repositioned from a general funder of 
programs in the Environment to a more proactive participant with the following goals: 
1. Long-term: Assess the social well-being of the target population. 
Work under a social- and digital-inclusion framework. Complexity-
aware monitoring is standard operating procedure in public 
policy design. Place emphasis on improving overall system (i.e., the 
entire portfolio of public policy offerings) performance and not on 
piecemeal performance goals. Overall system health is the main 
concern in a whole of government approach to assessing effects of 
multiple agency efforts (Australian Government Public Service 
Commission, 2004: 91). 
2. Mid-Term: Evaluate programs and initiatives as parts oflarger 
interventions to promote social well-being. Wherever possible, 
encourage "joined-up" local services as well as digitalized public 
services that "are personalised, flexible, and time-and-cost efficient" 
(HM Treasury, 2009: 19). Unlock "data silos" across all government 
departments (Productivity Commission Annual Report, 2010: 12). 
Widen intra-government information sharing efforts ( e.g., Govdex 
information system) to include stakeholders in other sectors. 
Develop flexible funding processes to deepen collaboration amongst 
stakeholders. 
3. Near-Term: Foster funding for effective programs and initiatives. 
Establish a proactive focus on identifying citizens in need. 
Understand that the "Australian public increasingly expects services 
to individuals, business and communities to be tailored to their 
particular needs" (Australian Government Public Service 
Commission, 2004: 2). Be open to innovative collaborative and self-
organizing efforts across neighborhoods, communities, organi-
sations, and sectors. Allow knowledge from these collaborative 
networks and others to inform the public policy agenda (Adams and 
Hess, 2002). 
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These goals would be shared with its partners in other sectors. 
Under the rubric of these three guidelines, let us return briefly to the micro-approach 
of looking at our young Tasmanian woman in need. Under this framework, it is now possible 
to extend the service delivery of any particular channel by addressing this woman's concerns 
in a more systemic way. While before her general practitioner might have taken it upon 
herself to flag her for follow-up if she missed an appointment, now that same GP would have 
access to data as to whether her patient was filling her prescriptions, meeting with her mental 
health service provider, receiving visits from home health agencies, receiving community 
support, accessing emergency care, etc. Government might now not only take an interest as 
to whether this person was no longer homeless (itself a rather narrow criteria of well-being) 
but how sustainable any such housing is for her given her near-term economic conditions. 
NGOs, freed from the perverse effects of cherry picking clients that fall under set criteria for 
their programs, might be now more eager to offer services to her if longer-term client 
outcomes are favoured. 
To return to the system as a whole, Government might have to adopt the approach of a 
"chef' rather than a "cook" in order to obtain a systems measure of its allocational 
effectiveness and fairness. In essence, the mix of funding for various social services creates a 
"stew" of sorts. In asking the systems evaluation question of whether we have a good mix of 
ingredients ( or to put it another way: Do we have the right programs offered by the right mix 
of organisations from each sector for the right client base?), we are also asking in effect 
whether the stew tastes good ( or to put it another way: Have we achieved a good level of 
social well-being for our citizens?). Continuing the analogy in a reductionist sense, we could 
measure each individual ingredient on a variety of measures ( e.g., freshness, cost, organic, 
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locally produced, fair labour), \Ve can take note of how each of the ingredients was prepared 
(e.g., when it was cleaned, how finely was it chopped, etc.) and when they were added to the 
mix, what cooking implement was used, on what cooking apparatus, at what settings, etc. 
There will never be 100% consensus of those who try to the stew-some genuinely might not 
like the ingredients, their individual or combined texture(s), the seasoning, or the overall 
flavour-some might dissatisfied with their portion, or the presentation of the stew (e.g., the 
bowls used to contain the stew or the implements used to eat it), its smell, or taste. They 
might never have tasted such stew before-they are put off by its novelty, or in contrast, they 
are tired of eating it time and time again. However, at the end of the day in a very practical 
sense, it is possible to measure across a wide variety of actors with different backgrounds 
whether this was a good stew or not. Inevitably change will come-the ingredients 
substituted for, the cooking implements altered, the cooking time varied, and the stew eaters 
(and their relative tastes) themselves altered. Yet good chefs who have good instincts (in 
contrast to good cooks who have good recipes) have been known to make gounnet meals on 
the fly from the simplest of ingredients. So how can our theoretical chef inform Government 
on its allocation of social services? By adopting their ways of leaming--constant trial and 
error leading to deep experience and an intense devotion to monitoring ingredients (which in 
this case reflects a combination of leading, lagging and lacking indicators in the 
Environment). At any given time, Government must be nimble enough to adjust its capacity 
in the following ways: 
1. Cooking pot--Is the pot big enough? (Is it feasible to adjust the 
inputs that are the source of funding?) 
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2. Cooking Time-How do we avoid overcooking or undercooking the 
stew? (Do we have the programs we need in place now? Are we 
likely to be covered in the future?) 
3. Ingredients-What ingredients are necessary but not sufficient? 
(What programmatic efforts are needed versus which are wanted? ) 
4. Cooking Temperature-Do we have the right level of heat? (Are 
there too few avenues of assistance or are too many programs 
overlapping and causing duplication of effort?) 
5. Number of Servers-Who is serving our stew? (Do we have a good 
mix-i.e., number, type, mission, region-focused, etc.-of sector 
agents?) 
This analogy has the added benefit of a sort of tiered assessment to the allocation of resources. 
If the stakeholders identify citizens in need who are not receiving or accepting the stew 
(services), this too is an important indicator. If some citizens receive only a small portion and 
are undernourished, then Government is informed from the initial serving of their continued 
need. If some citizens received a full serving, Government must still reflexively ask itself 
whether the serving was nutritious enough and how long such a serving will last the recipient. 
The researcher understands that is impossible to have complete geographic coverage 
of all possible programmatic offerings from each sector in each category of social problem. 
Therefore, N-dimensional environmental scanners with an eye toward short, intermediate and 
long-term time horizons might become the public policy "chefs" of tomorrow. They will 
determine whether certain clusters of social problems are emerging from the system-
clusters based on geography, demographics, social issues, etc. with causes either local or 
more distal. They will also determine the granularity and scale of these problems as deduced 
through various indicators. Finally, these scanners will have data necessary to advocate for 
greater or lesser coverage as the allocation stew is always subject to adjustment. 
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What are some of the implications for the behaviour of the system of adopting a more 
data-centric, client-oriented allocation framework? Because the "health" of the entire 
allocation system rather than the optimization of any particular part is now the overarching 
goal, the researcher would anticipate that the following features might be heavily emphasized: 
1. A system guided by gap analysis-What social services are lacking 
in what areas and for what population segments? 
2. A system interested in sector analysis-What percentage of social 
services for any region are being delivered by Government? Are 
being contracted out to NGOs? To the private sector? Are some 
sectors under- or over-utilized for some social problems? What is 
the level of cross-sector collaboration? 
3. A system no longer dominated by physical points of contact but one 
which allows some channels to be accessed as required, on a 
24/7 /365 day basis. 
4. A reorientation of the system toward self-organisation. This 
principle would require a new regulatory framework that would 
engender a myriad of organisational partnerships and alliances 
across sectors. Councils would be encouraged to make alliances to 
tackle regional problems. NGO/fourth sector and NGO/private 
sector alliances would be promoted. Local NGOs might form short 
but meaningful contacts with more geographically distant 
counterparts to deliver services locally, or they may team with 
international NGOs for a time to gain expertise. Smaller NGOs 
could be grouped under larger ones in ever-changing configurations 
in order to create new solutions. 
5. An adaptation of the system towards outcomes. Higher-level 
analysis of funding acquittals that is focused on a population 
segment or regional outcomes. Funding becomes more meritorious 
by remaining neutral as to the applicant's size, years of operation, 
level of past awards, etc. Funding becomes less about organisations 
and programs and more about results amongst clients. Single 
interventions like grants and contracts would be assessed more 
holistically and always in context of other related interventions 
designed to produce some aggregate result (see for example the 
revision of intervention terminology under a "complexity-aware 
monitoring" framework-Britt, 2013 ). 
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6. System "memory" is preserved through best practices and case 
studies in an open repository. Localized data, knowledge and 
experience are captured as part of the service delivery process. It is 
anticipated that other stakeholders like peak bodies and University 
researchers would supplement the local best practice store with 
wider reportage concerning state, country or international-level best 
practices. 
7. A de-emphasis of unifactorial reporting of deficiencies in the system 
to reportage on overall system health. 
Such system features would have the tendency to reduce competition for scarce funds and 
reorient organisations toward whatever structures are necessary to provide good social 
outcomes. Uneven geographical coverage by organisations in various sectors can be spotted 
quickly and incentives put in place to extend such coverage or to foster new start-ups. The 
use of a Best Practice repository and aggregate outcomes analysis would aid in questioning 
how innovative or brittle the current amalgamation of organisations is for various social 
issues. Complexity analysis could be undertaken by following the interlinked data flow 
between organisations and more precisely measuring the transactional requirements of new 
data requirements and regulations. Finally, organisational and program life cycle analysis 
would be more accessible to stakeholders. Some regions for example might require the 
intensive collective efforts of a multitude ofNGOs over many years (perhaps generations). 
Some NGOs might organise to fill a regional gap for a specific social service for a short 
period of time, or the founders might be seeking in pilot program fashion to test some new 
ideas in a new area. Although current organisational theory is heavily weighted towards the 
concept of sustainable ( one might also substitute the word "prolonged") activity, perhaps an 
equally supportable philosophy could be centred on impact and outcomes. Longevity is not 
necessarily a proxy for innovation or successful outcomes. There is some evidence 
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(Weerawardena et al., 2010) that a nonprofit's focus on sustainability leads them "to focus 
their efforts on innovative fund-raising strategies" while paying "less attention to 'service 
delivery"' (354). Indeed, a survival focus by an organisation is often at the cost of its 
creating "social-value" (Austin et al., 2006: 17). For that reason and others, future 
organisations might instead be created with self-imposed short timelines of operation right 
from their inception: 
Given the convergence of a multitude of technologies-translation 
technology to bridge language divides, common hardware platforms, 
back office software, currency transfer, and global, instantaneous 
telecommunications-combined with a growing global middle class of 
college educated, professionally trained self-employed workers, future 
organisations will form like soap bubbles and be just as ephemeral, 
forming at will with ever-shifting personnel from a multitude of 
countries, operating across multiple national jurisdictions, in order to 
achieve a common purpose. (Georgelas, 2014: para. 1 ). 
Under this framework, stakeholders can ask how robust the system is by looking at 
organisational entry/exit and their timeliness in filling whatever coverage gaps arise. Also in 
keeping with the spirit of self-organisation and outcome-based objectives, lots of 
experimentation with funding could be undertaken along the previously mentioned 
dimensions of Place, Space, and Time. Rather than grants to specific programs within an 
organisation, "pooled" funds for example could be made available to either individual 
organisations or consortiums based on tackling community or regional issues. Also in that 
same spirit, perhaps allowing a wider latitude of spending discretion to part or all of the funds 
would be in order. Perhaps it does make sense for an NGO in some circumstances to spend 
money on staff training so as to build organisational capacity to deliver better programs, 
especially when the likelihood of failure in the long-term is increased without such 
"continuous investments" (Emery, 2008: 12). Perhaps it does make sense to free NGOs from 
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the political cycle of Government funding and have a grant allocation portfolio of short, 
medium, and long-term funding options available. This type of thinking might also apply to 
non-governmental donor funding which so often now goes to large, stable organisations who 
market themselves well (Faulk, 2011: 85) and helps force NGOs to comply with donor 
interests because of their high resource dependency (AbouAssi, 2013: 598)-a dependency 
which has also been shown to foster mission drift (Gooding, 2012: 95). Under this 
framework, organisations, high worth individuals, the general public, crowdsourcing efforts, 
etc. could not only donate funds to certain organisations but could also donate to pooled 
funds by social cause, by demographic segment, by region, or a combination of factors ( with 
the funds apportioned to qualifying organisations), thereby further levelling the playing field. 
NGOs of any size could then seek out these more diversified streams of funding which might 
go a long way in reducing their hazard rate of failure (Vance, 2010: 116). 
Naturally, any radically new framework (and the researcher recognizes the idealized 
and normative aspects of the one outlined here) would generate its own set of complexity 
issues and unintended behaviours amongst its system elements, thus it is not presented as the 
"solution" to the problem of determining social well-being and its concomitant issue of the 
allocation of social services-which is ultimately "an exercise in the management of 
uncertainty" of the best course to take (Calman, 1994: 73). The researcher has highlighted 
the issues above in such a framework in the hope that: l) there is a recognition amongst 
stakeholders that there has been a "calcification" of the service allocation system ( and its 
system cousin, the grants system) into its present not particularly innovative form and that 
new schemas provide new opportunities to explore higher-order transformational change 
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opportunities, and 2) the illustration of such alternate schemas can help researchers develop 
more individual and more systemic measures of allocational efficiency under the wider 
banner of social well-being. 
5.6 Implications for theory development 
At various times throughout the course of this study, four major overarching questions 
manifested themselves, the answers to which have all remained undiscovered. They are: 
1. Why do grants systems remain a major part of public policy for so 
many governments around the world? 
2. Have grants systems grown more complex over time? To what 
effect? 
3. What prompts the genesis of ( additional) grants? 
4. What effect does a "static" grants system in which Government 
awards grants to fund specific programs run by organisations in the 
nonprofit sector affect the overall social services system? 
Each of these questions is a good jumping off point for theory building work. The 
question of why grants are still being used and used so heavily by governments throughout 
the world first raised in section 1.1 should be revisited by future researchers. Unlike systems 
found in nature, grants systems are not "Jong-lived products of competitive survival" 
(Crutchfield, 2009: 3). They have been relatively sheltered instruments of government public 
policy, but their consistent use over several decades lends them an air of persistence that 
bears further investigation. It may be that at the end of the day, grants are simply a form of 
expedient "political tree sap used to cover small wounds" (Professor David Adams, 2010, 
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pers. comm., 6 May) that by the means of global diffusion have become a standard tool in a 
generic government's policy toolbox. Then again, their ability to appeal to a wide group of 
stakeholders would seem to suggest that deeper theoretical linkages might emerge. 
The second question of whether grants systems have become more complex over time 
is particularly timely given the new Commonwealth Government's focus on trying to reduce 
complexity in bureaucratic systems by reducing red tape. However, as was pointed out in 
section 5.2, complexity manifests itself in social systems in a multitude of ways (and in part 
through unpredictable "emergent" behavior). Therefore, movements toward simplicity might 
have little or no effect unless a deeper understanding of the nature and structure of this 
complexity is gained (Miller and Page, 2007: 236). Of particular interest is another take on 
the follow-up question of what effect this complexity has on the system: If the essential 
operation of grants systems has not changed much over time, how robust are these systems 
presently? As Johnson (2001) points out, "systems can grow unwieldy when their 
component parts become excessively complicated" (78). It will take theory building work to 
determine when a system such as this "flips" from a state of robustness to a state of 
brittleness. One avenue of inquiry would be to use advanced simulation techniques to 
introduce various complexity parameters into a model to try to determine system performance 
measures. Grants systems may be a relatively inexpensive way for Government to address 
stakeholder concerns but what is the resultant state of the stakeholders if the complexity of 
the system rises over time? Does there exist an identifiable stakeholder "tipping point" 
(perhaps revolving around such key variables as level of NGO dissolutions and transactional 
cost "ceilings" reached) which could signal imminent partial or total system failure? 
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If grants are an integral part of wider public policy endeavors by Government, then 
the process of their creation might also bear some particular fruitful insights into their utility. 
In Figure 8, the author has constructed one possible starting point-an overarching yet simple 
systems feedback-oriented framework which could help initial research into the genesis of 
grants. Governments are likely to set policy based on a continuum of options ranging from 
simple fiat by one or a few members in the case of autocratic governments to large 
consensus-building efforts amongst numerous stakeholders in more participatory 
governments. Certain governments may remain aloof from public opinion and set policy 
agendas based more on party platforms, economic theory, or the social philosophy of its 
leaders. Other governments may find themselves with less-than-unified policies as different 
levels of government (perhaps dominated by competing departments, agents, or members of 
different political persuasion) actively block uniform policies across regional, state, or 
national lines. Generally speaking though, we can postulate that all levels of Government 
receive feedback on their public policy initiatives on a regular basis. This feedback would 
come from multiple external sources ( e.g., general public, lobbyists, special interest groups, 
clients, client advocacy groups, etc.) across time. In addition, internal Government sources 
(i.e., different levels of Government or departments within a single level) might also generate 
feedback about the relative success or failure of a particular policy within their domain. In 
Figure 8, Media occupies a special standalone place in the diagram due to its possible 
disproportionate effect on policy making (Franklin, 1999) and should be examined more 
thoroughly for its possible effects on grants ( especially given its ability to widely inform the 
general public on single issue causes like selected deviations in public expectations of policy 
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Figure 8 
Measuring the Pressure on Government to Do "Something" Based on Internal and External Feedback 
Sources of Feedback 
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outcomes). Under this framework, certain gradient lines on the "pressure to do something" 
thermometer's scale pictured [Note: This thermometer is a stand-in for an internalized mental 
model which can be used to quickly channel current issues before political leaders into "hot 
topics".] might signify a theoretical limit over which a Government feels constrained to act. 
[Also of interest: Between what gradients must an issue fall between in order to remain 
within the grants system sphere?] 
For example, going past a certain point might trigger an informal assessment across 
departments within a single level of Government about a particular policy, past another point 
might trigger a formal assessment in that level, past another point might trigger a formal 
assessment between levels of Government, past another might trigger the creation of a new 
grant ( or the modification or deletion of an existing one), past another might call for a new 
program, or an entirely new policy, past yet another might generate the impetus to determine 
a new source of revenue. For our purposes, it would be interesting to see if Government is 
this deliberate and feedback sensitive in its actions and while the genesis of grants is more 
than likely to be multi-factorial in nature, it would also be useful to know if feedback in the 
system is a key causal agent. If so, this "reactionary approach to feedback" framework 
fleshed out into a wider theory of government agenda setting might help explain the plethora 
of grants and their "longevity" once created. In this light, the entire life cycle of individual 
grants would also be worthy of study. Given the systems theory truism that systems once 
made are difficult to get rid of (Gall, 2011), we can also ask: How long do individual grants 
stay available and what is the justification for their continued existence? Does negative 
feedback on the possible withdrawal of a grant entitlement keep certain grants in existence 
long past the issue for which they were created for in the first place has been resolved? 
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It is relatively easy to picture the reinforcing feedback loops that would be created 
under this framework. An individual grant comes into existence, and the result of the 
program( s) that was funded by that grant is fed back through the system. Positive feedback 
( especially from the media which as mentioned before affects a wide and diverse set of 
stakeholders) would tend to reinforce the continuation of that grant. After all, what politician 
has the political wherewithal to cancel a grant that is now: 1) contributing to "good" results in 
the community, and 2) supporting an organisation (and by extension employing people-
another public good) that is also achieving good results in the community? Negative 
feedback might also reinforce the continuation of the grant in question because the original 
feedback which helped generate the grant remains-this discrepancy could lead the ordinary 
politician to decide that only adjustments in its implementation are required. These 
adjustments could be to the grant's scale ( e.g., it was insufficient, or the organisation awarded 
the grant was the incorrect choice) or scope ( other organisations in the sector could perhaps 
do a better job). The adjustments might cause the grant to bifurcate along these lines such 
that multiple grants to a diverse set of organisations may be generated to replace what was 
before a single grant. 
In this framework, success can breed success (continuation of grants), and failure can 
breed success (additional grants). Soon, it would not take long to populate a policy landscape 
with a plethora of grants, each of which must be must be administered from creation to 
acquittal (which in itself is another type of jobs program). This requires more and more 
Government personnel operating in different departments across different levels of 
Government each most likely using heterogeneous data formats and platforms. The 
"emergent" pressure to organize this portfolio of grants generates ever-more fonnal rules and 
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procedures, thereby introducing even more complexity into the system. In the environment, 
it is relatively easy to picture the cause-and-effect nature the increased pool of funds 
generated by the grants system has on the number and type of organisations in the nonprofit 
sector. Dependent as they have become on public sector grants funding, nonprofits would 
most likely suffer wide scale sector effects if downsizing grant offerings were a routine 
course of Government business. Targeted grant downsizing is also problematic since the 
larger grants would appear to be going to larger NGOs which often offer a multitude of 
services to local communities. Future researchers could explore this area by asking: Are 
some grants funding organisations that are simply too big to fail? 
This leads us to the research area encapsulated by the fourth question raised above 
which asks what type of system is generated by this "static" system of creating grants which 
feed ready-made programs by NGOs. This area is perhaps approached by asking two sub-
questions: 
1. How innovative is the current system? 
2. How is system performing in terms of overall outcomes? 
According to Altenburg and Pegels (2012: 6), "innovation is a relational, interactive 
and cumulative process that occurs between producers and users of goods and services". 
How innovative is the Tasmanian grants system, particularly at its current point in its life 
cycle? To answer this question, we would have to explore the concept of innovation from 
many perspectives. Innovation can take place within certain stakeholder groups but also 
across stakeholder groups ( e.g., by their use of new and value-added collaboration tools or 
methods or by their organisational relationships). We can look at: 1) particularly innovative 
programs being offered by individual stakeholders, or by groups of stakeholders, 
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2) inventive programs centred on certain social issues, or 3) certain technologies which allow 
for unique client outreach or that create opportunities for specialized client service delivery. 
There is no particular need to equate ·'innovative" with the concept of "pioneer" however. 
Tasmanian NGOs might demonstrate innovation by quickly adopting and tailoring a national 
or global best practice to suit their current circumstances. Others might gain "first mover 
advantage" by adopting a certain technology which may be cost prohibitive for other 
organisations in its sector. Other NGOs might be particularly innovative in marketing and 
branding activities which in tum perhaps allows them access to a wider range of funding 
sources. Does experimentation in the sector (e.g., collaborative efforts within the sector like 
joint grant proposals, collaborative programs across NGOs perhaps under an umbrella of a 
community focused endeavor, collaborative efforts across sectors) occur regularly, and is 
such experimentation encouraged by Government at all levels? All in all, we will need 
additional theory to guide us through these explorations, especially when questions are asked 
about complexity and whether its effects (e.g., increased Bureaucracy, red tape, and 
transaction costs) tamper down creative energies in the system, drive out smaller (and 
perhaps more innovative organisations) in the system, or by extension help develop a 
preference through grant funding for established (but not necessarily innovative) programs 
which contribute to perceived regularity and predictability in the system. 
The second question deals with an overall measure of effectiveness of the grants 
system. It is very possible for a grants system to generate a highly efficient usage of grant 
funds. With the exception of stakeholder feedback, this is cun-ently the major criteria by 
which the nonprofit sector is judged in Tasmania. Has the money allocated through public 
sector grants been spent to the Government's satisfaction? Would more sophisticated 
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outcome-based criteria engender too many disruptive effects on the nonprofit sector? Who 
should make that determination? These are questions which point to areas ripe for further 
research. 
5. 7 Implications for management practice and research 
Tasmania would have several advantages as a test bed if it should ever decide to 
prototype changes in its social services allocational framework. It has a relatively small 
population, urban clusters (it is the only Australian state without a rural Council), a good 
technology infrastructure once the roll out of the National Broadband Network is completed, 
organisational researchers available at the University of Tasmania and the Australian 
Innovation Research Centre, a large number and variety of voluntary and community service 
organisations, and a history of participatory democracy at the local level. In the past, 
Tasmania has made social inclusion part of its government deliberations, it has been the 
home to several pilot programs to help provide services to rural areas, it has a history of 
cooperation between individual councils [Note: Regional organisations of councils, or ROCs, 
began there in 1922 according to the Australian Government/Department oflnfrastructure 
and Regional Development, 2003: para. 8.], and it has successfully undertaken cluster 
developments with the help of local communities (West et al., 2012). 
Tasmania also has key economic and structural challenges. For example, "disposable 
incomes in the state's north and north-west were found to be some of the lowest in the 
country with two regions in the top 10 lowest disposable incomes" (State of the Regions 
report, 2014: para. 2). Tasmania also has "an ageing population and its associated costs, as 
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well as growing citizen demand for increased services and government" (Eggleton, 2014: 
para. 8). 
Regardless of whether such prototyping discussions ever take place in Tasmania, it is 
anticipated that this study ( even with its findings in a nascent stage) will make a contribution 
to management practice and research in the following ways: 
1. It will demonstrate to each grants system member that they are a 
stakeholder in a much larger public policy system, and that the 
boundaries currently dividing them should not be assumed to be 
static and unchangeable. 
2. The Tasmanian grants system with its various emergent behaviours 
has been shown to be eminently describable. In the opinion of the 
researcher, this makes it an especially good candidate to become one 
of the Australian Government's test case studies in its examination 
of "wicked" policy problems (see Briggs, 2007). 
3. It might encourage future researchers to more fully explicate the 
grants system, and as the system elements and their interactions 
become better known, might also eventually impact policy because 
case studies like these "provide vicarious experience which is an 
important basis for refining action options and expectation" (Stake, 
2005, cited in Bergerson 2007: 116). 
4. It might prompt future researchers to go beyond the grants system 
and look at the evolution of allocative policies in a new systems-
oriented, holistic manner. 
5. It might persuade future researchers to utilize multiple frameworks 
and multiple methodologies to address the issue of social well-being. 
6. It offers an opportunity for next generation researchers to explore 
different allocation mixes and assess whole-of-public-policy fitness 
landscapes even if certain emergent system behavior remains forever 
unpredictable. These researchers will have more refined multi-
criteria analytic techniques from an evolving field of study (Urli and 
Nadeau, 1999) and access to much more sophisticated technology 
platforms ( e.g., quantum computing) on which to conduct such 
analysis within the next twenty years (Connolly, 2012). 
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What began as a research endeavour with simple research questions in a field almost 
devoid of past studies has the potential to carry on in many directions-not only to study 
existing systems but potentially reformulating those systems under more fully realized 
alternate frameworks. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Future researchers are warned by Anderson (1972) as cited in Miller and Page (2007: 
41) that teasing out an understanding of a system's functioning by using a reductionist 
approach-the modelling its parts-might be a fool's errand since the whole is "not only 
more but very different" than the sum of its parts. A counterweight to that warning, however, 
is Johnson's (2007) reminder that "we don't need a full understanding of the constituent 
objects in order to understand what a collection of them might do" ( 17). Systems research 
along the lines initiated by the current study needs an overarching theory (yet to be developed) 
on how "states of the world (composed of low-level entities and interaction rules) are 
transformed into high-level entities" (Miller and Page, 2007: 42). Given that a variety of 
methodologies are likely to be needed in order to model such higher-level entities (Miller and 
Page, 2007: 42), that approach has been fervently endorsed herein. 
Furthermore, if a complex system like the Tasmanian grants system can be 
understood through "good theory," then a concomitant goal of such theory creation is to try to 
influence the outcomes of such a system (Miller and Page, 2007: 235). Several factors point 
to the need for such efforts. Grants systems touch the lives of countless citizens in numerous 
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countries across the globe. We are living in an era of decreasing government funding, 
increasing competition for this funding, building pressure on nonprofit organisations to 
"professionalize management practices and demonstrate measurable outcomes" (Lazarevski 
et al., 2008: 217), and increasing demands on government to produce solutions to complex 
problems. Developing a greater understanding of this small piece of the larger public policy 
pie might provide researchers with the very insights needed to improve not only this 
subsystem but by extension the wider policy system as well. 
The ability to give stakeholders of the Tasmanian grants system access to a larger 
picture than they might currently have of the public policy system they are embedded in is a 
good result from the current research effort. It is hoped that eventually all of the stakeholders 
of the public grants system will be made aware of the potential unintended consequences 
inherent in the current system design and become part of the discussion on how to improve 
the system. It is hoped that this awareness can lead to a discussion on how best to alter the 
grants system in the 21st century to make this public policy tool not only more efficient and 





The research effort detailed in the prior chapters focused on describing the public 
sector grants system as one tool at the disposal of the Tasmanian government in creating 
public policy. Such a system was examined up close by gathering the perspectives of a key 
stakeholder in that system-nonprofit actors. The system was also examined from a distance 
by looking at the behaviours that emerge when system elements interact. The findings from 
that dual examination are summarized in the following section. 
6.1 Synopsis of findings 
Each of the two research questions were addressed by the data gathered in the course 
of this study and the subsequent analysis. A summary of the findings is presented under each 
question. 
Research Question One: Are there any system archetypes noticeable in the public 
sector grants system? 
Findings. Analysis of the data uncovered five system archetypes which seem to be 
embedded both in the design and functioning of the Tasmanian grants system. They are most 
commonly known as: 
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1. Shifting the Burden-Addiction 
2. Escalation 
3. Success to the Successful 
4. Drifting Goals 
5. Limits to Success 
These patterns of behaviour were found during the exploration of four major themes which 
emerged from the data on how NGOs can respond to funding shortfalls. These themes deal 
with an NGO's attempt to cover funding gaps. They can do this by: 
1. Seeking additional funding ( e.g., by applying for additional grants). 
2. Adjusting their programs and client base ( e.g., by focusing on 
"grant-worthy" clients). 
3. Adjusting their organisational focus (e.g., by becoming a better 
fundraising organisation). 
4. Cost cutting ( e.g., reducing personnel and overhead). 
Each of these archetypes was then discussed in terms of their micro- and macro-level effects. 
Research Question Two: Is the complexity of the public sector grants system 
increasing, and if so, why? 
Findings. The consensus of the survey participants was that complexity was indeed 
increasing in the Tasmanian grants system and was doing so across multiple levels which the 
participants helped define. Key factors which led to this finding are: 
1. The grants system in toto was viewed as growing more complex due 
to significant sector growth and a competitive "imbalance" in the 
number and size of the NGOs in the field (with many small 
organisations and a few large ones). 
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2. The grants system makes few allowances for the scale and scope of 
NGOs and "burdensome" paperwork requirements throughout the 
grants process are equally applicable to all nonprofits. Larger 
organisations which have more specialized staffs are better 
positioned to apply for more and for a wider range of grants than 
smaller nonprofits. 
3. The larger an NGO becomes, the greater the organisational 
complexity involved in completing the grants process. This occurs 
because more staff and support personnel usually become involved 
in grant activities, and those activities become diffused across a 
wider range of intra- and inter-organisational positions ( e.g., contacts 
between an NGO and external financial, tax, and consultancy 
personnel). With increasing staff involvement comes an increased 
number of data checkpoints and permissions needed in transactional 
activities. 
4. Enforced collaboration schemes by the government ( e.g., joint 
tendering) is looked on both with hope and suspicion by the 
participants. In terms of complexity, such schemes cannot seem to 
counteract the natural competitive tendencies of actors operating in a 
zero-sum arena. 
5. Government grant specifications help create complex reverberations 
in the programmatic offerings ofNGOs, most notably in their 
selection of clients. The focus on "grant-worthy" clients can drive 
changes which affect not only operations but organisational mission, 
reputation, morale, retention, fundraising capacity, service quality, 
etc. 
6.2 Limitations 
The constraints in this research effort have also been noted in other sections. To 
summarize. the sample size used was small. Findings also represent only a small snapshot of 
NGO operations in what is a diverse sector. These factors combined with the exploratory, 
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interpretive nature of the study makes generalizations impossible to propose at this juncture. 
Furthermore, the research remains in the very early stages of theory development. Two other 
sets of constraints, the research design itself and the theoretical lens that was selected, are 
covered more fully in the following two subsections. 
6.2.1 Interpretative restrictions imposed by the research design 
The design, the case study approach, utilized herein was chosen for two major reasons: 
1) because according to Stake (1994: 156), case studies are valuable in "suggesting 
complexities for further investigation," and 2) because the perceptions of the stakeholders 
selected (NGO officers) reflect a "rarely observed quality" of uniqueness in the extant 
literature (Guest et al., 2013: 9). However, now that tentative themes have been established 
under a conceptual framework, it is suggested that such work can continue by utilizing a 
"diversity of theoretical and epistemological frameworks" (Guest et al., 2013: 3). Inductive 
thematic analysis should perhaps take on a central role for a time in order to take the thematic 
results to a larger sample from within the Tasmanian grants system as well as to a wider 
population of grants systems for comparative purposes. Such analysis could easily be 
extended to the grants systems of other Australian states as well as to other nations. However, 
it should also be noted here that enough anomalies may exist between local, national, and 
international public sector grants systems as to make such sampling problematic. 
The small, self-selected sample of volunteers used in this study was instrumental in 
the highlighting of some of the unique behaviours arising from the modelling of the local 
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grants system. However, this sample can be broadened on multiple fronts. Within 
Tasmanian NGOs, other key staff members should be sought out. These can include program 
managers who need to oversee compliance with government contract conditions, finance 
managers who handle government acquittals, and actual field workers who provide the 
organisation's services. Within Government, key staff could include agents responsible for 
grant contracts, acquittal agents, policy makers, policy implementers, and policy evaluators. 
Other key stakeholders in the grants system that might be considered for inclusion in future 
studies involve all client (and non-client) pools related to NGOs' programmatic offerings, 
especially those clients who have been ( or will be) affected by programmatic changes or cuts 
within NGOs, media personnel, other organisations which serve as NGO funding sources, 
private sector organisations, and the general public. On a wider, international front, grants 
systems under different types of Government structures should be investigated ( e.g., Is the 
complexity burden amongst stakeholders higher or lower in tightly regulated versus loosely 
regulated environments?). Different types ofNGOs (other than state or national NGOs) 
should also be part of a wider sample. Of particular interest are boundary-spanning, 
international NGOs (aka INGOs) which have been noted to be particularly "resistant to 
change" (Ronalds, 2010: 181 ). Wider sampling efforts should also take into account other 
environmental issues such as Culture to witness how grants systems are formulated in 
societies deemed to be more oriented to collaboration than to competition. 
Moving on from case studies, it is hoped that longitudinal data is also sought. As 
Byrne (1998: 69-71) points out, it will be this aggregation of the micro-level behaviours of 
the stakeholders that will help provide insights into the macro properties of the grants system: 
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Longitudinal data are essential if the temporal dependencies in micro-
level behavior are to be investigated in any analysis but micro-level 
behavior is not the basis on which we can analyze changes in society 
and politics. We need to understand how the whole system within 
which micro-level behavior occurs is changing (68). 
Finally, it is hoped that a mixed method research agenda is followed as this researcher also 
believes that a blend of qualitative and quantitative research would lead to a more "coherent 
account of the evidence" (Risjord et al., 2002: 273). Qualitative efforts will help deepen the 
metaphors derived from the system stakeholders and give rise to a multitude of questions 
beyond those raised in previous sections. Quantitative inquiry can then be used in an iterative 
conjunctive manner to help answer those questions. For example, qualitative analysis has 
already provided some interesting questions about data requirements throughout the grants 
process. Questionnaires and diary keeping with quantitative scales could now be used among 
NGO grant agents to determine transactional costs of those activities (Risjord et al., 2002: 
273-274). 
6.2.2 Interpretative restrictions imposed by the theoretical lens 
According to Gharajedaghi (2011 ), in order to contemplate something, "a mental 
image or model of it" is required, and this model is "a selective abstraction of reality and at 
best it is an oversimplification" (11 ). Given the Jack of prior research, the researcher focused 
on systems theory to establish a framework whose scaffolding was a minimalist description 
of a complex system so as not to get bogged down in detail in this foundational research 
effort. In the course of investigation, systems theory supported by concepts derived from 
both the NGO and public administration literature was further informed by the following 
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frames-resource-based theory, neo-institutional theory, social network theory, and 
organisational life cycle theory- due to stakeholder perceptions of the presence of some of 
the key theory elements in their daily organisational life. Some of these frames such as a 
resource-based view of the nonprofit stakeholders also fits nicely within the overarching 
systems framework since resource dependency highlights "the fi1m as an open system often 
necessarily dependent on other organizations as resource providers and subject to 
environmental influences" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, cited in Daellenbach, Davies and 
Asbill, 2006: 80). However, due to methodological and sampling issues which foster 
limitations on generalization, the researcher is unable to directly tie those theories into the 
conceptual framework proposed herein. Indeed, some of the assumptions of these theories 
would seem to conflict at first glance. For example, resource dependencies might work 
against the pressures of institutional isomorphism, and functional complexity issues might 
complicate the assumptions of all the frames (Irvine, 2003: 20). Indeed, the very notion of 
thinking of a particular NGO as a "unitary functioning agency with a unitary goal" (Irvine, 
2003: 19) has simply been a convenient assumption by the researcher yet to be borne out in 
the wider organisational research literature. 
The theoretical lens chosen allowed the researcher to operate at the intersection of 
three distinct research literature domains, namely that of systems theory, NGOs, and public 
administration, and to draw insights from each of them when examining the research 
questions. However, any conceptual "filter" or lens ( even one with multiple elements) is just 
a single way to view the phenomena in question, and the researcher must ahvays be careful of 
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness which according to Alfred North Whitehead, is "the 
error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete" (Irvine, 2013: 5). 
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Over the course of this study, it has become clear to this researcher that a sharper 
multiple theoretical lens is now needed to extend the conceptual framework into a higher 
level model. In particular, the theoretical foundations underpinning the actions of the key 
stakeholders must come to be understood to a greater degree to reach that higher level of 
descriptive complexity which will allow theory building to proceed. In order to address the 
need for a multiple theoretical lens that produces greater clarity, the researcher suggests 
proceeding using a variety of subjectivist epistemologies which can include (but is not 
limited to) the following: social construction theory, phenomenology, interpretism, 
hermeneutics, radical humanism, radical structuralism, critical theory, and postmodemism. It 
will be from a diverse set of research efforts guided by epistemologies such as these, 
combined with specific insights from the fields of organisational theory, social philosophy, 
welfare economics, social justice and social inclusion, that stakeholder metaphors will 
sharpen and grow more distinct. However, this researcher proposes that a more positivist, 
model-centric approach can also be a way forward once the higher level model's structures 
have been firmed up. Indeed, the researcher can foresee a time where empirical work might 
dominate the research effort. For example, let us return to the issue of the relationship 
between the level of complexity and the resultant transactional costs borne by organisations. 
As McKelvey (1998: 18) suggests, mathematical and computational analysis could be 
undertaken following the data flows in real organisations. According to McKelvey (1998), 
this type of analysis firmly positioned by "Campbellian realism" (18) would strengthen the 
"epistemological footing'' (18) for those researchers interested in using models to make 
predictions, which in this example would be predictions based on a theory of organisational 
data flows and organisational complexity levels. 
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Regardless of the frames eventually used, the researcher should make explicit the 
assumptions and limitations not only of each individual frame but also the limitations of the 
multiple lens in the dynamics of their frames interactions with each other. This concern 
might be especially relevant in the context of comparing public sector grants systems in a 
cross-cultural manner, wherein any particular conceptual filter might be prove itself less than 
optimal when looking at a system of multiple systems, each with its own embedded set of 
cultural meanings and interpretations. 
6.3 Suggestions for further research 
To help frame the efforts for a revised, future research agenda, the researcher suggests 
work on three fronts. First, a deeper exploration of the commonalities amongst the majority 
of grants systems would now be in order (a goodly research effort concerning the councils 
and states that make up Australia-a more challenging effort on a global basis). The 
following may be considered to be among the likely contenders for the dominant features of 
such systems; however, further research will be required to determine what might be the 
typical mix of these and other elements: 
• Zero-sum funding. 
• Shrinking funding pools (given the lingering after-effects of the 
global financial crises). 
• Dependency on government funding for nonprofit actors. 
• Competition within the nonprofit sector. Limited cooperation 
between sectors. 
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• Increasing system complexity ( chiefly driven by worldwide effo11s 
by Governments towards risk minimization through regulatory and 
other compliance requirements). 
• Complexity driving increasing transaction costs between 
Government and other major actors. 
• Organisational evolutionary pressures to: I) survive, 2) compete, and 
3) grow. 
• Systems pressure to maintain diversity (size, scale, and scope) 
amongst actors in each sector. 
• Differing goals and motivations ( e.g., capitalism, nonprofit social 
intervention, government bureaucracy) amongst stakeholders across 
sectors. 
• Emergent behaviour amongst system actors (Is there a recognizable 
mathematical relationship between complexity and occurrences of 
these behaviours, such as gaming behaviour?) 
• Grant "success" judged on organisation-by-organisation and grant-
by-grant acquittals versus community outcomes. 
Second, a refinement of several factors which arose in this study is needed. The 
concept of "complexity" must be operationalized. This will allow for this concept to flow 
across a much needed synthesis of theories to explain the workings of the various 
stakeholders found in grants systems. The broadened reach of new stakeholder metaphors, 
combined with the mapping of relationships within the system, will allow for the conceptual 
framework to be refined to a much higher level. In this way, work toward model-building 
and the testing of propositions ( centred first perhaps on the "reverberations" of complexity 
within the system) can begin anew. 
Third, the conceptual framework developed in this study can be used to explore "how 
a change to the magnitude of a variable of interest...impacts on the behaviour of the system as 
a whole" (Moizer and Tracey, 2010: 259). For example, a small change in focus from service 
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delivery to funding activities might have a disproportionate effect on a range of 
organisational factors such as organisational morale, retention, and reputation. Researchers 
and organisational decision makers can make use of this type of investigation to help 
determine the degree of influence of a number of key variables. Others might be interested in 
the investigating the consequences faced by NGOs who try to break out of the grant funding 
cycle entirely. Some may choose to extend the framework into additional funding areas such 
as contracts (Bull and Crompton, 2006: 49) or by tracing out the mixed-funding loops in a 
more explicit manner. 
All of these extended research efforts have been further encapsulated under the 
following more nuanced research aims. 
Reseach Aim #1: Extend the current conceptual framework of the 
Tasmanian grants system by incorporating the perceptions of more 
system stakeholders. 
Reseach Aim #2: Evaluate whether the revised conceptual framework 
is extendable to other grants systems. 
Research Aim #3: Critically assess the assertions (Meadows, 2008; 
Miller and Page, 2007) that leverage points can be used to either alter a 
system's behaviour or mitigate the effects of Systems Archetypes. 
Research Aim #4: Analyze the contention that grants systems grow 
increasingly complex on many levels over time. 
Research Aim #5: Demonstrate how complexity both constrains and 
encourages certain behaviours of system actors. 
Research Aim #6: Extend Research Aim #5 by developing a "systems 
level measure" of innovation and apply that measure to the nonprofit 
sector operating under varying levels of complexity. 
Research Aim #7: Explore the fundamental tension in grants systems 
over the desirability of predictability and stability versus the resulting 
emergent rigidity (Duit and Galaz, 2008: 320). 
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Research Aim #8: Investigate how grants systems respond to 
increased rigidity or brittleness-For example, how is the rate of 
organisational creation or dissipation affected by movement along this 
continuum? Is system collapse heralded by the passing of a theoretical 
tipping point? 
Research Aim #9. Assess the proposition that the resultant complex 
interdependence amongst stakeholders has pushed this area of public 
policy (grants) into a fitness landscape of complicated localized 
programmatic solutions versus complex problem adaptation with wider 
system health outcomes as the shared goal. What are the cumulative 
consequences for the wider public policy system when sub-policies are 
allowed to "rest" at non-optimal fitness landscapes? 
Research Aim #10: Develop testable propositions for each model 
generated to address the four questions raised in section 5.6. 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
In this exploratory research effort, the first few tentative steps have been taken under 
a constructivist paradigm to "reconstruct" the social world of some of the key actors in the 
Tasmanian public sector grants system (Zucker, 2009: 11 ). This case study allowed the 
researcher to glimpse some interesting patterns emerge from the data and seek for the 
meaning behind those patterns for the system observed. Even preliminary analysis of this 
relatively small-scale grants system has led the researcher to propose that grants systems 
should be looked at as part of a larger complex adaptive system that governments use to 
tackle the "wicked problem" of securing the "general welfare" of the public. This welfare, 
with multiple subareas of need all competing for limited resources, is not a simple allocation 
problem with Pareto optimals. Rather, it is postulated that any Government's public policy in 
toto resides on a performance landscape, and its speci fie sub-policy on grants (being a 
]86 
relatively fast policy instrument to initiate) might be a rational, albeit instinctively reflexive, 
way to try to remain on a fitness landscape that a Government has determined to be "good 
enough". Over time, however, every performance landscape shifts and currently we have no 
way to assess whether Governments are using grants to generate good solutions with good 
(system-wide) outcomes. 
To increase our understanding from this point forward, the researcher has suggested 
numerous avenues of follow-up research, some focusing on finding key variables and their 
relations, some to sharpen the theoretical/conceptual coherence of the frameworks proposed 
herein, and others to help build "logical chains of evidence" in order to "assemble a coherent 
understanding of the data" (Zucker, 2009: 11). It is hoped that these continued research 
efforts move towards a plateau whereby theory development can start to take place around 
the localized issue of grants system efficacy and its place in the total public policy schema as 
well as the wider issue of social well-being and public policy making under the umbrella of 
scarce resources. In this way, we might eventually develop some kind of multi-objective 
optimization algorithm that would show the performance landscape of not only a grants 
subsystem but the entire government public policy system. However, reframing the problem 
as a complex allocation issue or a concern over multidimensional performance measures is 
not sufficient. A multiple theoretical lens that includes welfare economics, social justice, and 
social inclusion as well as the perspectives of a number of organisational theories is necessary 
to proceed. This multiple theoretical lens under a parsimonious systems framework also has 
the potential to open up new areas of research involving organisational complexity and 
fragility. Also, by taking a more user-oriented approach with an eye toward social well-being 
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measures as in the case of the scenario presented of a homeless young Tasmanian who would 
currently likely find herself living "on less than half of the recognised poverty line in 
Australia" despite maximum Government payments (Humphries, 2014: para. 5), the 
researcher can begin to anticipate new schemas and structural changes which might one day 
play a role in restructuring the social services allocation system. All in all, it is an 
interdisciplinary challenge that calls out for a diverse methodological approach. In this way, 
a new and enlarged perspective on grants in the 21st century can be forthcoming. 
I hope this paper will kindle the type of dialogue that generates even more questions 
and inspires more research into social inequality and injustice embedded in social systems. 
Nested complex allocational systems addressing complex social problems is not an easy topic 
area to address in a single discipline, reductionist way. It will definitely take the involvement 
of numerous researchers from multiple disciplines to tease out all the underlying issues and to 
identify key causalities. It is hoped that this paper makes a good start on asking important 
questions and raising key issues. 
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HUMAN RESEARCTI ETIIlCS COMMI I fEE 
(TASMANIA) NETWORK 
SOCIAL SCIENCE HREC 
MINIMAL RISK APPLICATION 
UTAS. 
Important: Please send an electronic <;opy of this application (may be unsigned) and all 
attachments by emailto.Matilvn.Knott@utasledu.au. All electronic copies should 
~~'.• ,;-::'.~.-tt..,'f/4:;fi;.:'?-~.-O 1:F-~&f'*'_. · ... · 
be submitted as Microsoft Wor&do~nts .. A}igned hard copy must also be 
sent to: Marilyn Knott, Private Bag 1, Ht>bart, 7001 
If you have any questions, please call: 6226 7479 
1. Title ofprop~sed,inves_tig.ipb'JJ., 
- '---. .<:···~. 
Please be concise but sp(rific. Titlfu; should be consistent with those used on any external 
funding application. 
A Narrative Policy Analy~is oft~t!/!)is:~:~~~n C~µnj~~tan~~Program 
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1/9/2010 31/10/2013 
, 3. Investi <1.~Qrs: 
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(Re uired) 
B. Co-Investigator(s) 
i) Given },fame 












Professor; Honorary Fellow AIRC 
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,i'JRC 
!.:.t_-.,.·d .=,, Galleri:i LJi.ufding 
33 Salamfu1c-J Plac·"ei. 
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·'· /' :·· . 
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Gender: Date of Birth: Preferred Title: 
-------
Mr I Ms /Miss/Mrs /Dr 
Student Number: Level: 
--------- Undergraduate/ Hons/ Masters/ 




0 What is the main purpose of this project? 
Research for Publication D Teaching ., .. 
R~arcllf. r Th~~ X QJ.ali j\$kr:ance/ Audit~.' ti ·· -
Aims: 
Please give a concise g~p-tion of the main objectives and/or hypothesis of the study. 
To examine how puJm~ p9j~cy Jrtiti~'fiyes .. like the Tasaj.}tp1,an Community Grants Program. which are 
shaped and guided by &,;qtiaJ ~cli<Jocal ~~ncies, ~yC>1Ve''w1:p}ofupl~:SY~iI1S that produce not only social 
benefits but al~p transa~i()fi costs and.Uiiilitended_,59cfal co~uen~s. 
"' ustification: 
: \ 
· • ? E,xplain why this particular study is worth <loin~; and the main advantages to be gained from it. 
·Pioneering study exploring an under-researched subject; "it should provide new insights into grants as an emergent 
property of government agencies in response to public need. 
•. JfReview .tif:cEthiaf Considerations 
·~~e~fthio~.ly considered t~ lie Mi~~·Risk}f youan,§}!?,f~T;:~~o~! to all thef1{{owing questions. If you 
answer "Yes";· au must coni lete a' . ma ·1iciztjon- usin • ;the Sociaf Stje.11.ces Full'.A . lication Form 
Does your research mvolve the collection of human tissue samples? 
Human tissue samples include blood and other bodily fluids. 
Does your research mvolve the deception of participants, including 
concealing the purposes of research, covert observation and/or audio or 
visual recording without consent? 
Yes ElNo X 
Yes 0No X 
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A4 
... 
Does your research involve the participation of people without their prior 
consent? 
Does your research involve withholding from one group specific 
treatments or methods of learning from which they may benefit? 
Does your research involve the access or use of m€!Cii9!1 records where 
participants can be identified or linked to their record; in so~e way? 
Does your research involve the m,e of ionising r~~tion? 
Does your research involve tll¢'.use of pers_qnal data obtained from a 
Commonwe2ilth or State Gove~'P: Dep~~:c~~~jfh.out the 
consent of the particip3!!ts e.g. geftiifg a list of ~~acfs~rrr~tn the 
Australian Electoral Co:riuftis~ion? 
,. . --. ·.·,.·· 
Does your research spe~ca.Q.ytar&,~.t anx. of the,fo 
people; (speci,fically target m~ ~~ ar~ref 
participants, as:~1msed to poJ:~ffally bemgifia:$' 
of the general population) · · · 
• W ~IP:en who are:p'fygnaIJt::~d th~ {ittfuan f~ 
Children and ouft' \ '' ··. fm.'e" • 
• . . y (:'.·'.,g};l.?$C!~. . ... ·;·. ..... :··.' .::-.c· ,.·,' ·' 
• Those highly dep~n#ent on megical ~who af~una)>Ie to give 
consent 
•-· People w_~q-t a cogniti~e.imp~ent, intellectual ~lli~bility or 
mental illtiess 
. ... 
• People who may be involved in,ill~al activities o.r residents of 
custodial'institutip!15 · .. , ·/ 
• Aboriginal and Tcin'es §.tpijghfI~~cler Peoples 
• Peopie in other countrieh ,,,, ... ··: 
• People who are unabl~ifo giye·mfonned c~t-pecause of 
diffifulties in understandinganirifortn~tjonshei~t (ie. non English 
speakers etc) 
Does your research pose any risks fo_r participants under medical care 
beyond those of their routine care? (Risks includenot only physical risks 
but also psychological, spiritual and social harm or distress eg 
stigmatisation or discrimination) 
Yes D No X 
Yes O No X 
Yes D No X 
Yes O No X 
Yesi t]'No X 
•··.·. 
Yes O No X 
Yes O No X 
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Does your research involve the in depth discussion of any of the following 
topics whether by interview or as part of a questionnaire or survey; 
• Parenting practices, 
• Sensitive personal issues, 
• Sensitive cultural issues, 
• Grief death or serious traumatic loss, 
• Depression mood states or anxiety, 
• Gambling, 
• Eating disorders, 
• Illicit drug taking or substance abuse, 
• Psychological disorders, 
• Suicide, 
• Gender identity and/or .. sexuality, 
• Race and/or ei:lµric ider\tfty, 
• Fertility and/or termination of pregnancy 
Does your research involve the potential disclosure of ill~gal activities or 
Yes D No X 
criminal behaviour? :Yes D No X 
Are there any specific risks to;~ !es . ..;~··...,er (e.g., Wµl,·.the;{i.'esearch involve · · 
the use of hazardous mate:i:i~Ji~-"i· . . ~en in a}?U.~~y unstable :_ :Yes O No X 
area}? 
If your research will *e.p~\¥~ in ~ ~~g do ~gt the 
following apply: is the~res~~ito -,.;:,", ertal{~~-'~poij,'#.YY unstable 
area? Does it involve sensi_~~ °tJ~?iAnWgt1~:tlf9research 
take place in a country in ~c:4~ficisffi''of the,g6ii~(ffltffuld 
.. ~-.·: .~,~.·-·~·,,·,,-:,· .. -.• ~.. ·.·. -~·-·:·.-,, 
institutions might ptif participants and/or researchenfJ~:risk? 
,Does your research explore p9~¢p~y);<;>n.a4~lj.al]'.~~ess practices or 
' seek to elicit potentially confid~ti~il~miperciai inforn:i~ti9n from 
participants? · -· · ·+-
Does your research explore potentfally divergent po~tical views or 
involve the collection of politically sensitive iriforrrtatio:n? 
7.FUNDING 
Under the National Sta. tement (2.2.6) a researcher must disi:l.ose: 
. . 
• the amount and sources or potential sources of fundi~if or the research; and 
Yes D No X 
Yes D No X 
Yes ·o No X 
• finandal or other relevant declara#qns of interest of researchers, sponsors or institutions 
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I Is this research being funded? Yes 0 
If yes, please detail amount and source of funds (NS 
5.2.7) 
If this application relates to Grant(s) and/or 
Consultancies, please indicate the Title and Grant 
Number relating to it 
No X 
If no external funding has been obtained, please indicate how any costs of research will be met: 
Do the investigators have any financial interest in 
this project? 
if yes, please provide.getails 
8. Parti~t-'}1.ii§· 
..•. P.,·-·. 
Selection of Participants 
Yes O No X 
Gearly descnve the experimejt_tal and, where relevant, :control groups. Include details of number of 
subjects, sex, age range, and a°n.y special· characteri$Hts. Cive a j1ip/ification for your choice of participant 
group(s). 
Not t1pplicable. 
Recruitment of Participants 
Give specific detaitt!r'%JJW.t~~iP.-1Jicipants will be re9fuited. : Sqt_ne questions to consider include: 
• Are you recruititififi;d~gh advertisements?Jf so, indicate where they will be placed and append a 
copy 
..• Are you redfWting:fflf-<iji.gl1.3rd parti~(ikeassociations,.schpols or clubs? If so, detail how you will 
approach the organis'ii~ik and the prociss that the stake~lders will u.se to pass on information to 
potential participants: . . : Please attach copies of letters of introduction, emails, and telephone 
preambles if appropridt¢ 
• Are tile participants. Unfpersity or DHHS staff, or regular patients· in a particular clinic? If so, 
detail how they will be approadled i.e. through persortalinvitation, email etc 
Not applicable. 
Which of the following best describes the identifiability of the data (including tissues) 
collected? 
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a) Non-i,:!entifiable d~ta is de.ta which have never been labelled with 
individual identifiers or from which identifiers have been 
permanently removed, and by means of which no specific 
individual can be identified. A subset of non-identifiable data are 
those that can be linked with other data so it can be know that 
they are about the same data subject, but the person's identity 
remains unknown. 
b) Re-Identifiable data is data from which identifiers have been 
removed and replaced by a code, but it remains possible to re-
identify a specific individual by, for example, using the code or 
linking different data sets 
c) Identifiable data is data .where the ideqtity of a specific individual 
can reasonable be ascertaine,:LExamples of identifiers includ.~ the 





If the information is Re--I_clentifi}ible or Identifiable>please give details of the information that 
will be collected. Also indicate;how the·c6nfi.cl&t.ti~lity arid anonymity of the participants will 
be protected: 
~ip. Re}e\(. Ji(~_ :! . 
Please. list th~ most rel~vant ~-r~{1itera~e refereftces, both by the investigator and/or by· 
others, that support the jus~<;i'iti.P..!}fot the study. 
; .;11. Procedures 
Researchers should explain how the investigators intend t9.conduct the study including the 
methodological approach, the·s_pecifi,c pfo:cedures e¢pnlfyM and the methods of analysis of 
.. · .. -: •-= -. ... .. 
data. This should be consistent wiJh the aims of tlteproject. 
Please provide detailed procedures (describe exactly.what you are going to do): 
Researcher will do a review of the Tasmanian Grants Program utilizing historical grants-related 
data from relevant government agencies. 
Where is this project to be conducted? Researchers should attach a letter of agreement/support 
to participate from any organisation or department whose resources will be accessed as part of 
this project 
Please see 2 attached emails. 
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12. Monitorin 
What mechanisms do you intend to implement to monitor the conduct and progress of the 
research project? (NS 5.5) 
i Regular meetings of student and supervisors, supervisor-monitored data collection. 
I . 
I 
13 .. Data Storage . . .. t-fl'. -· 
All raw data (including blood and/or tissue) must be helcFby the responsible institution (i.e. 
UTas, DHHS, AMC) for a period of at1~;;ist five (5) y~s. from the date of the first publication 
(this includes publication of the·tlle~is). The.data II@Y be kept for ~ongt:?r than five (5) years but 
m~t ~ventual!y be destroyec!.-~_~il~if.~-~~~' :i\'.r}ffi th~ ~.Ifticip<"T•b iQ 
:fa@nr~.theirH$~· . . ' 
Where will the data be kept? 
UTas 
How will the data be kept secure? 
Secure University servers. 
How and when will the data be ~~troyed? 
As per UTas guidelines for P~~i@-4ent data. 
Will any personal irtformatfori.be collect:ed from sources otne_r thiin the subjects themselves 
. . .. ·.. . .. "··--·ii .. 
(Please refer to Privacy Legislation Section 95A - Nation"iirPB,vacy Principles)? 
No X Yes D 
If yes, please detail including adeclaration of the sources of the Information ie. medical records, 
databases, registries, lists of ~embers from Associations, clubs etc: 
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Will data on individual subjects be obtained from any Commonwealth Government agency 
without seeking the consent of the individuals? 
No X Yes 0 
If yes, please detail including a declaration concerning which agency and what information is being 
sought. If you wish to obtain data containing personal .information from any Commonwealth Government 
agency state the names of these agencies, describe the nature ofthis data and explain the justification for 
obtaining this information. At the Commonwealth level the collection, storage, use and disclosure of 
personal information by Commonwealth agencies is regulated by_the Privacy Act 1988. The NHMRC 
requires the HREC to provide informatwn on the cases in which it has approved access to, and use of, data 
held by Commonwealth Government agencies. 
':t~kinfo.,nhaJi.on Slie_et 
With few exceptions, it is essential that ~bj~cts are p.~,rided ,~th an information sheet about 
the study in which they are b~ing asked to participate. The <illfuir of the HREC will pay close 
attention to the information that is given. 
A copy of the proposed information sheet must be attached to your application form. 
(Information Sheet Pro Jonna is av_tiiW,le on our website at: 
http://www.research.utas.edu.au/hulllc~n ethics/social sden~, forffi!i.htm) 
Is your proposed Infoririati~ri,~heet a'.ttach~d tii~}flication?. 
Yes D No X (please provicl¢ ~ explanation as to why) No subJects. 
. .· . . . ' ' ..• ·.. ''{_}'.?' 
,15. Consent FQrm . , . . . .•..•. ·'4',~, 
·.·. ·*ritten evidence of consent is usually i~trired fof~~tt.ch rntoiving human subjects. If written 
.· {::onsent is to be obtained a copy of the actual consent tann:i;i. that you propose to use. In certain 
· }circumstances, the ~c may give appr~val for consent to be waived {see Chapter 2.3 of the 
National Statement). While ·written :c~nsent is the norm, there are various kinds of studies for 
which other procedures for obtaining consent file more appropriate (See Chapter 2.2 of Natwnal 
Statement). 
If you consider that written consent is inappropriate for this project please state your reasons 
clearly referring to the appropriate sections of the National Statement. 
(Consent Form Pro Jonna is available on our website at: 
http://www.research.utas.edu.au/human ethics/soda! science forms.htm) 
Is a proposed consent form attached to this application? 
Yes O No X 
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I If no, please explain. 
Not applicable. 
i6. Approvals from other-De'pa.rtmentsIInstituti.QilS .·.· 
Does this project need the approval of any institution other than the University of Tasmania 
and/or the Department of Health and Human Services (e.g., Department 
particular wards in hospitals, prisons, government institutions, or businesses)? 
of Education, 
No [xJ Yes D 
If yes, Please indicate below the Institutions involved and the st~f:us of the A,pproval. 
Name of Other Institution(s): Status: 
Does this project need the approval of any No 0 Yes D {please detail): 
otherHREC? 
Othed~EC(s): If yes, Please indicate !Je.!ow which HREC and ... ,., 
the status of the application. Status: 
The Head of School,ti~J.llie H~~d-dfDep~ent·i~;i~~b signsthe following statement of 
scientific merit: .rf::>/ 
"This proposal has be~ considered;~d is soµnd with regi-d to its merit and methodology." 
The Head of School or Head of_Pep~ertt's si~~~1,<Qi~:~tJ'le application form indicates that 
he/she has read the application and· cor@:\fus t&at:it,Hs ·sij'µhd With regard to: 
(i) educational and/or scientific: T,~rit and . ·. . . 
(ii) research design and methodology. 
~:.: __ ,This does not preclude the Committee !fom qµ:~~®1.g the research merit or methodology of 
; 'any proposed project. · · · · · 
If the Head of School/Department is one of the investigators, this statement must be signed by 
an appropriate person. This may be the Head of SchQ<;>l/D~partment in a related area or the 
Dean. The certification of scientific merit may not be given,by an investigator on the project. 
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Conformity with NHMRC Guidelines 
The Chief Investigator is required to sign the following statement: 
I have read and understood the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007 and 
the Australian Code of Conduct for Responsible Research 2007~ I accept that I, as Chief Investigator, 
am responsible for ensuring that the investigation proposed ll1 this form is conducted fully 
within the conditions laid down in the National Statement and any oth€r conditions specified by· 
theHREC. 
· Name of chief David Adams 
.. ~.vestigator 
, t\ ~·ci»£)d -~ ; ·_$ignature 
:nate - . ~i·'·:'.·"·'· 2-7 />" /(J . : ... - . ---:.:-.·. ·- ~ .. .··:: •.. 
'.•· 
..... ., . I 
; .1Sigrtatures of Other Investigators 
;_ ) a~owledge my involvement. in the project and I accept the role of the above researcher as 
; /thief investigator of this s:fu.dy .. ··. . . 
;,.{Name) (Signature) (IDate) 
Ian Marsh 
' 
/{Name) •jk;>•'_; 'lirr~ _(Date) 
: 
'..1~-~-:,~~,,- :\ -~ ·: ·., .::e~~-: ~>. 
' =A 3#_5/~10 
' 
F· 
, ;:(Name) "(Sig;iatttre) ({:)ate) ,. T 
: }?eter James Georgelas ~~~~~ 7/12/2009 
-. ! . 7 .,<;~: -~ .. · .. : . . :.~- -:~ -
•,!' 
·' Clf.~CKLIST 
~ ~ :Pl~ise ensure that the foIIowmg cfocwnents .ar~:m(Jlg'4~:ti~tJtl!ou~n1?J.ication: 
.. . .· ..... • .· . .. .. .... . "'' :..·:"'-,:·· ..... 
;: ;~ormation sheet/s (if not attach~d ensure you ha~eexplained why in'S~cfion 14) X 
.. . . 
' Consent form/s (if not attacl.led ensure you have ~plajr(~d w~y in§,ection 15) X 
.·: 'i. . . .. Questionnaires (if applicable) X 
· Interview schedules (if applicable) -· X 
A copy of any permissions obtained i.e. Other HREC, Other :Institutions (if applicable) · X 
All documents relevant to the study, including all information provided to subjects. X 
Telephone Preambles (if applicable) X 
Recruitment Advertisements {if applicable) X 
Email Contents (if applicable) X 
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i 
TO SUBMIT THIS APPLICATION: 
1. You must email an electronic copy of this application form (may be unsigned) and 
all study documents to Mari1yn.Knott@utas.edu.au (please submit all forms as 
Microsoft Word documents). 
2. You must also send a signed hard copy of this application form and all study 
documents to Marilyn Knott, Private Bag l, HobMt, 7001 _ 
~· .~.. . 
Has the 'Statement of Scientific Merit!'been signed X 
Have all investigatorn,~igg(,!d qr¢>fc;>rm? X 
A PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE UNIVERSITY OF 
TASMANIA 'w 







1 f .. 
Social Science Ethics Officer 
Private Bag 01 Hobart 
Tasmania 7001 Australia 
Tel: {03) 6226 2764 
Fax: (03) 6226 7148 
M EMO R AN D U M Marilyn.Knott@utas.edu.au . . . . 
_______ H_U_MA_N_R_E_S_EA_R_C_H_ET_H_IC_S_C_O_M_M_ITT_E_E_{T_A_SM_A_N_I_A_) _N_ETW __ O_R_K_~_ u . LA s 
MINIMAL RISK ETHICS APPLICATION APPROVAL 
16 June 2010 
Professor David Adams 
Management 
Private Bag 1316 
Hobart 
Ethics Reference: H11257 
A narrative policy analy~s of#ie Tasmanian Conmfunit.y-G,tants Program 
.~(~· .. 
Student: Peter Georgelas (PhD)'· 
Dear Professor Adams 
-I~_--, .._~enote~ · 
Pi:p~ss Report.,. 
submitted. 
proval lsJor fo~~!~ ari<Y.5~~-!!,4~ion~t,~g9n receipt o! an annual 
approval for ttits pro]ect"'wutlapse if a Progress Report 1s not 
. .J .• 
The following conditions apply to th~_.aP.proval. Failure to abide by these concfrtions may result 
in suspension or fflscontinuation ofappruval. 
1. It is the responsibility of the. Ghief lnves~gqtor to ec1sure~~at all _in~tigator,s are-aware of 
the terms of I, t<!~!)~~re the prilfe.l~M,i~n~ll:~ed as approve'tt:by'ihe!Gfflf"cs 
Committ~~ . otlfy th'e Committee if atiy Investigators are added to. or cease 
involvement with, the project. . 
2. Complaints: If any complaints are received or eth!~Ussues ari~e during the course of the 
projec_t: Investigators should advise the Executive -Office'r of the Ethics· Committee on 03 
6226 7479 or human.ethics@utas.edu.au. 











3. Incidents or adverse effects: Investigators should notify the Ethics Committee immediately 
of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen events 
affecting the ethical acceptability of the project. 
4. Amendments to Project Modifications to the project must not pr~~ until~approval is 
obtained fr?m the _Ethics Committee. Plec3se subi;nif·an_ ~enS~t,,i=biin~(available on 
our website} to notify the Ethics Committee of the proposed modifications. 
5. Annual Re~rt: Continued a_ep_roval for this P,fOje~ !~d~e_n<:kmt ~n ~~'~bfI1ission of a 
Pro~ress Report by,t!)~ ~nnr~.e~ry d<;1tEl .ofyo~r(~P.r;>-0>~1'.4-Y~l'!!lm~a_;.swt"a'f~urtesy . 
reminder closer to th1~_~ate. fa1_lureJo submll.c\~,:_ogress Report w!R mean that ethlcs 
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Appendix 2: Pilot questionnaire 
Al6 
You are being invited to participate in a research study whose purpose is to seek a better 
understanding of the public sector grants system in Tasmania and how such a system could be 
improved. This research project titled, Public Sector Grants: An Analysis of Complexity in 
Modern Public Administration, is one of the first to explore this important area. 
This study is being conducted primarily by Peter James George las to fulfill the requirements of a 
Doctor of Philosophy in Management at the University of Tasmania. The study is being 
overseen by Professor David Adams, Professor, School of Management, University of Tasmania 
and Professor Ian Marsh, Lecturer, School of Government, University of Tasmania. Additional 
researchers may be involved in the data gathering stage of this study. 
Your contribution to this research would initially consist in answering a questionnaire-based 
survey of 27 questions which should take approximately 60 minutes. This survey can be 
conducted on the premises of your organization or can be conducted by telephone should you 
prefer. If the research team would like to further explore issues raised by your survey responses, 
you would be contacted for your permission and any additional contact would likely take the 
form of either: 1) an in-person, taped, semi-structured interview of no longer than 30 minutes 
duration, or 2) a brief series of back-and-forth questions and responses delivered by email. 
All participants and their respective organizations shall remain confidential. All data will be 
used in a form that will make it impossible to determine the identity of the individual responses. 
Participation is strictly voluntary and participants are free to not answer any questions they 
choose and can withdraw their participation at any time. 
The original paper survey questionnaires will be stored in a locked/secured area. Digitally 
recorded data and databases will be kept on password-protected computers. All data will be 
securely stored against access by persons other than the research team for a period of five years, 
in accordance with the requirements of the University of Tasmania. After that time, paper data 
will be shredded and both recorded and digital data will be erased. 
Participants will be given an opportunity to request a summary report of the overall findings. If 
you have any questions or concerns about this study, you may contact any of the key research 
team members below: 
Dr. David Adams: David.Adams@utas.edu.au or (03) 6324-3583. 
Dr. Ian Marsh: Ian.Marsh@utas.edu.au or (03) 6226-2568. 
Peter James Georgelas: Peter.Georgelas@utas.edu.au or (03) 6226-7379. 
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Questionnaire 
1. Please answer as many of the following as you want. 









Organisation's website address 
(if applicable) 
Year your organization was 
established 
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2. The Australian Bureau of Statistics places Not-For-Profit organisations into one of 12 categories. Which of its categories below BEST describes 
the focus of your organization? Please tick just ONE box. 
D Culture and Recreation 
D Education and Research 
D Health 
D Social Services 
D Environment 
D Development and Housing 
D Law, Advocacy and Politics 
D Philanthropic Intermediaries and Voluntarism Promotion 
D International 
D Religion 
D Business and Professional Associations, Unions 
D Not Elsewhere Classified 
3. Please indicate the total annual income for your organisation for the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011. 
D Less than $100,000 
D Between $100, 000 and $1, 000, 000 
D Between $1,000,000 and $10,000,000 
D Over $10,000,000 
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4. Please estimate how many paid and unpaid people work for your 
organisation. 
Paid staff (full-time equivalent) people 
Paid staff (part-time) people 
Voluntary staff (full-time equivalent) people 
Voluntary staff (part-time) people 
Paid Board/Management Committee people 
Voluntary Board/Management Committee people 
5. Please estimate how many paid and unpaid people in your organisation 
work in the following areas. 



















6. Your organisation's primary source of funding in the financial year 
and/or calendar year 2010-2011 comes from which of the following? 
Please tick just ONE box. 
D Commonwealth government 
D State or territory government 
D Local government 
D Client fees 
D Donations 
D Corporate funding 
D Self-funding 
Other income (e.g., management fees, interest, managed fund 
D distributions, net profit on sale of property, plant and equipment, 
etc.) 
7 Please describe the key target groups that your organization focuses 
• on. 
8. For the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011, please estimate the percentage of people accessing your services whose primary 
source of income was: 
Pensions & Benefits % 
Low Income Earners % 





What other sources of income does your organisation receive from the 
government (Commonwealth, State, or local) either on a regular or ad 
hoc basis? 
Who has the primary responsibility in your organisation for filling out 
government grant applications? Please tick just ONE box. 
D Grants Officer 
D A manager 
D A full-time employee 
D A part-time employee 
D A volunteer 
D An outside consultant 
D Other (please specify): 
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11. 
Where is your organisation MOST likely to find out about government 
grant opportunities? Please tick just ONE box. 
D From the government directly (e.g., letter, email, phone call) 
D From a government website 
D Newspaper ad 
D Radio ad 
D Television ad 
D Online (e.g., from a non-govt. website or social media site you found) 
D From an outside consultant 
D From people in an organisation like your own 
D Through word of mouth 
D Through past experience applying for a particular grant 
D Other (please specify): 
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12. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree 
disagree 
There are no 
government 
grants that D D D D D 
apply to our 
organisation. 
Grants 
usually go to 






connections, D D D D D 
it is very hard 






about the D D D D D 








but we do not 
have a D D D D D 
specific 


















14. The following questions refer to your organisation in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011. 
How many grants (regardless of their grants 
source) were you awarded? 
In total, how much money were all the 
grants worth on an annualized basis? AUD$ (You can provide an estimate if an exact 
per annum number is not available.) 
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15. Was there a gap between the total dollar amount of government grants 
awarded your organisation in the financial year and/or calendar year 
2010-2011 and the money needed to fulfill your organisation's stated 
outcomes in its government grant applications? 
There was no gap. D 
There was a gap. D 
If there was a gap, what was the total 
gap amount? (You can provide an AUD$ 
estimate if an exact number is not 
available.) 
16. If you answered that there was a gap in Question #19, how did your 
organisation try to fill that gap for the financial year and/or calendar 
year 2010-2011? Please tick as many boxes as apply. 
D Applied for non-government grants 
D Sought help/partnerships with other like-minded organisations 
D Started/ramped up public donations campaign 
D Held various public fundraising functions 
D Sought out philanthropic donations 
D Offered dues-paying memberships in our organisation 
D Pursued donations/sponsorships from private organisations 
D Applied organisation's other income to close gap 
D Other (please specify): 
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17. The typical grant proposal contains eight major sections. For each 
section below, please estimate the total hours it takes to complete ONE 
grant proposal that your organisation might typically apply for. (If more 
than one person in your organisation completes a section, accumulate 
everyone's time for that section.) 
Need section ( describes the need for the hours project) 
Projected Results section (what will the hours project accomplish?) 
Methodology (what exactly is the project hours going to do?) 
Staff (who are going to work on the hours project?) 
Project Assessment (how will you know if hours the project is working?) 
Budget (how much will the project cost?) hours 
Qualifications (describes your ability to hours 
carry out the project) 
Sustainability (what will happen when the hours grant ends?) 
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18. Please estimate the total times your organisation needed to contact the government for assistance in completing each section below for ONE typical grant your 
organisation applied for in the financial year and/or calendar year2010-2011. Please 
tick just ONE box per section. 
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D O times 
D 1-3 times 
Need section (describes the need for the D 4-6 times project) 
D 7-9 times 
D 1 O times or more 
D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Projected Results section (what will the D 4-6 times project accomplish?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Methodology (what exactly is the project D 4-6 times going to do?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D O times 
D 1-3 times 
Staff (who are going to work on the D 4-6 times project?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D O times 
Project Assessment (how wiJJ you know if D 1-3 times 
the project is working?) D 4-6 times 
D 7-9 times 
D 1 O times or more 
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18. Please estimate the total times your organisation needed to contact the government for assistance in completing each section below for ONE typical 
( cont.) grant your organisation applied for in the financial year and/or calendar year2010-2011. Please tick just ONE box Qer section. 
D Otimes 
D 1-3 times 
Budget (how much will the project D 4-6 times cost?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D Otimes 
D 1-3 times 
Qualifications (describes your ability to D 4-6 times cany out the project) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D Otimes 
D 1-3 times 
Sustainability (what will happen when D 4-6 times the grant ends?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 1 O times or more 
19. For a typical grant your organisation applied for in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011, please estimate the TOTAL number 
of hours talking to each of the following government personnel. 
Administration/Finance personnel (i.e., hours 
staff who helped with technical details) 
Policy personnel (i.e., staff who could hours 
explain the purpose of the grant) 
Other personnel hours 
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20. For a typical grant in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011, how long did it take for you to receive formal notice about its 
final outcome after you submitted your grant application? Please 
tick just ONE box. 
D Less than a month 
D More than 1 month but less than 2 months 
D More than 2 months but less than 3 months 
D More than 3 months but less than 4 months 
D More than 4 months but less than 5 months 
D More than 5 months but less than 6 months 
D More than 6 months but less than 7 months 
D More than 7 months but less than 8 months 
D More than 8 months but less than 9 months 
D More than 9 months but less than 10 months 
D More than 10 months but less than 11 months 
D More than 11 months but less than 12 months 
D More than 12 months 
21. The following questions refer to your organisation in the financial year 
and/or calendar year 2010-2011. 
How many different government 
grant reporting systems were you reporting systems 
subject to? 
In total for this period, how many 
times did the government ask for 
adjustments in methods, evaluation times 
or budget regarding your grant(s)? 
(You can provide an estimate if exact 
number is not available.) 
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22. A typical grant compliance regime covers several organisational areas. For each area below, please estimate the total hours it takes to 
complete that ONE average grant compliance area concerning ONE 
grant from beginning to end. (If more than one person in your 
organisation helps with an issue, accumulate everyone's time for that 
issue.) 
Reviewing processes for grant 
administration, monitoring and reporting hours 
of grant activities. 
Financial Management Systems hours 
Procurement Systems hours 
Time and Effort Reporting Systems hours 
Monitoring Activities hours 
Adherence to terms & conditions of hours grant 
Formal Audit hours 
Non-compliance/Corrective Actions hours 
23. For all the government grants your organisation were awarded in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011, could you do each of 
the following online for ALL of them? 
Yes No 
Research the grants D D 
Contact appropriate D D government personnel for help 
Apply for the grants D D 
Submit performance reports D D 
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24. For any government grant in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011 for which you were NOT awarded, which of the following 
reasons for rejection were provided as feedback. Please tick as many 
boxes that apply. 
D Poor grammar, spelling errors, or factual errors. 
D Cost padding/insufficient cost research. 
D Failure to follow instructions precisely. 
D Failure to clearly state goals. 
D Failure to meet submission deadline. 
D Grant proposal incompatible with agency. 
D No business plan included. 
D Failure to show benefits/results of proposal. 
0 No long-term plan. 
0 Unclear how you intend to support project after grant money 
runs out. 
0 Proposal is too generic. 
0 Low quality presentation/issues with cover letter, look of 
materials, etc. 
0 Proposal failed to show how it is unique, original, or better than 
anyone else's. 
0 Unrealistic financial goals. 
0 There were not enough funds to go around. 
0 Others had better submissions. 
0 Other (please specify): 
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25. Which government grant-related issue is your organisation MOST 
concerned about? Please tick just ONE box. 
0 Figuring out which grants we should apply for takes too much time. 
0 The application process is too complex. 
0 We have to use specialized personnel to apply for grants. 
0 The quality of help the government gives us during the application process. 
0 The gaps that are left between the grants we get and the outcomes we would like to achieve. 
0 The reporting requirements are too burdensome. 
0 The reporting requirements are changing the very nature of our or.qanisation (e.g., we are becoming more bureaucratic) 
0 If we have to compete for grants, we have a harder time coordinating with other like-minded organisations. 
0 The time we spend on grants means less time with our clients. 
0 Other (please specify): 
26. May we contact you about this survey for follow-up if needed? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
27. Would you like a copy of the summary report? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
Thank you for filling out this questionnaire! 




"Generally speaking, a calendar year begins on the New Year's Day of the 
given calendar system and ends on the day before the following New Year's 
Day." The Australian calendar year runs from January I through December 31. 
Calendar Year Because some grant periods can extend beyond the calendar year, the term 
"financial year and/or calendar year" has been adopted for this study. 
Calendar year. (2011, June 23). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 08:30, July 19, 
2011, from httn://en.wikioedia.orn/w/index.oho?title=Calendar vear&oldid=435754842 
"Complexity theory has been used extensively in the field of strategic 
management and organizational studies .... In a CAS [complex adaptive system], 
the system and the agents co-evolve; the system lightly constrains agent 
Complexity 
behaviour, but the agents modify the system by their interaction with it." 
Complexity theory and organizations. (2011, June 1). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 
Retrieved 08:31, July 19, 2011, from 
htt1:1://en.wiki2edia.orgLw/index.1:1h2?title=Com1:1lexi!)'. theorr and organizations&oldid=43208 
1625 
"A contract is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more parties 
with mutual obligations, which may or may not have elements in writing .... The 
remedy at law for breach of contract is usually "damages" or monetary 
Contract compensation. In equity, the remedy can be specific performance of the contract 
or an injunction." 
Contract. (2011, July 11). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 09:28, July 19, 2011, 
from htto:// en. wikioedia. orn/w /index. oho ?title=Contract&oldid=4 3 8870060 
A cooperative agreement is "a support mechanism used when there will be 
substantial ... (government] scientific or programmatic involvement. Substantial 
involvement means that, after award, scientific or program staff will assist, 
Cooperative guide, coordinate, or participate in project activities." 
Agreement 
FAQ - Applying for a Grant or Cooperative Agreement. (2010, December 7) In U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, from 
htt1:1://www.fda.gov/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/Coo2erativeAgreementsCRADAsGrants/ 
ucm234 5 3 5 .htm#three 
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"The Australian government's financial year begins on July 1 and concludes on 
June 30 of the following year. This applies for personal income tax and the 
federal budget, and most companies are required to use it as their own. The 
year ending on the 30th June, 2011 is referred to as "financial year 2010-11" or 
Financial Year sometimes just "financial year 2011 ". 
Because some grant periods can extend beyond the financial year, the term 
"financial year and/or calendar year" has been adopted for this study. 
Fiscal year. (2011, June 29). In Wik.ipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 08:32, July 19, 
2011, from httn://en.wikinedia.orn:/w/index.ohn?title=Fiscal vear&oldid=436891 l 49 
Government Government in this study is used to refer to all three levels of the Australian government: Commonwealth, State/Territory, and Local. 
A government grant is "an award of financial assistance in the form of money 
by ... government to an eligible grantee with no expectation that the funds will 
be paid back. The term does not include technical assistance which provides 
services instead of money, or other assistance in the form of revenue sharing, 
Government loans, loan guarantees, interest subsidies, insurance, or direct appropriations." 
Grant 
Contrast this definition with the more complex or legally binding mechanisms 
of a Contract, Cooperative Agreement, or Partnership Funding. 
Government Grants. In Entrepreneur.com Retrieved 08:33, July 19, 2011, from 
htto://www .entreoreneur.com/encvclooedia/term/82162.html 
Partnership funding refers to "a grant or funding program where various 
"partners" have input into the project. In some cases, this may refer to joint 
Partnership funding between government and philanthropic sources. It may also refer to 
Funding partners who give resources in kind." 
Partnership Funding (2007, July 24). In PhilanthropyWiki. Retrieved 08:34, July 19, 2011, 
from htto://ohilanthroovwiki.ortr.au/index.oho/Partnershio Fundin!.': 
"The project budget is a prediction of the costs associated with a particular 
company [or organizational] project. These costs include labor, materials, and 
Project other related expenses. The project budget is often broken down into specific 
Budget tasks, with task budgets assigned to each." 
Budget. (2011, July 7). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 09:25, July 19, 2011, 
from htto://en.wikioedia.orn:/w/index.oho?title=Bud!.':et&oldid=438214 l 56 
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Appendix 3: Introductory email accompanying written questionnaires 
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Good afternoon, 
Your organization is invited to participate in a research study whose purpose is to seek a 
better understanding of the public sector grants system in Tasmania and how such a system 
could be improved. This research project titled, Public Sector Grants: An Analysis of 
Complexity in Modem Public Administration is one of the first to explore this important area. 
This study is being conducted primarily by Peter Georgelas (peterg7@utas.edu.au) to fulfill 
the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy in Management at the University of Tasmania. 
This research is being supervised by Prof. David Adams (David.Adams@utas.edu.au), 
Professor of Management at the University of Tasmania. 
Who would be interviewed? We would like to interview two people: 1) your grants officer--
the person in your organisation whose primary responsibility is to oversee your entire 
government grants application and fulfillment process, and 2) a senior manager or CEO who 
has policy responsibilities. Following a short email-based survey, the taped, semi-structured 
30 minute interview for each person can be conducted in-person at your organisation or by 
telephone. 
Why should we participate? The complexity of grants is an ongoing issue for the community 
sector (please see attachment entitled "Government Grants"). This research will build the 
evidence base to understand the impact of the grants system on community sector agencies. A 
summary report of the survey' s findings will be made available to survey participants and 
interested stakeholders. It is hoped that the findings could offer some aid in modeling a more 
streamlined approach to grants administration. 
My organisation is an umbrella organisation for other non-profits. That is fine. If that is the 
case, we would like to make arrangements to speak to a grants officer who has a broad 
perspective on your organisation's funding needs. 
What about confidentiality? All participants and their respective organizations shall remain 
confidential. All data will be used in a form that will make it impossible to determine the 
identity of the individual responses. Participation is strictly voluntary and participants are free 
to not answer any questions they choose and can withdraw their participation at any time. 
Who has endorsed this survey? This survey was reviewed by the 2010-2011 Board Members 
of The Tasmanian Council of Social Service (TasCOSS) which is the peak body for the 
community services sector in Tasmania. In addition, this survey was reviewed by Prof. David 
Adams. 
If your organization is agreeable to participation, could you please contact: 
Peter Georgelas: peterg7@utas.edu.au or (03) 6248-6019. 
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Government Grants: A Complex System in Action? 
Community sector agencies are operating in increasingly complex environments. One 
such environment centers on funding through the use of government grants. This environment, 
or system of competitive actors, over time adds layers of complexity in areas of grant research, 
application, reporting, and compliance by requiring more extensive and detailed data acquisition 
and reporting--which in return causes ripple effects in organizational personnel, resources, and 
mission. There is evidence that the more complex the system, the more burdensome it is for 
agencies to plan for and manage such systems. This research will examine various grants 
processes to understand the range of interactions required by following the processes through 
from initial awareness to final acquittal of a grant. 
This research can best be understood using Systems Theory and hopes to show how 
agencies can be more effective and efficient in their management of the grants system. The 
evidence base about complex systems derives from both the physical and social sciences. 
CSIRO defines a complex system like genomes, ecosystems, stock markets, the weather, and 
society itself as "large aggregations of many smaller interacting parts" like species, investors, air 
particJes or individuals."1 These collections of interconnected things exhibit two basic 
properties-emergence, which is "the appearance of behavior that could not be anticipated from 
a knowledge of the parts of the system alone," and self-organisation, which means that the 
emergent behavior is not planned but appears "spontaneously."2 Although the terms "complex" 
and "complexity" carry multiple definitions--in general in can be said that a system is complex if 
its large number of interacting parts foster this emergent, difficult-to-understand behavior. 3 
There is evidence that the complexity of grants systems causes the following System 
behavior: 1) It "teaches" grant-seeking organisations that to get grants then they have to learn 
how to become excellent grant writing organisations-with all the time, cost, and personnel 
allocations necessary to achieve this new goal, 2) it "teaches" them that regardless of their own 
organisation's particular goals that in order to get government grants it is necessary to tailor their 
own organisation's goals to more cJosely match government objectives for a particular grant, and 
3) it "teaches" them that grants are almost always awarded to individual organisations and rarely 
to combinations or clusters of organisations who can perhaps most optimally deliver needed 
services--so there is little advantage in cooperation or data sharing between grant-seeking 
organisations. 
This research will examine alternative mechanisms for streamlining grants systems and 
reducing the transaction and reporting costs. This research will be conducted in 2013 and a final 
Report will be available in December 2014. 
I CSJRO, ''Complex or just complicated: what is a complex system?" http://www.csiro.au/en/Organisation-Structure/Divisions?marine--
Atmospheric-Research/Complex-S ystems-Science-2/ About-Complex-Systems.aspx, 14 October 2012. 
2 Ibid. 
3 "Complexity", http://cn.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complexi)y, 14 October 2012. 
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Appendix 4: Written questionnaire (Grants Officer level) 
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Grants Officer/Written Questionnaire: 
1. Please answer as many of the following as you want. 









Organisation's website address 
(if applicable) 
Year your organization was 
established 
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2. Where is your organisation MOST likely to find out about government grant opportunities? Please tick just ONE box. 
D From the government directly (e.g., letter, email, phone call) 
D From a government website 
D Newspaper ad 
D Radio ad 
D Television ad 
D Online (e.g., from a non-govt. website or social media site you found) 
D From an outside consultant 
D From people in an organisation like your own 
D Through word of mouth 
D Through past experience applying for a particular grant 
D Other (please specify): 
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3. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
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Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree 
disagree 
There are no 
government 
grants that D D D D D 
apply to our 
organisation. 
Grants 
usually go to 






connections, D D D D D 
it is very hard 






about the D D D D D 








but we do not 
have a D D D D D 
specific 


















5. The following questions refer to your organisation in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011. 
How many grants (regardless of their grants 
source) were you awarded? 
In total. how much money were all the 
grants worth on an annualized basis? 
(You can provide an estimate if an AUD$ 
exact per annum number is not 
available.) 
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6. Was there a gap between the total dollar amount of government grants awarded your organisation in the financial year and/or 
calendar year 2010-2011 and the money needed to fulfill your 
organisation's stated outcomes in its government grant 
applications? 
There was no gap. D 
There was a gap. D 
If there was a gap, what was the total 
gap amount? (You can provide an AUD$ 
estimate if an exact number is not 
available.) 
7. If you answered that there was a gap in Question #19, how did your 
organisation try to fill that gap for the financial year and/or calendar 
year 2010-2011? Please tick as many boxes as apply. 
D Applied for non-government grants 
D Sought help/partnerships with other like-minded 
or_qanisations 
D Started/ramped up public donations campaign 
D Held various public fundraising functions 
D Sought out philanthropic donations 
D Offered dues-paying memberships in our organisation 
D Pursued donations/sponsorships from private organisations 
D Applied organisation's other income to close gap 
D Other (please specify): 
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8. The typical grant proposal contains eight major sections. For each 
section below, please estimate the total hours it takes to complete 
ONE grant proposal that your organisation might typically apply for. 
(If more than one person in your organisation completes a section, 
accumulate everyone's time for that section.) 
Need section (describes the need for hours the project) 
Projected Results section (what will hours the project accomplish?) 
Methodology (what exactly is the hours project going to do?) 
Staff (who are going to work on the hours project?) 
Project Assessment (how will you hours know if the project is working?) 
Budget (how much will the project hours 
cost?) 
Qualifications (describes your ability to hours 
carry out the project) 
Sustainability (what will happen when hours the grant ends?) 
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9. Please estimate the total times your organisation needed to contact the government for assistance in completing each section below for ONE typical grant your 
organisation applied for in the financial year and/or calendar year2010-201 l. Please 
tick just ONE box 12er section. 
D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Need section (describes the need for the D 4-6 times project) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Projected Results section (what will the D 4-6 times project accomplish?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Methodology (what exactly is the project D 4-6 times going to do?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D Otimes 
D 1-3 times 
Staff (who are going to work on the D 4-6 times project?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D O times 
D 1-3 times 
Project Assessment (how will you know if D 4-6 times the project is working?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
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9. Please estimate the total times your organisation needed to contact the government for assistance in completing each section below for ONE typical 
(cont.) grant your organisation applied for in the financial year and/or calendar year2010-2011. Please tick just ONE box 12er section. 
D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Budget (how much will the project D 4-6 times cost?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
, D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Qualifications (describes your ability D 4-6 times to carry out the project) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
D 0 times 
D 1-3 times 
Sustainability (what will happen when D 4-6 times the grant ends?) 
D 7-9 times 
D 10 times or more 
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10. For a typical grant your organisation applied for in the financial year 
and/or calendar year 2010-2011, please estimate the TOTAL 
number of hours talking to each of the following government 
personnel. 
Administration/Finance personnel (i.e., hours 
staff who helped with technical details) 
Policy personnel (i.e., staff who could hours 
explain the purpose of the grant) 
Other personnel hours 
11. For a typical grant in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011, how long did it take for you to receive formal notice about its 
final outcome after you submitted your grant application? Please 
tick just ONE box. 
D Less than a month 
D More than 1 month but less than 2 months 
D More than 2 months but less than 3 months 
D More than 3 months but less than 4 months 
D More than 4 months but less than 5 months 
D More than 5 months but less than 6 months 
D More than 6 months but less than 7 months 
D More than 7 months but less than 8 months 
D More than 8 months but less than 9 months 
D More than 9 months but less than 10 months 
D More than 10 months but less than 11 months 
D More than 11 months but less than 12 months 
D More than 12 months 
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12. The following questions refer to your organisation in the financial year 
and/or calendar year 2010-2011. 
How many different government 
grant reporting systems were you reporting systems 
subject to? 
In total for this period, how many 
times did the government ask for 
adjustments in methods, evaluation times or budget regarding your grant(s)? 
(You can provide an estimate if exact 
number is not available.) 
13. A typical grant compliance regime covers several organisational areas. For each area below, please estimate the total hours it takes to 
complete that ONE average grant compliance area concerning ONE 
grant from beginning to end. (If more than one person in your 
organisation helps with an issue, accumulate everyone's time for that 
issue.) 
Reviewing processes for grant 
administration, monitoring and reporting hours 
of grant activities. 
Financial Management Systems hours 
Procurement Systems hours 
Time and Effort Reporting Systems hours 
Monitoring Activities hours 
Adherence to terms & conditions of hours grant 
Formal Audit hours 
Non-compliance/Corrective Actions hours 
A51 
14. For all the government grants your organisation were awarded in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011, could you do each of 
the following online for ALL of them? 
Yes No 
Research the grants D D 
Contact appropriate D D government personnel for help 
Apply for the grants D D 
Submit performance reports D D 
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15. For any government grant in the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011 for which you were NOT awarded, which of the following 
reasons for rejection were provided as feedback. Please tick as 
many boxes that apply. 
D Poor grammar, spelling errors, or factual errors. 
D Cost padding/insufficient cost research. 
D Failure to follow instructions precisely. 
D Failure to clearly state goals. 
D Failure to meet submission deadline. 
D Grant proposal incompatible with agency. 
D No business plan included. 
D Failure to show benefits/results of proposal. 
D No long-term plan. 
D Unclear how you intend to support project after grant money 
runs out. 
D Proposal is too generic. 
D Low quality presentation/issues with cover letter, look of 
materials, etc. 
D Proposal failed to show how it is unique, original, or better than anyone else's. 
D Unrealistic financial goals. 
D There were not enough funds to go around. 
D Others had better submissions. 
D Other (please specify): 
Thank you for filling out this questionnaire! 




"Generally speaking, a calendar year begins on the New Year's Day of the 
given calendar system and ends on the day before the following New Year's 
Day." The Australian calendar year runs from January 1 through December 31. 
Calendar Year Because some grant periods can extend beyond the calendar year, the term 
"financial year and/or calendar year" has been adopted for this study. 
Calendar year. (20 l l, June 23). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 08:30, July 19, 
20 l l, from httn://en. wikinedia.orn:/w/index.nhn?title=Calendar vear&oldid=435754842 
"Complexity theory has been used extensively in the field of strategic 
management and organizational studies .... In a CAS [complex adaptive system], 
the system and the agents co-evolve; the system lightly constrains agent 
Complexity 
behaviour, but the agents modify the system by their interaction with it." 
Complexity theory and organizations. (2011, June l). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 
Retrieved 08:31, July 19, 2011, from 
h!!Q://en.wikiQedia.orgl'.w/index.QhQ?title=Com12lexitv theo!}'. and organizations&oldid=43208 
1625 
"A contract is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more parties 
with mutual obligations, which may or may not have elements in writing .... The 
remedy at law for breach of contract is usually "damages" or monetary 
Contract compensation. In equity, the remedy can be specific performance of the contract 
or an injunction." 
Contract.(2011, July 11). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 09:28, July 19, 2011, 
from httn://en.wikinedia.ore/w/index.nhn?title=Contract&oldid=438870060 
A cooperative agreement is "a support mechanism used when there will be 
substantial ... [government] scientific or programmatic involvement. Substantial 
involvement means that, after award, scientific or program staff will assist, 
Cooperative guide, coordinate, or participate in project activities." 
Agreement 
FAQ-Applying for a Grant or Cooperative Agreement. (2010, December 7) In U .. S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, from 
h!tQ://www.fda.gov/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/CoogerativeAgreementsCRADAsGrants/ 
ucm23453 5 .htm#three 
"The Australian government's financial year begins on July 1 and concludes on 
June 30 of the following year. This applies for personal income tax and the 
federal budget, and most companies are required to use it as their own. The 
year ending on the 30th June, 2011 is referred to as "financial year 2010-11" or 
Financial Year sometimes just "financial year 2011 ". 
Because some grant periods can extend beyond the financial year, the term 
"financial year and/or calendar year" has been adopted for this study. 
Fiscal year. (2011, June 29). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 08:32, July 19, 
2011, from httn://en.wikioedia.ore/w/index.oho?title=Fiscal vear&oldid=436891149 
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Government Government in this study is used to refer to all three levels of the Australian government: Commonwealth, State/Territory, and Local. 
A government grant is "an award of financial assistance in the form of money 
by ... government to an eligible grantee with no expectation that the funds will 
be paid back. The term does not include technical assistance which provides 
services instead of money, or other assistance in the form of revenue sharing, 
Government loans, loan guarantees, interest subsidies, insurance, or direct appropriations." 
Grant 
Contrast this definition with the more complex or legally binding mechanisms 
of a Contract, Cooperative Agreement, or Partnership Funding. 
Government Grants. In Entrepreneur.com Retrieved 08:33, July 19, 2011, from 
httn ://www .entrepreneur.com/ encvclooedia/term/82162.html 
Partnership funding refers to "a grant or funding program where various 
"partners" have input into the project. In some cases, this may refer to joint 
Partnership funding between government and philanthropic sources. It may also refer to 
Funding partners who give resources in kind." 
Partnership Funding (2007, July 24). In PhilanthropyWiki. Retrieved 08:34, July 19, 2011, 
from httn ://ohilanthronvwiki.ore.au/index.nho/Partnershin Fun dine 
"The project budget is a prediction of the costs associated with a particular 
company [or organizational] project. These costs include labor, materials, and 
Project other related expenses. The project budget is often broken down into specific 
Budget tasks, with task budgets assigned to each." 
Budget. (2011, July 7). ln Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 09:25, July 19, 2011, 
from httn:// en. wikinedia. org/w /index.oho ?title=Budget&o ldid=4 3 8214156 
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Appendix 5: Oral interview questionnaire (Grants Officer level) 
A56 
Grants Officer/Oral Questionnaire 
A. Quick review of organizational goals. 
1. Do you feel that your organisation feels pressure to offer programs and services that can be 
mostly funded by government grants? 
2. Do you feel that your organisation is more or less dependent on government grants? If so, 
in what ways has your organisation changed over time because of this dependency? 
3. How would you respond to the following statements from your fellow NGOs: 
a. Grant winners often exaggerate the best case scenarios they present to the 
government. 
b. Grant winners often overstate the problem areas they will be addressing. 
c. Grant winners often make up projects tailored to the government grants they are 
applying/or rather than seeking grants related to their current projects. 
4. In percentage terms, how successful is the organisation in obtaining all the government 
grants it has applied for from: 






5. What factors do you attribute to your organisation's success rate? Failure rate? 
6. Do you feel that competing for government grants with other NGOs makes your 
organisation less willing to partner ( or share data) with other NGOs? 
7. Do you believe that the compliance processes put in place with government grants are 
becoming more or less complex? If more complex, please give me an example of how 
this is affecting you, your staff, and your organization as a whole? 
8. Do you believe that the complexity of the entire government grants process keeps your 
organisation from researching and seeking funds from other sources? 
9. Given the current government grant requirements in total--in your opinion, is the 
government more interested in managing risk or in achieving specific outcomes? 
10. May we contact you about this survey for follow-up if needed? 
11. Would you like a copy of the summary report? 
B. Request to see a sample of Grant Filings since inception: 
a. Number of applications filed per year. 
b. Number of questions per application. 
c. Number of separate government fulfillment agencies mandated per grant. 
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Appendix 6: Written questionnaire (CEO level) 
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Higher Level Officer/Written Questionnaire 
1. Please answer as many of the following as you want. 









Organisation's website address 
(if applicable) 





The Australian Bureau of Statistics places Not-For-Profit organisations 
into one of 12 categories. Which of its categories below BEST 
describes the focus of your organization? Please tick just ONE box. 
D Culture and Recreation 
D Education and Research 
D Health 
D Social Services 
D Environment 
D Development and Housing 
D Law, Advocacy and Politics 
D Philanthropic Intermediaries and Voluntarism Promotion 
D International 
D Religion 
D Business and Professional Associations, Unions 
D Not Elsewhere Classified 
Please describe the key target groups that your organization 
focuses on. 
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4. Please indicate the total annual income for your organisation for the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011. 
D Less than $100,000 
D Between $100,000 and $1,000,000 
D Between $1,000,000 and $10,000,000 
D Over $10,000,000 
5. Please estimate how many paid and unpaid people work for your 
organisation. 
Paid staff (full-time equivalent) people 
Paid staff (part-time) people 
Voluntary staff (full-time equivalent) people 
Voluntary staff (part-time) people 
Paid Board/Management Committee people 
Voluntary Board/Management people Committee 
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6. Please estimate how many paid and unpaid people in your organisation 
work in the following areas. 


















7. Your organisation's primary source of funding in the financial year 
and/or calendar year 2010-2011 comes from which of the following? 
Please tick just ONE box. 
0 Commonwealth government 
0 State or territory government 
0 Local government 
0 Client fees 
0 Donations 
0 Corporate funding 
0 Self-funding 
Other income (e.g., management fees, interest, managed fund 





For the financial year and/or calendar year 2010-2011, please 
estimate the percentage of people accessing your services whose 
primary source of income was: 
Pensions & Benefits % 
Low Income Earners % 
Other Salary (Wage Earners) % 
Retirees % 
What other sources of income does your organisation receive from 
the government (Commonwealth, State, or Local) either on a 
regular or ad hoc basis? 
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10. Which government grant-related issue is your organisation MOST 
concerned about? Please tick just ONE box. 
D Figuring out which grants we should apply for takes too much time. 
D The application process is too complex. 
D We have to use specialized personnel to apply for grants. 
D The quality of help the government gives us during the application process. 
D The gaps that are left between the grants we get and the outcomes we would like to achieve. 
D The reporting requirements are too burdensome. 
D The reporting requirements are changing the very nature of our organisation (e.g., we are becoming more bureaucratic) 
D If we have to compete for grants, we have a harder time coordinatinq with other like-minded organisations. 
D The time we spend on grants means less time with our clients. 
D Other (please specify): 
Thank you for filling out this questionnaire! 




"Generally speaking, a calendar year begins on the New Year's Day of the 
given calendar system and ends on the day before the following New Year's 
Day." The Australian calendar year runs from January 1 through December 31. 
Calendar Year Because some grant periods can extend beyond the calendar year, the term 
"financial year and/or calendar year" has been adopted for this study. 
Calendar year. (2011, Jm1e 23). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 08:30, July 19, 
2011, from httn://en. wikioedia.org/w/index.oho?title=Calendar vear&oldid=43 5754842 
"Complexity theory has been used extensively in the field of strategic 
management and organizational studies .... In a CAS [complex adaptive system], 
the system and the agents co-evolve; the system lightly constrains agent 
Complexity 
behaviour, but the agents modify the system by their interaction with it." 
Complexity theory and organizations. (2011, June 1 ). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 
Retrieved 08:31, July 19, 2011, from 
h!m://en.wiki12edia.orgLw/index.QhQ?title=Com12lexi!Y theory and organizations&oldid=43208 
1625 
"A contract is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more parties 
with mutual obligations, which may or may not have elements in writing .... The 
remedy at law for breach of contract is usually "damages" or monetary 
Contract compensation. In equity, the remedy can be specific performance of the contract 
or an injunction." 
Contract. (2011, July 11). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 09:28, July 19, 2011, 
from httn:// en. wikioedia.ondw/index.oho?title=Contract&oldid=4 3 8870060 
A cooperative agreement is "a support mechanism used when there will be 
substantial ... [government] scientific or programmatic involvement. Substantial 
involvement means that, after award, scientific or program staff will assist, 
Cooperative guide, coordinate, or participate in project activities." 
Agreement 
FAQ -Applying for a Grant or Cooperative Agreement. (2010, December 7) In U .. S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, from 
h!m://www.fda.gov/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/Coo12erativeAgreementsCRADAsGrants/ 
ucm234535.htm#three 
"The Australian government's financial year begins on July 1 and concludes on 
June 30 of the following year. This applies for personal income tax and the 
federal budget, and most companies are required to use it as their own. The 
year ending on the 30th June, 2011 is referred to as "financial year 2010-11" or 
Financial Year sometimes just "financial year 2011 ". 
Because some grant periods can extend beyond the financial year, the term 
"financial year and/or calendar year" has been adopted for this study. 
Fiscal year. (2011, June 29). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 08:32, July 19, 
2011, from httn://en.wikioedia.on.>Jw/index.oho?title=Fiscal vear&oldid=436891149 








A government grant is "an award of financial assistance in the form of money 
by ... government to an eligible grantee with no expectation that the funds will 
be paid back. The term does not include technical assistance which provides 
services instead of money, or other assistance in the form of revenue sharing, 
loans, loan guarantees, interest subsidies, insurance, or direct appropriations." 
Contrast this definition with the more complex or legally binding mechanisms 
of a Contract, Cooperative Agreement, or Partnership Funding. 
Government Grants. In Entrepreneur.com Retrieved 08:33, July 19, 2011, from 
h ://www.entre reneur.com/enc clo edia/term/82162.html 
Partnership funding refers to "a grant or funding program where various 
"partners" have input into the project. In some cases, this may refer to joint 
funding between government and philanthropic sources. It may also refer to 
partners who give resources in kind." 
Partnership Funding (2007, July 24). In PhilanthropyWiki. Retrieved 08:34, July 19, 2011, 
from h :// hilanthro iki.or .au/index. h /Partnershi Fundin 
"The project budget is a prediction of the costs associated with a particular 
company [ or organizational] project. These costs include labor, materials, and 
other related expenses. The project budget is often broken down into specific 
tasks, with task budgets assigned to each." 
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Appendix 7: Oral interview questionnaire (CEO level) 
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Higher Level Officer/Oral Questionnaire 
A. Quick review of organisaional goals. 
I. Have your organisation's target groups changed since the NGO's inception? If yes, to what do 
you attribute this change? Has the organisation ever had to change its client base due to its 
success or failure to win Government grants? 
2. Do you feel that the organisation feels pressure to offer programs and services that can be 
mostly funded by government grants? 
3. How would you respond to the following statement? All the time and money this organization 
spends on grant applications, monitoring, and acquittals makes it harder for us to actually 
serve our client base. 
4. How would you respond to the following statement? The reporting requirements for grants 
are changing the very nature of our organisation (e.g., we are becoming more bureaucratic) 
in order to fulfill them. 
5. How would you respond to the following statement? Jf we are successful in obtaining 
significant government grants for particular programs, we are more likely to keep those 
programs going and apply for more grants to support them. 
6. How would you respond to the following statement? I would be less likely to partner with (or 
share data with) a fellow NGO who I know is competing for the same government grant as us. 
7. Would you say in general that the gaps that are left between the grants you get and the 
outcomes you would like to achieve are growing larger? If so, what do you do to handle such 
gaps? 
8. Has your organisation ever had to primarily focus on cost-cutting to handle such gaps, and if 
so, how did that affect your client programs? 
9. Do you believe that the compliance processes put in place with government grants are 
becoming more or less complex? If more complex, please give me an example of how 
this is affecting you, your staff, and your organization as a whole? 
10. Do you believe that the complexity of the entire government grants process keeps your 
organisation from researching and seeking funds from other sources? 
11. Given the current government grant requirements in total--in your opinion, is the government 
more interested in managing risk or in achieving specific outcomes? 
12. May we contact you about this survey for follow-up if needed? 
13. Would you like a copy of the summary report? 
B. Request to see sample of Mission & Client Statements since inception. 
Thank you for your assistance! 
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Appendix 8: Coding Pass I using NVivo I 0/Descriptive coding 
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Coding Pass 1 using NVivo 10: Descriptive Coding 
1. Bureaucracy/Culture 
2. Bureaucracy/Effects on Staff 
3. Bureaucracy/General Issues 
4. Bureaucracy/Grant Applications 
5. Community/Feedback on Programs 
6. Community/Impact of Programs 
7. Community/Involvement 
8. Complexity/Compliance Processes 
9. Complexity/Entirety of Grants Process 
10. Complexity/Government Decision Making 
11. Complexity/Reporting Issues 
12. Funding/Delays 
13. Funding/Funding Gap-Actions On 
14. Funding/Funding Gap (incl. existence of) 
15. Funding/Fundraising Sources (incl. lack of) 
16. Funding/Programs vs. Other 
17. Government/Changes in Personnel & Effects on NGO Projects 
18. Government/Contract Manager Behaviour 
19. Government/Contract Managers vs. Implementation Managers 
20. Government/Data Usage in Decision Making 
21. Government/Election Cycle & Effects on NGO Programs 
22. Government/Feedback via Compliance Reports 
23. Government/Managing Risk vs. Achieving Specific Outcomes 
24. Government/Public Policy Agendas & Effects on NGO Projects 
25. Government/Risk Management vs. Risk Elimination 
26. Government/Separate Fulfilment Agencies per Grant 
27. Grants/ Applications Filed 
28. Grants/Applications Formats 
29. Grants/As Cultural Change Agent 
30. Grants/Community or Suburb Specific 
31. Grants/Efficiency & Effectiveness 
32. Grants/Failures 
33. Grants/Failures to Apply 
34. Grants/Finding Grant Opportunities 
35. Grants/Grant Acquittals 
36. Grants/Grant Applications, Primary Responsibility For 
37. Grants/Grant Money Rollovers Year-To-Year 
38. Grants/In-the-field Monitoring of Effects 
39. Grants/Inter-government Technology Systems & Grant Format Requirements 
40. Grants/Intra-government Technology Systems & Grant Format Requirements 
41. Grants/Issues of Most Concern 
42. Grants/Grant Reporting Systems 
43. Grants/One-Time vs. Recurring 
44. Grants/Organisational Pressure 
45. Grants/Proposal Completion Activities 
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46. Grants/Questions per Application 
4 7. Grants/Reporting, Consistency 
48. Grants/Successes 
49. Grants/Time Spent on Grants Process vs. Time Serving Clients 
50. Grants/ Timing Effects on Other Org. Factors (e.g. leases, infrastructure, etc.) 
51. Grants/Timing Issues in Grants Process 
52. Grants Mid-Process/Criteria & Rule Changes 
53. Grants Mid-Process/Reporting Systems Changes 
54. Grants Mid-Process/Target Client Base Changes 
55. NFPs/Designation Issues 
56. NFPs/Justifications for Involvement 
57. NFPs/Other Tax Issues 
58. NFPs/Representativeness of Sector 
59. NFPs/Tax Concession Status 
60. NGOs/Alignment with Government Public Policy 
61. NGOs/ Alliances and Loss of Local Connections 
62. NGOs/Best Practices 
63. NGOs/Business Model vs. Social Model 
64. NGOs/Changing Client Base--Changing Service Delivery Model 
65. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Demographics 
66. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Lifestyles 
67. NGOs/Client Selection--General Issues 
68. NGOs/Client Statements 
69. NGOs/Community Relationships 
70. NGOs/Cost Cutting 
71. NGO/Credibility 
72. NGOs/Effects of Contract Duration 
73. NGOs/"Give Us the Suburb" vs. Projects 
74. NGOs/Inter-organisational Issues 
75. NGOs/Inter-state Issues 
76. NGOs/Interplay of Mission & Organisational Structure 
77. NGOs/Mission Statements 
78. NGOs/National vs. Local Scale 
79. NGOs/New Tendering Paradigms (Partnerships, Consortiums, Collaborative 
Submissions, Joint Submissions, Sector Approaches, etc.) 
80. NGOs/Organisational Goals 
81. NGOs/Partnerships 
82. NGOs/Peak Body Representation 
83. NGOs/Power Disparity 
84. NGOs/Program Continuity 
85. NGOs/Program & Projects Life Cycle 
86. NGOs/Projects 
87. NGOs/Publicity & Media Relationships 
88. NGOs/Service Modelling 
89. NGOs/Shared Sector Research 
A71 
90. NGOs/Size Disparity 
91. NGOs/Stakeholder Linkages 
92. NGOs &. Government/Sector Expertise 
93. NGOs & Government/Personnel Movement Between 
94. NGOs & Government/Relationship Issues 
95. NGOs & Government/Technology Differences 
96. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Boundaries 
97. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Competitive Neutrality 
98. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Tender Competition 
99. Staff/Development 
100. Staff/Expertise 
101. Staff/Grant Writers 
102. Staff/Management 
103. Staff/Other Staff Issues (e.g., Morale, Retention, Work Roles) 
104. Staff/Sustainable Employment 
105. Staff/Understanding Organisational Model 
106. Unintended Consequences/Bureaucracy 
107. Unintended Consequences/Competitive Environment 
108. Unintended Consequences/Exaggeration of Best Case Scenarios 
109. Unintended Consequences/Gaming Behaviour 
110. Unintended Consequences/Grants Applications 
111. Unintended Consequences/Grants Dependency 
112. Unintended Consequences/Mission 
113. Unintended Consequences/Mistrust 
114. Unintended Consequences/Overstating Problem Areas 
115. Unintended Consequences/Reporting Issues 
116. Unintended Consequences/Systemic Change 
117. Unintended Consequences/Tailoring Projects to Grants 
118. Unpaid Workers/General Issues 
119. Unpaid Workers/Social Inclusion Issues 
120. Unpaid Workers/Status 
121. Unpaid Workers/Value Of 
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Appendix 9: Coding Pass 2 using NYivo IO/Interpretive Coding 
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Coding Pass 2 Using NVivo 10: Interpretive Coding 
1. Alliances 
2. Client Issues 
3. Complexity in the Grants Process 
4. Compliance Burdens 
5. Funding 
6. Grants Process 
7. Perceptions of Government 
8. Perceptions of Itself 
9. Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
10. Programs/Projects 
11. Staff Issues 
12. Unexpected Consequences 
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Appendix 10: Coding Pass 2 including nodes from Pass I 
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Coding Pass 2 including nodes from Pass 1 
1. Alliances 
61. NGOs/Alliances and Loss of Local Connections 
79. NGOs/New Tendering Paradigms (Partnerships, Consortiums, Collaborative 
Submissions, Joint Submissions, Sector Approaches, etc.) 
81. NGOs/Partnerships 
83. NGOs/Power Disparity 
89. NGOs/Shared Sector Research 
90. NGOs/Size Disparity 
96. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Boundaries 
97. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Competitive Neutrality 
98. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Tender Competition 
107. Unintended Consequences/Competitive Environment 
113. Unintended Consequences/Mistrust 
2. Client Issues 
54. Grants Mid-Process/Target Client Base Changes 
63. NGOs/Business Model vs. Social Model 
64. NGOs/Changing Client Base--Changing Service Delivery Model 
65. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Demographics 
66. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Lifestyles 
67. NGOs/Client Selection--General Issues 
68. NGOs/Client Statements 
76. NGOs/Interplay of Mission & Organisational Structure 
80. NGOs/Organisational Goals 
84. NGOs/Program Continuity 
85. NGOs/Program & Projects Life Cycle 
86. NGOs/Projects 
3. Complexity in the Grants Process 
1. Bureaucracy/Culture 
2. Bureaucracy/Effects on Staff 
3. Bureaucracy/General Issues 
4. Bureaucracy/Grant Applications 
8. Complexity/Compliance Processes 
9. Complexity/Entirety of Grants Process 
I 0. Complexity/Government Decision Making 
11. Complexity/Reporting Issues 
31. Grants/Efficiency & Effectiveness 
39. Grants/Inter-government Technology Systems & Grant Format Requirements 
40. Grants/Intra-government Technology Systems & Grant Format Requirements 
41. Grants/Issues of Most Concern 
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42. Grants/Grant Reporting Systems 
95. NGOs & Governmentffechnology Differences 
4. Compliance Burdens 
I. Bureaucracy/Culture 
2. Bureaucracy/Effects on Staff 
3. Bureaucracy/General Issues 
4. Bureaucracy/Grant Applications 
8. Complexity/Compliance Processes 
9. Complexity/Entirety of Grants Process 
10. Complexity/Government Decision Making 
11. Complexity/Reporting Issues 
17. Government/Changes in Personnel & Effects on NGO Projects 
18. Government/Contract Manager Behaviour 
19. Government/Contract Managers vs. Implementation Managers 
20. Government/Data Usage in Decision Making 
21. Government/Election Cycle & Effects on NGO Programs 
22. Government/Feedback via Compliance Reports 
23. Government/Managing Risk vs. Achieving Specific Outcomes 
24. Government/Public Policy Agendas & Effects on NGO Projects 
25. Government/Risk Management vs. Risk Elimination 
26. Government/Separate Fulfilment Agencies per Grant 
84. NGOs/Program Continuity 
85. NGOs/Program & Projects Life Cycle 
86. NGOs/Projects 
98. Public Sector vs. Private Sectorff ender Competition 
107. Unintended Consequences/Competitive Environment 
5. Funding 
12. Funding/Delays 
13. Funding/Funding Gap-Actions On 
14. Funding/Funding Gap (incl. existence of) 
15. Funding/Fundraising Sources (incl. lack of) 
16. Funding/Programs vs. Other 
80. NGOs/Organisational Goals 
81. NGOs/Partnerships 
84. NGOs/Program Continuity 
85. NGOs/Program & Projects Life Cycle 
86. NGOs/Projects 
99. Staff/Development 
I 00. Staff/Expertise 
IO 1. Staff/Grant Writers 
102. Staff/Management 
103. Staff/Other Staff Issues (e.g., Morale, Retention, Work Roles) 
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104. Staff/Sustainable Employment 
105. Staff/Understanding Organisational Model 
6. Grants Process 
27. Grants/Applications Filed 
28. Grants/Applications Formats 
29. Grants/As Cultural Change Agent 
30. Grants/Community or Suburb Specific 
31. Grants/Efficiency & Effectiveness 
32. Grants/Failures 
33. Grants/Failures to Apply 
34. Grants/Finding Grant Opportunities 
35. Grants/Grant Acquittals 
36. Grants/Grant Applications, Primary Responsibility For 
37. Grants/Grant Money Rollovers Year-To-Year 
38. Grants/In-the-field Monitoring of Effects 
39. Grants/Inter-government Technology Systems & Grant Format Requirements 
40. Grants/Intra-government Technology Systems & Grant Format Requirements 
41. Grants/Issues of Most Concern 
42. Grants/Grant Reporting Systems 
43. Grants/One-Time vs. Recurring 
44. Grants/Organisational Pressure 
45. Grants/Proposal Completion Activities 
46. Grants/Questions per Application 
4 7. Grants/Reporting, Consistency 
48. Grants/Successes 
49. Grants/Time Spent on Grants Process vs. Time Serving Clients 
50. Grants/ Timing Effects on Other Org. Factors (e.g. leases, infrastructure, etc.) 
51. Grants/Timing Issues in Grants Process 
52. Grants Mid-Process/Criteria & Rule Changes 
53. Grants Mid-Process/Reporting Systems Changes 
54. Grants Mid-Process/Target Client Base Changes 
. 62. NGOs/Best Practices 
79. NGOs/New Tendering Paradigms (Partnerships, Consortiums, Collaborative 
Submissions, Joint Submissions, Sector Approaches, etc.) 
81. NGOs/Partnerships 
83. NGOs/Power Disparity 
89. NGOs/Shared Sector Research 
90. NGOs/Size Disparity 
96. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Boundaries 
97. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Competitive Neutrality 
98. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Tender Competition 
99. StafVDevelopment 
100. StaWExpertise 
101. Staff/Grant Writers 
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103. Staff/Other Staff Issues (e.g., Morale, Retention, Work Roles) 
104. Staff/Sustainable Employment 
105. Staff/Understanding Organisational Model 
106. Unintended Consequences/Bureaucracy 
107. Unintended Consequences/Competitive Environment 
108. Unintended Consequences/Exaggeration of Best Case Scenarios 
109. Unintended Consequences/Gaming Behaviour 
110. Unintended Consequences/Grants Applications 
111. Unintended Consequences/Grants Dependency 
112. Unintended Consequences/Mission 
113. Unintended Consequences/Mistrust 
114. Unintended Consequences/Overstating Problem Areas 
115. Unintended Consequences/Reporting Issues 
116. Unintended Consequences/Systemic Change 
117. Unintended Consequences/Tailoring Projects to Grants 
7. Perceptions of Government 
4. Bureaucracy/Grant Applications 
17. Government/Changes in Personnel & Effects on NGO Projects 
18. Government/Contract Manager Behaviour 
19. Government/Contract Managers vs. Implementation Managers 
20. Government/Data Usage in Decision Making 
21. Government/Election Cycle & Effects on NGO Programs 
22. Government/Feedback via Compliance Reports 
23. Government/Managing Risk vs. Achieving Specific Outcomes 
24. Government/Public Policy Agendas & Effects on NGO Projects 
25. Government/Risk Management vs. Risk Elimination 
26. Government/Separate Fulfilment Agencies per Grant 
34. Grants/Finding Grant Opportunities 
35. Grants/Grant Acquittals 
42. Grants/Grant Reporting Systems 
74. NGOs/Inter-organisational Issues 
75. NGOs/Inter-state Issues 
92. NGOs &. Government/Sector Expertise 
93. NGOs & Government/Personnel Movement Between 
94. NGOs & Government/Relationship Issues 
95. NGOs & Government/Technology Differences 
100. Staff/Expertise 
101. Staff/Grant Writers 
8. Perceptions of Itself 
1. Bureaucracy/Culture 
2. Bureaucracy/Effects on Staff 
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3. Bureaucracy/General Issues 
4. Bureaucracy/Grant Applications 
5. Community/Feedback on Programs 
6. Community/Impact of Programs 
7. Community/Involvement 
55. NFPs/Designation Issues 
56. NFPs/Justifications for Involvement 
57. NFPs/Other Tax Issues 
58. NFPs/Representativeness of Sector 
59. NFPs/Tax Concession Status 
60. NGOs/Alignment with Government Public Policy 
61. NGOs/Alliances and Loss of Local Connections 
62. NGOs/Best Practices 
63. NGOs/Business Model vs. Social Model 
64. NGOs/Changing Client Base--Changing Service Delivery Model 
65. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Demographics 
66. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Lifestyles 
67. NGOs/Client Selection--General Issues 
68. NGOs/Client Statements 
69. NGOs/Community Relationships 
70. NGOs/Cost Cutting 
71. NGO/Credibility 
72. NGOs/Effects of Contract Duration 
73. NGOs/"Give Us the Suburb" vs. Projects 
74. NGOs/Inter-organisational Issues 
75. NGOs/Inter-state Issues 
76. NGOs/Interplay of Mission & Organisational Structure 
77. NGOs/Mission Statements 
78. NGOs/National vs. Local Scale 
79. NGOs/New Tendering Paradigms (Partnerships, Consortiums, Collaborative 
Submissions, Joint Submissions, Sector Approaches, etc.) 
80. NGOs/Organisational Goals 
81. NGOs/Partnerships 
82. NGOs/Peak Body Representation 
83. NGOs/Power Disparity 
84. NGOs/Program Continuity 
85. NGOs/Program & Projects Life Cycle 
86. NGOs/Projects 
87. NGOs/Publicity & Media Relationships 
88. NGOs/Service Modelling 
89. NGOs/Shared Sector Research 
90. NGOs/Size Disparity 
91. NGOs/Stakeholder Linkages 
92. NGOs &. Government/Sector Expertise 
93. NGOs & Government/Personnel Movement Between 
A80 
94. NGOs & Government/Relationship Issues 
95. NGOs & Government/Technology Differences 
96. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Boundaries 
97. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Competitive Neutrality 
98. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Tender Competition 
99. Staff/Development 
100. Staff7Expertise 
10 I. Staff/Grant Writers 
102. Staff/Management 
103. Staff/Other Staff Issues (e.g., Morale, Retention, Work Roles) 
104. Staff/Sustainable Employment 
105. Staff/Understanding Organisational Model 
9. Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
5. Community/Feedback on Programs 
6. Community/Impact of Programs 
7. Community/Involvement 
69. NGOs/Community Relationships 
72. NGOs/Effects of Contract Duration 
73. NGOs/"Give Us the Suburb" vs. Projects 
81. NGOs/Partnerships 
82. NGOs/Peak Body Representation 
83. NGOs/Power Disparity 
87. NGOs/Publicity & Media Relationships 
88. NGOs/Service Modelling 
89. NGOs/Shared Sector Research 
90. NGOs/Size Disparity 
91. NGOs/Stakeholder Linkages 
92. NGOs &. Government/Sector Expertise 
96. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Boundaries 
97. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Competitive Neutrality 
98. Public Sector vs. Private Sector/Tender Competition 
103. Staff/Other Staff Issues (e.g., Morale, Retention, Work Roles) 
107. Unintended Consequences/Competitive Environment 
113. Unintended Consequences/Mistrust 
118. Unpaid Workers/General Issues 
10. Programs/Projects 
17. Government/Changes in Personnel & Effects on NGO Projects 
21. Government/Election Cycle & Effects on NGO Programs 
24. Government/Public Policy Agendas & Effects on NGO Projects 
25. Government/Risk Management vs. Risk Elimination 
62. NGOs/Best Practices 
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70. NGOs/Cost Cutting 
73. NGOs/"Give Us the Suburb" vs. Projects 
84. NGOs/Program Continuity 
85. NGOs/Program & Projects Life Cycle 
86. NGOs/Projects 
87. NGOs/Publicity & Media Relationships 
108. Unintended Consequences/Exaggeration of Best Case Scenarios 
109. Unintended Consequences/Gaming Behaviour 
111. Unintended Consequences/Grants Dependency 
112. Unintended Consequences/Mission 
114. Unintended Consequences/Overstating Problem Areas 
11. Staff Issues 
62. NGOs/Best Practices 
63. NGOs/Business Model vs. Social Model 
64. NGOs/Changing Client Base-:-Changing Service Delivery Model 
65. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Demographics 
66. NGOs/Client Selection--Changing Lifestyles 
67. NGOs/Client Selection--General Issues 
68. NGOs/Client Statements 
69. NGOs/Community Relationships 
92. NGOs &. Government/Sector Expertise 
93. NGOs & Government/Personnel Movement Between 
94. NGOs & Government/Relationship Issues 
99. Staff/Development 
100. Staff/Expertise 
101. Staff7Grant Writers 
102. Staff/Management 
103. Staff70ther Staff Issues (e.g., Morale, Retention, Work Roles) 
104. Staff/Sustainable Employment 
105. Staff7Understanding Organisational Model 
I 18. Unpaid Workers/General Issues 
119. Unpaid Workers/Social Inclusion Issues 
120. Unpaid Workers/Status 
121. Unpaid Workers/Value Of 
12. Unexpected Consequences 
29. Grants/ As Cultural Change Agent 
41. Grants/Issues of Most Concern 
106. Unintended Consequences/Bureaucracy 
107. Unintended Consequences/Competitive Environment 
108. Unintended Consequences/Exaggeration of Best Case Scenarios 
I 09. Unintended Consequences/Gaming Behaviour 
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110. Unintended Consequences/Grants Applications 
1 I l. Unintended Consequences/Grants Dependency 
112. Unintended Consequences/Mission 
113. Unintended Consequences/Mistrust 
114. Unintended Consequences/Overstating Problem Areas 
115. Unintended Consequences/Reporting Issues 
116. Unintended Consequences/Systemic Change 
117. Unintended Consequences/Tailoring Projects to Grants 
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Appendix 11: Coding Pass 3 using NVivo IO/Abstract coding 
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Coding Pass 3 Using NVivo 10: Abstract Coding 
1. Setting Organisational Mission (including Iterative Selection of Target Base for Services) 
2. Maintaining Organisational Attractiveness for Funding Opportunities 
3. NGO's Perceptions of Itself & Other Stakeholders in the Government Grants Process 
4. Fundraising Activities/ Adjustments to Funding Gaps 
a. Strategy # 1: Additional Funding 
b. Strategy #2: Adjust Programs or Service Recipients 
c. Strategy #3: Adjust Organisational Focus 
d. Strategy #4: Cost Cutting 
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Appendix 12: Coding Pass 3 including nodes from Pass 2 
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Coding Pass 3 including categories from Pass 2 
I. Setting Organisational Mission (including Iterative Selection of Target Base for Services) 
• Client Issues 
• Funding 
• Perceptions of Government 
• Perceptions of Itself 
• Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
• Programs/Projects 
• Staff Issues 
2. Maintaining Organisational Attractiveness for Funding Opportunities 
• Alliances 
• Client Issues 
• Funding 
• Grants Process 
• Perceptions of Government 
• Perceptions of Itself 
• Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
• Programs/Projects 
• Staff Issues 
3. NGO's Perceptions of Itself & Other Stakeholders in the Government Grants Process 
• Alliances 
• Client Issues 
• Complexity in the Grants Process 
• Funding 
• Grants Process 
• Perceptions of Government 
• Perceptions of Itself 
• Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
• Programs/Projects 
• Staff Issues 
4. Fundraising Activities/Adjustments to Funding Gaps 
• Client Issues 
• Complexity in the Grants Process 
• Compliance Burdens 
• Funding 
• Grants Process 
• Perceptions of Government 
• Perceptions of Itself 
• Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
• Programs/Projects 
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• Staff Issues 
a. Strategy # 1: Additional Funding 
o Alliances 
o Complexity in the Grants Process 
o Compliance Burdens 
o Grants Process 
o Grants Dependency 
o Staff Issues 
o Unexpected Consequences 
b. Strategy #2: Adjust Programs or Service Recipients 
o Client Issues 
o Complexity in the Grants Process 
o Compliance Burdens 
o Funding 
o Grants Process 
o Perceptions of Itself 
o Programs/Projects 
o Staff Issues 
o Unexpected Consequences 
c. Strategy #3: Adjust Organisational Focus 
o Alliances 
o Client Issues 
o Complexity in the Grants Process 
,o Compliance Burdens 
o Funding 
o Grants Process 
o Perceptions of Itself 
o Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
o Programs/Projects 
o Staffissues 
o Unexpected Consequences 
d. Strategy #4: Cost Cutting 
o Client Issues 
o Complexity in the Grants Process 
o Compliance Burdens 
o Funding 
o Grants Process 
o Perceptions of Itself 
o Staff Issues 
o Unexpected Consequences 
A88 






At our interview of [Interview Date], you indicated that you would like to receive the 
Summary Report that went along with the research being undertaken into the public sector 
grant system. I am pleased to provide that summary herein and if you are interested in 
reading a fuller account, the research will be submitted toward the end of this year as a 
doctoral thesis entitled, Public Sector Grants: An Analysis of Complexity in Modem Public 
Administration, to the University of Tasmania and, if accepted, would become available in 
their library. 
Thank you for your time and input into this effort. I hope the report can at least aid in the 
important conversation surrounding the issues of NGO funding. I would appreciate your 
feedback on the summary report. How well does it match your day-to-day experiences? 
Would you like to suggest any changes? Please send all commentary to me at the address 
above or feel free to contact me at petergeorgelas@hotmail.com. 
Kind regards, 
Peter Georgelas 
[OPTIONAL] P.S. Thank you for letting me borrow your organisation's annual report(s). I 
have returned [it/them] in this mailing. 
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Summary Report 
This research was undertaken to better understand how the public sector grants system 
functions as a system. That is to say, how does the interplay between NGOs, Government, 
Service Clients, Funding Sources, Communities, and a wide range of other stakeholders 
affect each other? It also seeks to recommend ways of furthering research along this line of 
mqmry. 
The Grants "System" 
The research draws attention to the following attributes ohhis system: 
1. Government (local, state, & federal] is the primary source of funding for NGOs. 
2. Government typically funds NGO "programs" or "projects"-not staff development 
or recurring costs. 
3. Government interest in a service client base and the programs to serve them changes 
frequently over time. [In terms of definition, there is a significant difference in the 
Clients that are the target of government grants, Clients served by NGOs, and needy 
Clients at large.] 
4. Government funding is usually tied into the political cycle-e.g., grants of a duration 
of three years or less in Tasmania. 
5. Government seeks to reduce funding risk by ever-increasing reporting and compliance 
standards--complexity that is particularly burdensome to smaller NGOs. 
6. Government is not a monolith. Different standards and reporting systems can exist 
within a government department, between departments, between interstate 
government entities, etc. 
7. NGOs can respond to shortfalls in program funding either by shifting resources 
internally, or they can respond in one or more of the following ways: 
a. Obtain additional funding. 
b. Adjust their "reach," usually on a program or client basis, form partnerships, 
or subcontract out service delivery. 
c. Cut costs. 
d. Get better at grant funding activities in the long-term. 
e. Form longer-term partnerships or service delivery subcontracting 
arrangements. 
Unintended Consequences 
Each of the NGO responses to a shortfall can help create "system archetypes," or patterned 
behaviour which is really a set of unintended consequences of the grants system: 
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l. The "easiest" way to make up a shortfall is to apply for additional grants-this 
dependence of government grants can blind an organisation to other funding 
opportunities. 
2. Where there is no opportunity for partnership or sector grant applications, government 
grants are a zero-sum game. This makes other NGOs into natural competitors for 
government grants and can lead to a perception that competition is a barrier to 
alliances and to the sharing of data amongst NGOs. 
3. One way for NGOs to "push back" against the rules (which are primarily set by 
Government) is to game the system as Liddel Willaims of Cat Haven points out in her 
response to the Productivity Commission's report, "Contribution of the Not for Profit 
Sector": "Almost every grant we apply for wants to fund a 'project'. We battle every 
day just to carry out our core business and to keep volunteers to enable us to do this. 
Other Grants will not fund everyday running costs. We are getting better at creativity 
with respect to how our huge vet account can become a 'project'." 
4. NGOs are hampered by not knowing which of their current or developing projects 
will be "grant worthy". If a project suddenly becomes grant-worthy, then it has the 
potential to drain resources away from other ( even long-standing successful) projects. 
This archetype is called Success to the Successful but in this case, success is 
measured by the acquisition of grant funding not on objective standards of project 
efficacy. 
5. Another side effect of grant dependency is called Drifting Goals, which is a "drifting 
away" from target clients to grant-worthy clients. In other words, the gap between an 
individual NGO's target clients (clients targeted through the organisational mission), 
grant-worthy clients (clients that the government grants favor), and (potential) clients 
not covered ( or under-covered) under grant guidelines would be growing over time as 
ever-changing social conditions produce more variety in those that could benefit from 
service delivery and there is an inevitable delay in the change of client focus by 
NGOs and Government. 
6. Although there is no fundamental reason a NGO cannot achieve a more balanced 
outcome, NGOs over time can be pushed onto a track of either offering high quality 
client services or evolving to become highly efficient in acquiring funding. In part 
this is a response to a natural impulse to hire and maintain larger and more dedicated 
staffs around the money-raising side of the organization, because more professional 
staffs are able to fill out grant applications more efficiently, complete more and a 
wider range of applications, and are able to handle the increased number of reporting 
and compliance mechanisms that successful grant awards bring. 
7. Those NGOs who are forced into a long-term cycle of cost cutting are also subject to 
Drifting Goals. The NGO can expect a gradual degradation of quality services since 
maintaining high quality service delivery requires such a large investment in both 
personnel training and quality process development. Serious degradation in services 
over time would reinforce a funding gap leading to another potential vicious cycle and 
a downward spiral. Outsourcing service delivery also has the potential for altering the 
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8. organisation's key values and mission, thus having ramifications for issues of morale, 
retention, and funding. 
Recommendations 
The research recommends that all of the stakeholders of the public grants system be made 
aware of the potential unintended consequences inherent in the system design. It is hoped 
that this awareness can lead to a discussion on how best to alter the grants system in the 21st 
century to make this public policy tool more efficient and effective. Some key questions 
which may help initiate this discussion could be: 
1. What role should competition and cooperation amongst NGOs play in the system? 
2. Is there a better way to assess the aggregate effect of multiple programs from multiple 
NGOs on a community over time? 
3. Is there a more "healthy" mix of funding sources that each NGO should strive for? 
4. Should NGOs found to be gaming the system be censored in some way? 
5. Should grants be less program-specific and more open-ended allowing more freedom 
by the NGOs to use the money as they see fit? 
6. Is there a natural NGO lifecycle? Is a focus on service quality for a particular client 
base truly sustainable over time? 
7. Is there an optimum number ofNGOs in a community of a certain size and 
demographic makeup that takes into account diversity in mission, client base, NGO 
staff levels and scope? 
8. Are Government-enforced partnerships/collaborations for grant applications a good 
example of collective NGO behaviour or are other models (e.g., Collective Impact --
http://www.fsg.org/OurApproach/WhatisCollectiveimpact.aspx) a better framework? 
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